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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three studies. Each study examines the role of trade
costs for some facet of trade or nance, thus partly addressing a number of the Six Puzzles
of International Economics highlighted by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000). The rst one studies
ination targeting by the Bank of Canada, in the context of a small open economy subject to
trade costs. The second one develops a partial equilibrium gravity model and estimates key
trade and trade cost elasticities, previously not separately identied. The nal one develops
a general equilibrium trade model across cities with traded goods and a distribution sector
in each city. We explain the details of each study in the following sections.
Is there a Role for Trade Costs in Explaining the Central Bank
Behavior?
The goal of this study is to address the following question: What is the role of
trade costs in monetary policy? This question is important, because as is well known, the
actions of a central bank play a big role in the overall performance of an economy. More
specically, a sound economic environment (in which the ination rate should be low) can be
obtained only through accurate economic policies determined by central banks. Otherwise,
an economy can experience devastating business cycles just like the U.S. economy had
experienced during the Great Depreciation or World War II. In order to determine which
monetary policy is right and which monetary policy is wrong, a central bank authority
has to consider what is going on in the economy. The situation of an economy can be
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determined through its dynamics mainly consisting of two agents: individuals and rms.
Since the behaviour of these agents is a¤ected by trade costs, the central bank needs to take
trade costs into account when framing its policy decisions.
The role of trade costs has not been considered in the literature when evaluating
the performance of central banks. This is surprising given the long-standing emphasis of
trade costs in international trade and nance models. This study is intended to bridge the
gap and show that trade costs may play an important rule in the actions of central banks.
We investigate whether or not central banks, especially the Bank of Canada, take trade
costs into account when they alter their policy instruments. Canada is chosen because it
is a small open economy, open to shocks in trade costs, especially the shocks in oil prices.
Approximately 36% of consumption in Canada is imported. Moreover, Canada has explicitly
targeted ination since 1991. In sum, Canada is an appropriate case study given the focus
of the model.
Turning to the details, the model boils down to two main equations, an IS curve
(an indicator for the behaviour of individuals) and a New-Keynesian Phillips curve (an
indicator for the behaviour of rms). These two equations help dene the current economic
situation and the policy reaction function of the central bank.
We estimate these equations using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
and use the resulting equations to consider both the welfare e¤ects of existing policy action
by the Bank of Canada and to evaluate historical policy in comparison to optimal policy,
conditional on the model. When a utility-based expected loss function is considered, the
central bank is found to be far from being optimal in its actions, independent of trade costs.
This suggests that a utility-based expected loss function may not be what the central bank
of Canada uses when deciding on monetary policy. When an ad hoc expected loss function
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considering the volatilities in ination, output and interest rate is considered, it is found
that the actions of the central bank are explained best when trade costs in fact exist but the
central bank ignores them. Given the ad hoc loss function, the actions of the central bank
are best explained when 70% of weight is assigned to ination, 15% of weight to interest
rate and 15% of weight to output.
Understanding Interstate Trade Patterns
What is the main motivation behind intranational trade? Compared to relatively
complex models in the literature, this study contributes to the debate using a partial equi-
librium model to analyze the motivations behind bilateral trade patterns of regions within
the U.S. at the disaggregated level. We attempt to nd why regions import more goods
from some regions while importing less from others. The main determinants of trade in the
model are geography, distance and technology di¤erences.
In particular, we study a monopolistic competition model consisting of a nite
number of regions with two types of goods, traded and non-traded. Each region produces
and consumes a unique non-traded good. Each region may also consume all varieties of all
traded goods while producing one variety of each traded good. While the traded goods are
produced by a perfectly mobile unique factor, the only non-traded good in each region is
produced by the same mobile factor together with traded intermediate inputs.
We show that the trade of a variety of a particular traded good across any two
regions depends on the relative price of the variety and the total demand (nal consumption
demand plus intermediate input demand) of the good in the destination (importer) region.
This is standard. The contribution comes into the picture when the ratio between imports
of varieties from di¤erent origins (exporters) are considered.
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We show that the estimated model o¤ers numerous insights:
 There is no identication problem in terms of separately estimating the elasticity of
substitution across varieties of a good and the elasticity of distance at the same time.
 The methodology avoids possible upward bias in the distance measures (due to using
calculated distances, such as great circle) mentioned by Hillberry and Hummels (2001).
 The model is also capable of controlling for the e¤ects of local (i.e., wholesale and
retail) distribution costs, insurance costs, local taxes, international trade (under rea-
sonable assumptions), and intermediate input trade, each of which are heavily debated
and largely unresolved in the existing literature (see Anderson and vanWincoop 2004).
 The analytical solution for bilateral trade ows obviates the need for income data
given the technology levels.
The model is estimated using bilateral trade data across U.S. states. The estimated
parameters correspond to: a) the elasticity of substitution across varieties of a good, each
produced in a di¤erent region; b) the elasticity of distance, which governs good specic trade
costs; and c) the heterogeneity of individual tastes, such as home-bias. Several empirical
strategies are pursued and sensitivity analysis is conducted. Overall, the model is capable
of explaining the interstate trade data up to 60% at the disaggregate level.
The estimated parameters provide insights about U.S. interstate trading patterns
that mostly contrast with international patterns: a) compared to empirical international
studies, the elasticity of substitution is lower intranationally; b) compared to empirical
international studies, the elasticity of distance is higher intranationally; c) there is evidence
for home-bias even at the intranational level; d) trade costs are mostly good specic even
at the intranational level; e) source specic xed e¤ects are important for bilateral trade
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patterns, which is usually ignored in the literature; f) production technologies are both good
and region specic rather than country specic.
A Model of International Cities: Implications for Real Exchange Rates
This study develops and estimates a novel theory of trade which extends the proto-
type trade model to include a retail and distribution market sector. The competitive trade
model assumes that goods are shipped from the foreign factory gate to the nal consumer;
as such the price di¤erence across two locations equals a shipping cost plus a distortion due
to trade policy, such as an import tari¤, unless the good is duty free. This extension to
existing theory is necessary for two reasons.
The rst reason to extend existing trade models is driven by empirical evidence.
The observed deviations of prices across locations at the level of retail goods and services
have been shown to exceed what may be reasonably attributed to shipping costs and tari¤
barriers. That is, the magnitudes of international shipping costs and tari¤ barriers are
insu¢ cient to account for the bulk of international price dispersion that we observe. This
is particularly evident when the less developed nations are brought into the analysis.
The second reason is more theoretical. Analysis to date has focused on highly
traded manufactured goods, which represent less than 20 percent of employment and gross
national product while ignoring the service and distribution sector. Thus, the existing mod-
els and empirical studies have omitted the bulk of economic activity as well as the economic
interactions that take place across traded and non-traded goods. For example, medical
services are largely non-traded and yet used traded goods as inputs. Thus the interaction
of the traded and non-traded sectors is an important dimension of price determination and
trade ows.
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The model follows the existing literature in assuming specialization in the manu-
facturing sector. Since we are referring to a single good and city given the empirical focus
of the work, this specialization assumption is more innocuous in this setting than when it
is imposed in national level analysis at higher levels of aggregation across sectors. That is,
it is more plausible that a region of a country supplies much of the world market with a
brand of a particular good than it is for a nation to dominate the world market in an entire
sector. By choosing to disaggregate more in the good and location dimension, our model
will have some of the avour of the increasingly popular models of variety.
The more novel element is to have a second economic agent in each city (the rst
is the producer of the traded good) that e¤ectively shops the world for the best deals and
o¤ers all the goods for sale in the local retail market. This brings in the distribution sector
as a time allocation problem at the local level and allows us also to capture both retail
services and labour allocated to locally produced services such as medicine and education.
Thus, if much of the local available pool of labour is allocated to services, less labour is
available to produce traded goods for the purpose of international exchange. The model
structure captures the direct and indirect economic interactions between traded and local
inputs at the level of individual goods and services in a general equilibrium context.
We incorporate productivity at the city level in both the retail sector and the
individual good that the city exports to other cities. Thus each location has two productivity
variables, one that a¤ects its e¢ ciency in production of the traded good and one that a¤ects
its e¢ ciency across the entire retail sector. The former will alter the price of a good relative
to all other goods in the consumption basket in a similar way across locations; the latter
will alter the relative price level (e.g. the CPI index) across locations. These two margins
allow the model to capture more of the price dispersion at the retail level than models with
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a single sector or only two production locations.
The data used to quantify the implications of theory as well as test its validity
are the Economist Intelligence Unit worldwide surveys of retail prices. The data contains
price information about 301 goods and services in 123 international cities annually between
1990 and 2005. This is the best available data that includes price data from 79 di¤erent
countries as well as data from cities within the same countries. In this way, we can compare
the price dispersion across countries (e.g., the US vs. Canada) and within countries (e.g.,
New York vs. Los Angeles) empirically after controlling for exchange rate di¤erences. The
intranational dimension allows us to isolate international commercial policy and exchange
rate e¤ects from factors that drive price di¤erences both within and across countries, such as
the distribution sector, shipping costs and markups. Markups are the price margins retailers
charge over and above the marginal cost of the good. In our competitive model they are
ignored, in our empirical work we treat them as residuals. Thus, we are not attempting to
explain all of price dispersion with the competitive model we develop, but the fraction not
attributable to markup di¤erences across locations.
What we explain is a large fraction of what we see in the data, however. The
empirical results show that our model is capable of explaining the price dispersion across
123 cities up to 80%, the remaining is attributed to markups and measurement error. This
suggests that price di¤erences are indeed due to trade costs and retail costs, a very promising
result for the modelling approach we take.
Parsing this explained variation into trade costs and location specic retail costs,
we nd their relative contribution depends on the geography of locations pooled together.
That is, if we take locations within the same country as opposed to cross-border pairs, the
variance and its component decomposition changes dramatically. For cross-border pairs
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(respectively, locations within the same country), on average, we nd trade costs account
for 51 (respectively, 56) percent of the variance, distribution costs account for about 11
(respectively, 10) percent. Since the micro-data we use is skewed toward traded goods, we
also decompose the variance for cross-border pairs (respectively, locations within the same
country) based on the median good on an expenditure weight based; the tables turn, with
distribution accounting for 43 (respectively, 15) percent and trade costs 36 (respectively,
60) percent.
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CHAPTER II
IS THERE A ROLE FOR TRADE COSTS IN EXPLAINING THE CENTRAL BANK
BEHAVIOR?
Introduction
Research on ination targeting and monetary policy has focused on explaining
the actual central bank behavior.1 But, is there a role for trade costs in explaining this
behavior? This chapter attempts to answer this question using a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model (DGSE) with the addition of trade costs shocks to an otherwise standard
New-Keynesian model of the Bank of Canada monetary policy. A New-Keynesian Phillips
curve, together with the monetary policy rule of the Bank of Canada, is estimated for the
Canadian economy. In order to analyze the e¤ects of trade costs on monetary policy, we
consider versions of the model, with and without trade cots. It is found that, under a
utility-based expected loss function, the Bank of Canada appears to be far from optimal in
its actions, independent of trade costs. In contrast, under an ad hoc expected loss function,
the actions of the Bank of Canada are explained best when trade costs in fact exist, but
the Bank of Canada ignores them. We also show that, given the ad hoc loss function,
the actions of the Bank of Canada are best explained when 70% of weight is assigned to
ination, 15% of weight to interest rate and 15% of weight to output.
1See Taylor (1993, 2000), Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida et al. (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001), Judd and
Rudebusch (1998), Ball (1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999), McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001), Walsh
(1999), Nelson (2000), Erceg et al. (2000), Svensson (2000), Dib (2001, 2003), Sutherland (2001), Ghironi
and Rebucci (2002), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000, 2002), Parrado and Velasco (2002), Benigno and Benigno
(2003), Devereux and Engel (2003), Laxton and Pesenti (2003), Woodford (2001, 2003), Ambler et al. (2004),
Parrado (2004), Murchison et al. (2004), Christiano et al. (2005), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Gali and
Monacelli (2005), Huang and Liu (2005), Yazgan and Yilmazkuday (2007), Yilmazkuday (2007), among
many others.
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We set up an open economy model with the home country and the rest of the
world. In the model, there are three sets of agents: individuals, rms, and the central bank
policy makers. Individuals maximize their intertemporal lifetime expected utility function
consisting of utility obtained from domestic (home) goods and imported goods, together
with disutility from supplying labor. The production of goods requires labor input combined
with technology. The model employs a Calvo price-setting process, in which rms are able
to change their prices only with some probability, independent of other rms and the time
elapsed since the last adjustment. Firms behave as monopolistic competitors. Imported
nal goods are subject to a trade cost for both domestic individuals and foreign individuals.
The main nuance of the model is the inclusion of trade costs which is important in terms
of its implications on real exchange rates and the Law-of-One-Price.2
The micro-foundations of the individual-rm behavior results in the IS curve and
the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. While the New-Keynesian Phillips curve takes into
account the non-zero ination target as the steady-state ination (similar to the studies
such as Kozicki and Tinsley, 2003; Ascari, 2004; Cogley and Sbordone, 2006; Amano et
al., 2006, 2007; Bakhshi et al., 2007; Sbordone, 2007), the IS curve considers the e¤ect
of trade costs on output, which is not the usual case in the literature.3 In particular, we
nd that the output decreases with trade costs. Moreover, an expected increase in trade
costs has a negative e¤ect on the expected change in output gap, ceteris paribus. For
the monetary policy rule, we assume that the central bank manages a short-term nominal
interest rate according to an open economy variant of the Taylor rule. Following Yazgan
2See Alessandria (2004), Caves et al. (1990), Crucini et al. (2005), Engel (1983), Engel and Rogers
(1996), Krugman and Obstfeld (1991), Lutz (2004), Parsley and Wei (2000), Rogers and Jenkins (1995).
Also see Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) who show that trade cost may be important in explaining the six major
puzzles in international macroeconomics.
3See McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001), Walsh (2003), Woodford (2003), Parrado (2004), Gali and
Monacelli (2005), Yilmazkuday (2007), Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), among many others, that consider
foreign output levels in the IS curve instead of trade costs.
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and Yilmazkuday (2007), we modify the monetary policy rule of Taylor (1993) and Clarida
et al. (1998, 1999, and 2000) by keeping the ination target in the nal form of the rule.
Another contribution of this chapter is the estimation of the New-Keynesian Phillips
curve, together with the monetary policy rule for the Canadian economy, by using the Gen-
eralized Method of Moments (GMM). However, recently, GMM estimators have been criti-
cized on the grounds that inference, based on these estimators, is inconclusive. The related
econometric literature indicates that there has been considerable evidence that asymptotic
normality provides a poor approximation of the sampling distributions of GMM estimators.
Particularly, the GMM estimator becomes heavily biased (in the same direction as the ordi-
nary least squares estimator), and the distribution of the GMM estimator is quite far from
the normal distribution (e.g. bimodal). Stock and Wright (2000) attribute this problem
to weak identicationor weak instruments, that is, instruments that are only weakly
correlated with the included endogenous variables. Stock et al. (2002) and Dufour (2003)
provide a comprehensive survey on weak identication in GMM estimation. In this chapter,
we address the problem of weak identication by using two di¤erent tests. The rst of these
tests is the Anderson and Roubin (1949) test (AR-test) in its general form presented by
Kleibergen (2002). The second test is the K -test developed by Kleibergen (2002). These
two tests are robust in the case of nonlinear models (see Dufour, 2003; Stock et al., 2002),
and perhaps more importantly, they are robust even to excluded instruments (see Dufour,
2003). Since it is rarely possible to use all possible instruments, this latter property is quite
important from an applied point of view (see Yazgan and Yilmazkuday, 2005, 2007).
By applying a simulation based on the estimated parameters, we nd optimal
monetary policy rules under di¤erent scenarios. In particular, following the lead of Ambler
et al. (2004), Cayen et al. (2006), Murchison and Rennison (2006), Ortega and Rebei
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(2006), which give insights about the Bank of Canadas policy-analysis models, we use the
method of stochastic simulations to determine the vector of monetary policy rule parameters
that minimizes the expected loss function, given the dynamics of the Canadian economy
(i.e., the IS curve and the estimated New-Keynesian Phillips curve).4 Following Woodford
(2003), we rst consider a utility-based expected loss function and show that the Bank of
Canada is far from being optimal in such a case, independent of trade costs.
We then consider an ad hoc expected loss function and compare the calculated
optimal monetary rules with the estimated monetary policy rule to obtain the weights
assigned to ination, output and interest rate volatilities, at which the percentage deviation
of the expected loss from its optimal value takes its minimum value. We follow an optimistic
approach and accept these calculated weights as the Bank of Canadas policy weights. Thus,
instead of assigning specic weights to the mentioned variables in the loss function, we
calculate them by simulation techniques.5 The simulation results show that the actions of
the Bank of Canada are best explained when trade costs actually exist but the Bank of
Canada ignores them.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section II introduces the New-
Keynesian model and illustrates our modied specication of monetary policy developed
to take into account the ination targets. Section III presents the main estimation results.
Section IV depicts the results and comparisons of the simulation based on the Canadian
economy. Section V concludes. The derivation of the model, together with the details of
4Also see Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (1999), Erceg et al. (1998, 2000) as other studies on optimized
monetary policy rules.
5See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997); Woodford (1999); Batini and Nelson (2001); Smets (2003); Parrado
(2004); Yilmazkuday (2007), among many others, for di¤erent types of loss functions considered in the
literature.
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the data used, is given in the Appendices.
The Model
Extending a simpler version of Gali and Monacellis (2005) model by introducing
trade costs, we introduce a continuum of goods model in which all goods are tradable,
the representative individual holds assets, and the production of goods requires only labor
input. The optimality conditions of the agents (i.e., microfoundations of the model) are
derived in the Appendices, and the key equations are introduced in the text. Although the
text of this chapter is self-contained, the reader is encouraged to read the Appendices and
the footnotes there for very important technical details of this chapter.
In the model, the aggregate demand is as follows:
yt = Et (yt+1) 
 
it   Et
 
H;t+1

+ Et ( t+1) (II.1)
where yt is the (log) output; it is nominal interest rate;  t is the (log) gross trade cost; and
H;t is the ination of home-produced goods. In particular, Equation (II:1) represents an
IS curve that considers the e¤ect of trade costs on output, which is not the usual case in the
literature where the third term (i.e., the change in trade costs) is absent. The derivation of
Equation (II.1) is given in Appendix D.
From another point of view, Equation (II.1) represents an IS curve that relates
the expected change in (log) output (i.e., Et (yt+1)   yt) to the di¤erence between the
interest rate, the expected future domestic ination (i.e., an approximate measure of real
interest rate that becomes an exact measure of real interest rate when the terms of trade
are constant across periods), and the expected change in trade costs.6 An increase in
6See Kerr and King (1996), and King (2000) for discussions on incorporating the role for future output
gap in the IS curve with a unit coe¢ cient.
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the di¤erence between the expected ination and the nominal interest rate decreases the
expected change in the output gap, with a unit coe¢ cient. Finally, an expected increase in
the trade costs leads to a decrease in the expected change in (log) output. The latter is due
to the intertemporal substitution of supply in response to a change in trade cost.
As is also shown in Appendix F, Equation (II.1) can be written in terms of output
gap as follows:
xt = Et (xt+1) 
 
it   Et
 
H;t+1

+ Et (zt+1) (II.2)
where xt = yt yt is the output gap dened as the deviation of (log) domestic output yt from
the domestic natural level of output yt dened as the one under exible price equilibrium;
and zt is the (log) level of technology, which evolves according to:
zt = zzt 1 + "
z
t (II.3)
where z 2 [0; 1] and "zt is assumed to be an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance 2z.
The New-Keynesian Phillips curve in this economy is given by:
H;t = Et [H;t+1] + m ('+ cmct) (II.4)
where  =

1 (1 )() , m =
(1 )(1 )
1 (1 )() , and ' = 1   (1  ). In particular,  is the
probability that a rm does not change its price within a given period;  is the discount
factor;  = exp () is the exponential of trend ination; and cmct = mct   mc is the log
deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state value. Note that this expression reduces
to a standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve when trend ination is equal to zero (i.e.,  = 0
or  = 1). The derivation of Equation (II.4) is given in Appendix E.
For the monetary policy rule, we assume that the central bank manages a short-
term nominal interest rate according to the Taylor rule. Following Taylor (1993) and Clarida
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et al. (1998, 1999, and 2000), the monetary policy rule is given by:
{t = r +  +  [Et (t+1j
t)  ] + xEt (xtj
t) (II.5)
where {t denotes the target rate for nominal interest rate in period t ; is the information set
at the time the interest rate is set; t+1 denotes CPI ination one period ahead;  is the
target for CPI ination; xt is the output gap in period t ; and r is the long-run equilibrium
real rate.7 As in Clarida et al. (2000), we assume that the real rate is stationary and is
determined by non-monetary factors in the long run. Since we consider the monthly sample
over the period 1996:1 to 2006:12, in which the annual ination target range is exactly the
same (i.e., 2%, the midpoint of a control range of 1% to 3%, according to the Bank of
Canada, Macklem, 2002, and Coletti and Murchison, 2002) and the long-run interest rates
are pretty much stable for the Canadian economy, we assume r and  are time invariant.
Similar policy rules to (II.5) have been used in empirical research of several coun-
tries. However, most of these and previously mentioned studies consider a zero ination
target over the period of estimation. In this study, following the lead of Yazgan and Yil-
mazkuday (2007), we keep the ination target in the monetary policy rule and modify
Equation (II.5) as follows:
it = r +  +  [t+1   ] + xxt +  t (II.6)
where it is the actual nominal interest rate, and
 t =   [t+1   Et (t+1j
t)]  x [xt   Et (xtj
t)] + t
7It should be noted that r is an approximate real rate since the forecast horizon for the ination rate
will generally di¤er from the maturity of the short-term nominal rate used as a monetary policy instrument.
As noted by Clarida et al. (2000), in practice, the presence of high correlation between the short-term rates
at maturities associated with the target horizon (1 year) prevents this from being a problem.
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The term t captures the di¤erence between the desired and the actual nominal interest
rate, i.e. t = it   {t.8 According to Clarida et al. (2000), this di¤erence may result
from three sources. First, the specication in Equation (II.6) assumes an adjustment of the
actual overnight rates to its target level, and thus ignores, if any, the Bank of Canadas
tendency to smooth changes in interest rates (we will address this issue below). Second, it
treats all changes in interest rates over time as reecting the Bank of Canadas systematic
response to economic conditions. Specically, it does not allow for any randomness in policy
actions, other than that which is associated with misforecasts of the economy. Third, it
assumes that the Bank of Canada has perfect control over the interest rates, i.e., it succeeds
in keeping them at the desired level (e.g., through open market operations).
Interest rate smoothing is introduced into the model via the following partial
adjustment mechanism (see Clarida et al., 1998, 2000):
it = (1  i){t + iit 1 + vt (II.7)
where i 2 [0; 1] captures the degree of interest rate smoothing. Equation (II.7) postulates
that in each period, the Bank of Canada adjusts the funds rate to eliminate a fraction
(1  i) of the gap between its current target level and its past value. And, t is an
independently and identically distributed error term. Substituting Equation (II.5) into
Equation (II.7) yields:
it = (1  i) (r +  +  [t+1   ] + xxt) + iit 1 + "t (II.8)
where "t =   (1  i) f [t+1   Et (t+1j
t)] + x [xt   Et (xtj
t)]g+ t.
8We assume that t is identically and independently distributed.
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Using the utility function specied in the model, we may dene the utility-based
welfare function as follows:
Et
1X
k=0
t+k (U (Ct+k)  V (Nt+k)) (II.9)
= Et
1X
k=0
t+k (log  +  t+k   ) st+k
 1
2
Et
1X
k=0
t+k

(1  log     t+k) 
w
(H;t+k)
2 + (xt+k)
2

+t:i:p+ o
 a3
where w =
(1 )(1 )
 ;   =(   1) is a markup as a result of market power;  > 1
is the price elasticity of demand faced by each monopolist; st is the (log) e¤ective terms
of trade dened as the di¤erence between foreign and domestic prices;  is the share of
domestic consumption allocated to imported goods; t.i.p. represents terms independent of
policy; and nally, o
 a3 represents terms that are equal to or higher than 3rd order.
The derivation of the utility-based welfare function is shown in Appendix F.
Note that the utility-based welfare function depends on the volatility in ination
and output gap as well as the trade costs and the terms of trade. It is derived explicitly as
a quadratic approximation to the utility function of the representative household. However,
the welfare comparisons below are made on the basis of a linearized model. We know on
the results of Kim and Kim (2003) that this can be misleading, because linear approximate
methods fail to take into account the impact of uncertainty (stochastic shocks) on the
expected values of the endogeneous variables. In order to remedy this problem, following
Erceg et al. (2000), we introduce taxes and subsidies into our model such that the steady
state of the economy is Pareto optimum. See the Appendices for the details.
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In our initial welfare analysis, we assume that the Bank of Canada is benevolent
and thus uses Equation (II.9) as its objective function. We will relax this assumption later
to consider an alternative ad hoc objective function. For now, we need parameter values of
, , and  to calculate the value of the welfare function of Equation (II.9). We estimate
these parameters in the next section.
Estimation
In this section, we separately estimate the monetary policy rule of the Bank of
Canada and the New-Keynesian Phillips curve for the Canadian economy by using con-
tinuous updating GMM.9 Our estimation results will not only help us determine how our
model explains the Canadian data, but they will also provide parameters for our simulation
analysis in the next section. The data are described in Appendix I.
Estimation of the Monetary Policy Rule
Let zzt be a vector of variables, within the central banks information set at the
time it chooses the interest rate (i.e. zzt 2 
t) that are orthogonal to "t. Possible elements
of zzt include any lagged variables that help to forecast ination and output gap, as well as
any contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with the current interest rate shock
t. In sum, we have the following orthogonality condition:
Et [it   (1  i) fr +  +  [t+1   ] + xxtg   iit 1 jzzt ] = 0 (II.10)
In Equation (II.10), the expected signs of r; ; ; x are all positive. By using
9Our reason for individual GMM estimations is that joint GMM estimations can be hazardous according
to Hayashi (2000, p.273). In particular, while a joint estimation theoretically provides asymptotic e¢ ciency,
it may su¤er more from the small-sample bias in practice.
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this orthogonality condition, we use continuous updating GMM to estimate the parameter
vector [r; ; ; x].
10 Since the econometric estimation procedure that we use here (GMM)
requires that all the variables (including instruments) used in the estimation should be
stationary, all of the variables are tested by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
tests. We nd that the null of unit root is rejected in all variables, at least at the 10 percent
signicance level, when tests are applied at di¤erent lags.11 The results are illustrated
in Table 1. The instruments we use for GMM estimation consist of twelve lags of home
ination, percentage change in M1 and three lags of output gap.12
Table 1 reports the estimates of r, , x and i. All of the estimates satisfy their
expected signs.13 In particular, the estimate of the coe¢ cient on the di¤erence between
expected and targeted ination is around 5.50 for Canada. That is, if expected ination
were 1 percentage point above the target, the Bank of Canada would set the interest rate
approximately 5.50 percent above its equilibrium value. This coe¢ cient is signicant at
the 10% level when we use asymptotic normality as an approximation to the sampling
distribution of GMM estimators.
The response of the Bank of Canada to the deviations of the expected output gap
from its target (assumed to be zero) is around 0.09. In other words, holding other parameters
constant, one unit increase in output gap induces the Bank of Canada to increase the interest
rates by 9 basis points. This coe¢ cient is again signicant at the 10% level. The equilibrium
real interest rate is estimated as 1.37 percent and it is signicant at the 10% level using
10For continuous updating GMM estimators, we have modied the GAUSS code originally used by Stock
and Wright (2000). All of our codes are available upon request. Gauss version 6.0 has been used.
11These results are available upon request.
12By choosing these instruments, we implicitly assume that these variables are strong instruments for
predicting ination and output gap.
13Although the comparison of these estimates with the existing literature is di¢ cult due to the di¤erences
in model specications and sample periods, see Ambler et al. (2004), Murchison et al. (2004), Cayen et al.
(2006), Ortega and Rebei (2006), Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) for other monetary policy rule estimations
of the Bank of Canada.
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normal asymptotics. The estimation results also indicate that the smoothing parameter is
highly signicant and equal to 0.96. This estimate implies that the Bank of Canada puts
forth signicant e¤ort to smooth interest rates.
Table 2 illustrates the test statistics for GMM estimation. The Hansens J -statistic
does not reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are satised at
conventional signicance levels.
Despite their signicance, one should be wary about GMM-based results that are
obtained under the asymptotic normality of the sampling distributions obtained under con-
ventional asymptotics. Under weak-identication asymptotics, the sampling distributions
are quite far from being normally distributed. In this chapter, we address the problem of
weak identication by using two di¤erent tests. The rst of these tests is the Anderson
and Roubin (1949) test (AR-test) in its general form presented by Kleibergen (2002). The
second test is the K -test developed by Kleibergen (2002). These two tests are robust in the
case of nonlinear models (see Stock et al., 2002; Dufour, 2003; Dufour and Taamouti, 2005,
2006), and perhaps more importantly, they are robust even to excluded instruments (see
Dufour, 2003). Since it is rarely possible to use all possible instruments, this latter property
is quite important from an applied point of view (see Yazgan and Yilmazkuday, 2005).
AR and K -test statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that:
H0 : r = 1:37; = 5:50;x = 0:09; i = 0:96
i.e. given the instruments that we used, whether the estimated parameters are compatible
with the data or not.14 Since both of these tests are fully robust to weak instruments (see
Stock et al., 2002, pp.522), a non-rejection of this null hypothesis means that our estimates
14As suggested by Kleibergen (2002), the AR-test and the K-test statistics are calculated by interpreting
all data matrices in the test as residuals from the projection on exogenous variables.
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are also data-admissibleeven under the case of weak instruments.
As is evident from Table 2, given the high p-value of the AR-test, our parameter
estimates cannot be rejected.15 In other words, our GMM estimates of the Bank of Canadas
monetary policy cannot be refuted by the Canadian data.
However, as argued by Kleibergen (2002), the deciency of the AR-statistic is
that its limiting distribution has a degree of freedom parameter equal to the number of
instruments. Therefore the AR-statistic su¤ers from the problem of low power when the
number of instruments highly exceeds the number of parameters. Kleibergen proposed a
statistic (K -statistic) that remedies the drawback of the AR-statistic. Kleibergen, unlike
the AR-test, does not provide a nite sample theory, but instead shows that his K -statistic
follows an asymptotic 2(G) distribution (where G is the number of endogenous regressors)
under the null hypothesis in the absence of exogenous regressors. As can be seen from Table
2, our K -statistics provides a similar result to the AR-test.
Estimation of the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve
We continue with the structural estimation of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve
dened by Equation (II.4) where the expected signs of  and  are both positive. We use
exactly the same methodology that we used for the estimation of the monetary policy rule.
The estimation results are illustrated in Table 3. The instruments we use for the GMM
estimation consist of six lags of home ination, six lags of the percentage change in terms of
trade and two lags of percentage change in M1. As is evident, both estimates satisfy their
expected signs.
15The AR-statistics, under the above null hypothesis, has an exact Fisher distribution with k and T-k
degrees of freedom (where k is the number of instruments, and T is the number of observations), given
that the error terms are i.i.d. normal, and the instruments are strictly exogenous. k  AR statistics are
asymptotically distributed chi-square with k degrees of freedom even without i.i.d. normal errors under
standard regularity conditions (see Dufour and Jasiak, 2001, pp. 829, and Dufour 2003, pp.20).
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Although the comparison of these estimates with the existing literature is di¢ cult
due to the di¤erences in model specications and sample periods, see Ambler et al. (2004),
Murchison et al. (2004), Dufour et al. (2006), Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) for recent
New-Keynesian Phillips curve estimations of the Canadian economy. Finally, both AR-and
K -statistics in Table 4 support our estimation results for the Phillips curve.
Remaining Parameters
Before we continue with our simulation analysis, we set the serial correlation para-
meters for productivity, trade costs and foreign interest rate as (z;  ; i)= (0:98; 0:97; 0:99)
by estimating the relevant AR(1) processes given in the text and the Appendices. Moreover,
the related standard deviations, which are used to determine the size of the shocks in our
simulations next section, are similarly estimated as (z; ;i) = (0:01; 0:09; 0:17). We
set the share of domestic consumption allocated to imported goods to  = 0:36, which is
(implied by Equation (II.34) in the Appendices as) the mean ratio of the value of imports
to the value of GDP over the sample period. Finally, we set the gross markup equal to
 = 1:35, which is equal to the average markup in the manufacturing sector in Canada,
and thus, it is implied that price elasticity of demand faced by each monopolist is set as
 = 3:85. Now, we have each parameter used in the utility-based welfare function (i.e.,
Equation (II.9)) and the model solution given in Appendix H. By using our model solution,
we start our simulation analysis based on the Canadian economy in the next section.
Results and Comparisons
In order to compare the expected loss implications of alternative monetary policy
rules, a criterion is needed. We consider two alternative approaches that are highly accepted
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in the literature: i) utility-based loss function, ii) ad hoc loss function
While the utility-based loss function is obtained through the microfoundations of
our model, the ad hoc loss function is assumed to depend on the volatility in ination, the
output gap, and the interest rate. We provide the details of each approach in the following
subsections.
Utility-Based Loss Function
The utility-based loss function implied by Equation (II.9) is as follows:
Et
1X
k=0
t+kLubt+k (II.11)
= Et
1X
k=0
t+k
 
 (1  log     t+k) (H;t+k)2
2w
+
(xt+k)
2
2
  (log  +  t+k   ) st+k
!
The estimated policy function is evaluated relative to the optimal policy as follows:
1. Since a typical central bank determines its policy considering the dynamics of the
economy (i.e., the IS curve and the New Keynesian Phillips curve), given these dy-
namics, following the lead of Ambler et al. (2004), Cayen et al. (2006), Murchison
and Rennison (2006), and Ortega and Rebei (2006), we search for the optimized mon-
etary policy rules under possible types of shocks. In particular, we use the method
of stochastic simulations to determine the vector of parameters that minimizes the
expected loss function; i.e., for each possible combination of i, , and x values in
Equation (II.8), we calculate the expected loss value by Equation (II.11).
2. We compare the performance of the estimated monetary policy rule of the Bank of
Canada with the optimized monetary policy rule (obtained by Exercise 1) in terms of
expected loss in the economy (i.e., Equation (II.11)).
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In both exercises, we consider a combination of three possible types of shocks,
namely a trade cost shock, a technology shock, a foreign interest rate shock. These shocks
are determined by Equations (II.17), (II.26) and (II.3). We set the size of the shocks equal
to one standard deviation of the relevant shock variables.16 In other words, we compute
the standard deviation of the observed shocks and use them in the simulation.
The results of both exercises are given in Table 5 which compares optimal mone-
tary policy rules and historical (i.e., estimated) monetary policy rules. Note that we have
considered the cases of with and without trade cost to show the e¤ect of trade costs. While
the case with trade costs refers to the unrestricted version of our model, the case without
trade costs refers to the restricted version of our model in which trade costs are ignored
(i.e.,  t = 0 for all t). In both cases, optimal  and x values are much higher than
the estimates of historical monetary policy rule of the Bank of Canada. Nevertheless, i
values are very close to each other. In other words, given the utility-based welfare function,
the Bank of Canada places much lower weight upon ination and output than the optimal
monetary policy, while it gives approximately the same weight to smoothing the interest
rate.
When we compare the welfare loss values calculated by Equation (II.11), we see
that the historical monetary policy rule is far from optimal. Moreover, when we compare the
discounted (lifetime) value of the deviation of consumption between optimal and historical
monetary policy rules, we see that the consumption implied by the historical rule deviates
around 50% from the one implied by the optimal rule, in the case with trade costs. This
deviation increases to around 90% in the case without trade costs. This brings another
possibility into the picture: What if the Bank of Canada has its own expected loss function
16MATLAB version 7.1.0.246 R(14) Service Pack 3 has been used for the simulation. The codes are
available upon request.
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rather than the utility-based loss function? We consider this possibility in the following
subsection by considering an ad hoc loss function.
Ad Hoc Loss Function
Similar to Svensson (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Rudebusch and
Svensson (1998), Woodford (1999), Batini and Nelson (2001), Smets (2003), the ad hoc
intertemporal loss function is assumed to depend on the deviations of ination and out-
put from their steady state values, and the volatility of the policy instrument. It can be
demonstrated as follows:
Et
1X
k=0
kLaht+k (II.12)
where  is the discount factor of the central bank (which can be di¤erent from the consumer
discount factor, ), and the period loss function, following Smets (2003), is given by:
Laht =  
 
H;t
2
+ (1   )

 x (xt)
2 + (1   x) (it)2

(II.13)
where 0     1 and 0   x  1. While the inclusion of ination and output into the loss
function is almost standard, as Cayen et al. (2006) point out, the policy instrument may
enter as an argument of the loss function for three di¤erent reasons: (i) big and unexpected
changes to interest rates may cause problems for nancial stability (Cukierman 1990; Smets
2003), (ii) the policy-makers may be concerned about hitting the lower nominal bound on
interest rates (Rotemberg and Woodford 1997; Woodford 1999; Smets 2003), or (iii) in
reality, the monetary authority (and other agents) may be uncertain about the nature and
the persistence of the shocks at play in the economy at the time it must make a decision
about its policy instrument.
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Following Rudebusch and Svensson (1998), we consider the limiting case of the
central bank discount factor satisfying  = 1 in order to interpret the intertemporal loss
function as the unconditional mean of the period loss function, which is equal to the sum
of the unconditional variances of the goal variables:
E
h
Laht
i
=  V ar

H;t

+ (1   ) ( xV ar [xt] + (1   x)V ar [it]) (II.14)
Instead of assuming specic values as in the related empirical literature (see Batini and
Nelson, 2001; Rudebusch and Svensson, 1998; Cayen et al., 2006), we consider di¤erent
possible values for   and  x in our analysis. In particular, we employ the following
exercises:
1. By considering all possible values for   and  x, we analyze the performance of
our estimated model (i.e., by using the estimated parameters of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve and monetary policy rule) in terms of the expected loss function, after
possible types of shocks.
2. Since a typical central bank determines its policy considering the dynamics of the
economy (i.e., the IS curve and the New Keynesian Phillips curve), given these dy-
namics, following the lead of Ambler et al. (2004), Cayen et al. (2006), Murchison and
Rennison (2006), and Ortega and Rebei (2006), we search for the optimized monetary
policy rules under possible types of shocks, again by considering all possible values
for   and  x.
3. By considering the expected loss functions calculated by Exercise 1 and Exercise 2,
we compare the performance of the estimated monetary policy rule of the Bank of
Canada with the optimized monetary policy rule in terms of expected loss in the
economy. By this comparison, we search for the weights assigned to ination, output
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and interest rate volatilities in the loss function at which the Bank of Canada is most
successful. We follow an optimistic approach and accept these calculated weights as
the Bank of Canadas policy weights.
We depict the details of each exercise in the following subsections. In all exercises,
we again consider three possible types of shocks, namely a negative foreign interest rate
shock, a negative trade cost shock and a positive technology shock. We again set the size
of the shocks equal to one standard deviation of the relevant shock variables.
Exercise 1
This subsection calculates the expected loss function given by Equation (II.14)
considering the estimated model parameters in Section III (i.e., the estimated parameters
of the New Keynesian Phillips curve and monetary policy rule) together with all possible
  and  x values. We also consider two cases: one with trade cost, the other without trade
costs. The results are given in Figure 1 and Figure 2. As is evident, roughly speaking, the
expected loss function decreases in   and increases in  x for Figure 1, while it is slightly
di¤erent for Figure 2. The intuition behind this result will be clearer by the following
exercises.
Exercise 2
This subsection searches for the optimized monetary policy rules (MPRs) with and
without trade costs. As before, following the lead of Cayen et al. (2006), and Murchison
and Rennison (2006), we use the method of stochastic simulations to determine the vector
of parameters that minimizes the expected loss function. In particular, for each possible
combination of i, , x and s values in Equation (II.8), we calculate the variance of
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ination, the output gap, and the change in the level of the interest rate to nd the mini-
mized expected loss, after simultaneous shocks of technology, trade cost and foreign interest
rate. We again consider all possible ( ;  x) pairs in our analysis. Our grid search in the
existence of trade costs results in the expected loss values in Figure 3 which are computed
through Equation (II.8) by using the calculated optimal monetary policy coe¢ cients given
in Figures 4-6.
As is evident from Figure 3, the expected loss function under optimal policy rules
increases in  x while it takes its lowest value when we move toward   = 1. When we look
at the optimal monetary policy rules under possible ( ;  x) pairs in Figures 4-6, we see
that the optimal , x and i take higher values when   decreases.
When we repeat the same analysis in the absence of trade costs, the e¤ects of the
inclusion of trade costs become clearer. The results are given in Figures 7-10.
Figures 3-10 show that the loss function specication of the central bank (i.e., the
( ;  x) values) together with the inclusion of trade costs plays a big role in the determina-
tion of optimized MPRs. We use this information to compare the performance of estimated
MPR with the optimized MPRs in the following exercise.
Exercise 3
By considering the expected loss functions calculated by Exercise 1 and Exercise
2, this subsection compares the performance of the estimated (historical) monetary policy
rule of the Bank of Canada with the performance of the optimized monetary policy rule
in terms of expected loss in the economy, under all possible ( ;  x) pairs together with
considering the e¤ect of trade costs. By this comparison, we search for the weights assigned
to ination, output and interest rate volatilities in the loss function by which the actions of
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the Bank of Canada are explained best.
In particular, we consider three di¤erent cases:
1. The presence of trade costs, i.e., the unrestricted version of our model.
2. The absence of trade costs, i.e., the restricted version of our model in which  t = 0
for all t.
3. The hybrid case in which trade costs exist, but the Bank of Canada ignores them.
For Case 1, we compare the expected loss values in Figure 1 and Figure 3. We
make this comparison by calculating the percentage deviation of the expected loss under
estimated monetary policy from the one under optimal monetary policy. The results are
given in Figure 11. As is evident from Figure 11, the percentage deviation takes lower values
towards ( ;  x) = (0:9; 0:7) at which it reaches its minimum. According to these values,
for Case 1, it follows that the Bank of Canada assigns 90% of weight to ination, 7% of
weight to output gap and 3% weight to interest rate in the loss function.
According to the calculated weights, the optimal MPR for Case 1 is implied as
follows:
o = 2:2;
o
x = 0:08; 
o
i = 0:57
Compared to the estimated/historical MPR in Table 1, the optimal o = 2:2 and 
o
i = 0:57
values are lower while the optimal ox = 0:08; value is almost the same.
For Case 2, we compare the expected loss values in Figure 2 and Figure 7. We
make this comparison again by calculating the percentage deviation of the expected loss
under the estimated monetary policy from the one under optimal monetary policy. The
results are given in Figure 12. As is evident from Figure 12, the percentage deviation takes
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lower values toward ( ;  x) = (0:1; 0:1) at which it reaches its minimum. According to
these values, for Case 2, it is implied that the Bank of Canada assigns 10% of weight to
ination, 9% of weight to output gap and 81% weight to interest rate in the loss function.
According to the calculated weights, the optimal MPR for Case 2 is implied as
follows:
o = 0:9;
o
x = 0:27; 
o
i = 0:85
Compared to the estimated/historical MPR in Table 1, the optimal o = 0:9 and 
o
i = 0:85
values are lower while the optimal ox = 0:27; is higher.
For Case 3, we compare the expected loss values in Figure 2 and Figure 3. We
again make this comparison by calculating the percentage deviation of the expected loss
under the estimated monetary policy from the one under optimal monetary policy. The
results are given in Figure 13.
As is evident from Figure 13, the percentage deviation takes lower values toward
( ;  x) = (0:7; 0:5) at which it reaches its minimum. According to these values, for Case
3, it is implied that the Bank of Canada assigns 70% of weight to ination, 15% of weight
to output gap and 15% weight to interest rate in the loss function.
According to the calculated weights, the optimal MPR for Case 3 is implied as
follows:
o = 2:2;
o
x = 0:08; 
o
i = 0:57
which is the same as in Case 1.
Now, we have to nd a criterion to evaluate which case is more likely to represent
the actions of the Bank of Canada. We achieve this by considering the percentage deviation
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of the historical monetary policy rule from the optimal monetary policy rule in terms of
expected loss values for each case. The results are given in Table 6. As is evident, the
minimum percentage deviation is achieved by the Hybrid Case, which suggests that the
actions of the Bank of Canada are explained best when trade costs in fact exist but the
Bank of Canada ignores them.17
Impulse Response Functions
This subsection compares the impulse response functions under the estimated (his-
torical) monetary policy with the ones under optimal monetary policy (both utility-based
and ad hoc), after possible types of shocks. We consider the cases with trade costs in our
analysis. The results under simultaneous shocks of technology, trade cost and foreign inter-
est rate are given in Figures 14-17. We consider simultaneous shocks rather than individual
shocks, because, according to our data, they are the possible shocks that the economy can
experience in a typical period.
Figure 14 compares the response of output gap to three simultaneous shocks under
estimated and optimal MPRs. As is evident, the volatility in output gap is best controlled
under estimated MPR, while it is highest under optimized MPR found by the ad hoc
expected loss function. Nevertheless, it is the opposite case for ination when we consider
Figure 15: the volatility in ination is best controlled under optimized MPR found by the ad
hoc expected loss function, while it is highest under estimated MPR. Similar comparisons
can be made in Figures 16-17.
17When we compare the discounted (lifetime) value of the deviation of consumption between optimal and
historical monetary policy rules, we see that the consumption implied by the historical rule deviates around
101% from the one implied by the optimal rule, in the presence of trade costs. The deviation is around 18%
in the absence of trade costs. In the Hybrid Case, the deviation is calculated as 99%.
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Conclusions
We introduced an open economy DSGE model to analyze the e¤ects of trade costs
on the actual central bank behaviour. The log-linearized model is expressed in terms of four
blocks of equations: aggregate demand (i.e., the IS curve), aggregate supply (i.e., the New-
Keynesian Phillips curve), monetary policy rule, and stochastic processes. We estimated
the New-Keynesian Phillips curve for the Canadian economy together with the monetary
policy rule of the Bank of Canada.
By considering the dynamics of the Canadian economy (i.e., the New-Keynesian
Phillips curve and the IS curve), we calculated optimal monetary policy rules under di¤erent
scenarios and compared them with the estimated monetary policy rule to have a better
insight for the actions of the Bank of Canada. When we consider a utility-based expected
loss function, we nd that the actions of the Bank of Canada are far from being optimal.
When we consider an ad hoc expected loss function based on ination, output and interest
volatilities, we nd the actions of the Bank of Canada are best explained by a model in
which trade costs actually exist in the economy but the Bank of Canada ignores them.
Finally, we nd that the Bank of Canada assigns 70% of weight to ination, 15% of weight
to interest rate and 15% of weight to output in its ad hoc loss function.
Many things remain to be done, in terms of either modeling or empirical analysis:
what if trade costs a¤ect both nal good and intermediate input prices; what is the relation
between capital (utilization) and trade costs (and/or oil prices); is there any di¤erence in
terms of the trade cost e¤ects between the monetary policy of developing and developed
countries (e.g., small versus large economies)? These are possible topics of future research.
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Table 1. GMM Estimates of the Monetary Policy Rule
r  x i
1.37 5.50 0.09 0.96
(0.8441) (4.1913) (0.0616) (0.0258)
[0.0523] [0.0946] [0.0835] [0.0000]
Notes: Standard errors calculated using the Delta method are in parentheses and p-values are in
brackets. The sample size is 114 after considering data availability and instruments used which
consist of twelve lags of home ination, percentage change in M1 and three lags of output gap.
33
Table 2. Test Statistics for GMM Estimation of the Monetary Policy Rule
AR stat K stat J stat Adjusted R2
F (27; 87) 2 (27) 2 (2) 2 (25)
0.74 19.87 2.39 15.53 0:99
[0.82] [0.84] [0.30] [0.93]
Notes: P-values are in brackets.
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Table 3. GMM Estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
   m
0.99 0.99 1.09 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets. The sample size is 127
after considering data availability and instruments used, which consist of six lags of home ination,
six lags of the percentage change in terms of trade and two lags of percentage change in M1. The
standard errors of  and m have been calculated by using the Delta method.
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Table 4. Statistics for GMM Estimation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
AR stat K stat J stat Adjusted R2
F (14; 113) 2 (14) 2 (2) 2 (13)
0.65 9.03 0.05 11.99 0:86
[0.82] [0.83] [0.98] [0.53]
Notes: P-values are in brackets.
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Table 5. Optimal vs. Historical Monetary Policy Rule
 x i Welfare Loss
Optimal MPR with Trade Costs 18.5 0.37 0.97 1:11 10 5
Optimal MPR without Trade Costs 13.0 0.36 0.95 2:29 10 5
Historical MPR with Trade Costs 5.5 0.09 0.96 12.76
Historical MPR without Trade Costs 5.5 0.09 0.96 13.65
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Table 6. Expected Loss Values
Monetary Policy Rule Percentage
Case Estimated MPR Optimized MPR Deviation
Presence of Trade Costs 3:77 10 6 3:44 10 6 9%
Absence of Trade Costs 1:60 10 6 2:34 10 8 422%
Hybrid Case 4:40 10 6 4:40 10 6 0%
Notes: MPR stands for Monetary Policy Rule. Percentage deviation is dened as 100 times the log
di¤erence between the expected loss functions under estimated MPR and optimized MPR.
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Figure 1. Expected Loss Values for Historical MPR in the presence of Trade Costs
Figure 2. Expected Loss Values for Historical MPR in the absence of Trade Costs
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Figure 3. Expected Loss Values for Optimal MPR in the presence of Trade Costs
Figure 4. Optimal Coe¢ cient of Ination in the presence of Trade Costs
Figure 5. Optimal Coe¢ cient of Output in the presence of Trade Costs
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Figure 6. Optimal Coe¢ cient of Interest Rate in the presence of Trade Costs
Figure 7. Expected Loss Values for Optimal MPR in the absence of Trade Costs
Figure 8. Optimal Coe¢ cient of Ination in the absence of Trade Costs
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Figure 9. Optimal Coe¢ cient of Output in the absence of Trade Costs
Figure 10. Optimal Coe¢ cient of Interest Rate in the presence of Trade Costs
Figure 11. Percentage Deviation from Optimal Expected Loss in the Presence of Trade
Costs
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Figure 12. Percentage Deviation from Optimal Expected Loss in the Absence of Trade
Costs
Figure 13. Percentage Deviation from Optimal Expected Loss for the Hybrid Case
Figure 14. Response of Output Gap
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Figure 15. Response of Ination
Figure 16. Response of Nominal Interest
Figure 17. Response of Real Exchange Rate
44
Appendices
This section depicts the microfoundations and the technical details of the model.
The log-linearized model is expressed in terms of four blocks of equations: aggregate demand
(i.e., the IS curve), aggregate supply (i.e., the New-Keynesian Phillips curve), a monetary
policy rule, and stochastic processes. Lower case letters denote log variables; the subscripts
H and F stand for domestically produced and imported variables, respectively; the super-
script  stands for the variables of the rest of the world; and lastly, a bar on a variable ( : )
stands for the target.18
A. Denitions and Some Identities
We dene the CPI as follows:
pt  (1  )pH;t + pF;t (II.15)
where pH;t is the (log) price index for domestically consumed home goods; pF;t is the (log)
price index for imported goods; and  is the share of domestic consumption allocated to
imported goods. In other words,  represents a natural index of openness. Both pH;t and
pF;t are in domestic currency. The price index for imported goods is given by:
pF;t = et + p

F;t +  t (II.16)
where et is the (log) nominal e¤ective exchange rate; pF;t is the (log) price index for do-
mestically consumed foreign goods at the source; and  t is the (log) gross trade cost, which
is an income received by the rest of the world.19 Since we assume that the transportation
18Although some of the equations in this section are repeated from Gali and Monacelli (2005) or Yil-
mazkuday (2007) for the convenience of the reader, the equations with trade costs are new to this paper.
19For future reference, pH;t is the (log) price index for the imported goods for the rest of the world, and
pF;t is the (log) domestic price index for the rest of the world. We assume that the trade costs consist of
transportation costs and transportation sector is owned by the rest of the world, so there is no transporta-
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costs are the same across goods and they are symmetric, the (log) gross trade cost directly
enters the price index for imported goods. The autoregressive parameter,  , appears in
the evolution of trade costs as follows:
 t =  t 1 + "

t (II.17)
where  2 [0; 1] and "t is assumed to be an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
shock with zero mean and variance 2 .
20
If we dene the (log) e¤ective terms of trade as st  pF;t   pH;t, we can write the
CPI formula as:
pt  (1  )pH;t + pF;t (II.18)
Thus, we can write the formula of CPI ination as follows:
t = H;t +  (st   st 1) (II.19)
where H;t = pH;t   pH;t 1 is the ination of home-produced goods.
By combining st  pF;t   pH;t and pF;t = et + pF;t +  t, we can write:
st  et + pF;t +  t   pH;t (II.20)
We can dene the (log) e¤ective real exchange rate as:
qt = et + p

t   pt (II.21)
By using Equations (II.15), (II.16) and (II.20), together with the symmetric versions of
tion income received by the home country. This assumption is reasonable after considering the fact that
we are analyzing the ination targeting experience of Canada after the introduction of NAFTA. Another
interpretation of this assumption would be to have iceberg trade costs. See Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) for a discussion of iceberg melt structure of economic geography literature and trade costs.
20The introduction of an AR(1) process for the trade costs is essential in our simulations below.
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Equations (II.15) and (II.16) for the rest of the world, we can rewrite Equation (II.21) as
follows:
qt = (1     )st   (1  2) t (II.22)
where  is the share of foreign consumption allocated to goods imported from the home
country. In a special case in which the home country is a small one (i.e.,  is a very small
number), Equation (II.22) can be approximated as:
qt  (1  )st    t (II.23)
Compared to the studies in the literature that ignore trade costs in open economy
models, such as Parrado (2004), Gali and Monacelli (2005), Lubik and Schorfheide (2007),
and Yilmazkuday (2007), the presence of trade costs is important in Equations (II.22) and
(II.23). In particular, as is shown empirically by Caves et al. (1990), Crucini et al. (2005),
Engel (1983), Engel and Rogers (1996), Krugman and Obstfeld (1991), Lutz (2004), Parsley
and Wei (2000), Rogers and Jenkins (1995), trade costs play a big role in the determination
of real exchange rates.
The uncovered interest parity condition is given by:
it = i

t + Et [et+1]  et (II.24)
where E is the expectation operator. The derivation of this condition is given in Appendix
B. Equation (II.24) relates the movements of the interest rate di¤erentials to the expected
variations in the e¤ective nominal exchange rate. Since st  et + pF;t +  t   pH;t, we can
rewrite Equation (II.24) as follows:
st =
 
it   Et

F;t+1
   it   Et H;t+1+ Et st+1   t+1 (II.25)
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where  t+1 is the change in trade cost from period t to t + 1. Equation (II.25) shows
the terms of trade between the home country and the rest of the world as a function of
current interest rate di¤erentials, expected future home ination di¤erentials and its own
expectation for the next period together with the expected future change in trade cost.
Here, the evolution of foreign interest rate shock is given by:
it = ii

t 1 + "
i
t (II.26)
where i 2 [0; 1], and "it is assumed to be an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
shock with zero mean and variance 2i .
B. Individuals
We can make our analysis for a representative individual who has the following
intertemporal lifetime utility function:
Et
" 1X
k=0
k fU (Ct+k)  V (Nt+k)g
#
(II.27)
where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor; U (Ct) is the utility out of consuming a composite in-
dex of Ct; and V (Nt) is the disutility out of working Nt hours. The composite consumption
index, Ct, is dened by:
Ct = (CH;t)
1 (CF;t) (II.28)
Consumption sub-indexes, CH;t and CF;t, are symmetric. These Dixit-Stiglitz type indices
are dened by:
CH;t =
Z 1
0
CH;t(j)
( 1)=dj
=( 1)
and CF;t =
Z 1
0
CF;t(j)
( 1)=dj
=( 1)
(II.29)
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where  > 1 is the price elasticity of demand faced by each monopolist and CH;t(j) and
CF;t(j) are the quantities purchased by home agents of domestic and imported goods, re-
spectively. The optimality conditions result in:
CH;t(j) =
h
PH;t(j)
PH;t
i 
CH;t
CF;t(j) =
h
PF;t(j)
PF;t
i 
CF;t
(II.30)
where
PH;t =
Z 1
0
([PH;t(j)])
1  dj
1=(1 )
(II.31)
and
PF;t =
Z 1
0
([PF;t(j)])
1  dj
1=(1 )
(II.32)
Similarly, the demand allocation for home and imported goods implies:
CH;t =
(1  )CtPt
PH;t
(II.33)
and
CF;t =
PtCt
PF;t
(II.34)
where Pt =

PH;t
1  
PF;t

is the consumer price index (CPI).
The individual household constraint is given by:
Z 1
0
[PH;t(j)CH;t(j) + PF;t(j)CF;t(j)] dj + Et [Ft;t+1Bt+1] =WtNt +Bt + Tt (II.35)
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where Ft;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor, Bt+1 is the nominal payo¤ in period t+ 1 of
the portfolio held at the end of period t, Wt is the hourly wage, and Tt is the lump sum
transfers/taxes.
By using the optimal demand functions, we can rewrite (II.35) in terms of the
composite good as follows:
PtCt + Et [Ft;t+1Bt+1] =WtNt +Bt + Tt (II.36)
The home agents problem is to choose paths for consumption, portfolio and the
output of good j. Therefore, the representative consumer maximizes her expected utility
[equation (II.27)] subject to the budget constraint [equation (II.36)]. By FOC, we obtain:
Et

UC(Ct+1) Pt
UC(Ct) Pt+1

=
1
It
(II.37)
where It = 1=Et [Ft;t+1] is the gross return on the portfolio. Equation (II.37) represents
the traditional intertemporal Euler equation for total real consumption. We also obtain the
labor supply decision of the individual as follows:
Wt
Pt
=
VN (Nt)
UC (Ct)
(II.38)
The problem is analogous for the rest of the world. The Euler equation for the
rest of the world would thus be:
Et

uC(Ct+1)P

t t
uC(C

t ) P

t+1t+1

= Et [Ft;t+1] (II.39)
where t is the nominal e¤ective exchange rate. By combining Equations (II.37) and (II.39),
together with assuming U(C) = logC, one can obtain:
Ct = C

tQt (II.40)
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for all t, where Qt = tP t =Pt is the real e¤ective exchange rate. Under the assumption of
complete international nancial markets, by combining log-linearized version of Equations
(II.37), (II.39) and (II.40) together with Equation (II.21) (the log linear version of Qt =
tP

t =Pt), one can obtain:
it = i

t + Et [et+1]  et (II.41)
where it = log (It) = log (1/ (Et [Ft;t+1])) and it = log (t/ (Et [Ft;t+1t+1])). Equation
(II.41) is the uncovered interest parity condition given by Equation (II.24) in the text.
After introducing the micro-foundations of aggregate demand, we can now nd a
log-linearized equation for the IS curve. From now on, lower case variables will denote the
log variables, and the capital letters without time subscript will denote steady-state values
of the respective ratios.
C. Firms
We assume that the production function is as follows:
Yt (j) = ZtNt (j) (II.42)
where Zt is an exogenous economy-wide productivity parameter; and Nt is labor input.
Accordingly, the marginal cost of production is given by:
MCnt = (1  !)
Wt
Zt
(II.43)
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where ! is the employment subsidy. By also using Equation (II.38) together with assuming
U(C) = logC and V (N) = N , we can write the real marginal cost as follows:21
mct = log (1  !) + wt   pH;t   zt (II.44)
Moreover, If we dene the aggregate output in the home country as
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt(j)
( 1)=dj
=( 1)
labor market equilibrium implies:
Nt =
Z 1
0
Nt(j)dj =
YtAt
Zt
(II.45)
where At =
R 1
0
Yt(j)
Yt
dj of which equilibrium variations can be shown to be of second order
in log terms. Thus, we can write:
yt = zt + nt (II.46)
D. Aggregate Demand
For all di¤erentiated goods, market clearing implies:
Yt(j) = CH;t(j) + C

H;t(j) (II.47)
By using Equation (II.30), we can rewrite it as follows:
Yt(j) =

PH;t(j)
PH;t
 
CAH;t (II.48)
21Balanced growth requires the relative risk aversion in consumption to be unity, and thus we set U(C) =
logC . Following the lead of Hansen (1985), we also assume that labor is indivisible, implying that the
representative agents utility is linear in labor hours so that V (N) = N .
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where CAH;t = CH;t + C

H;t is the aggregate world demand for the goods produced in the
home country. By using Equation (II.33) and the symmetric version of Equation (II.34) for
the rest of the world, we can rewrite it as follows:
Yt(j) =

PH;t(j)
PH;t
  
(1  )PtCt
PH;t
+ 
P t Ct
P H;t
!
(II.49)
By using Yt =
hR 1
0 Yt(j)
( 1)=dj
i=( 1)
, we can write:
Yt =

(1  )PtCtPH;t + 
P t Ct
P H;t

=

Pt
PH;t

Ct

(1  ) + 

P t PH;t
PtP H;t

Q 1t
 (II.50)
which implies that we can rewrite Equation (II.49) as follows:
Yt(j) =

PH;t(j)
PH;t
 
Yt (II.51)
Log-linearizing Equation (II.50) around the steady-state together with using st  pF;t pH;t
and Equation (II.22) will transform it to the following expression:
yt = ct + st    t (II.52)
By also using Equation (II.19) and the log-linearized version of Equation (II.37) (i.e., Euler),
we can rewrite Equation (II.52) as follows:
yt = Et (yt+1) 
 
it   Et
 
H;t+1

+ Et ( t+1) (II.53)
E. The New-Keynesian Phillips Curve
Now, we have the equation of aggregate demand. In order to nd the equation of
aggregate supply, we have to analyze the producer part. Our derivation draws on Gali and
Monacelli (2005) except for the fact that we consider the target ination as the steady-state
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level of ination.22 The model employs a Calvo price-setting process, in which producers
are able to change their prices only with some probability, independently of other producers
and the time elapsed since the last adjustment. It is assumed that producers behave as
monopolistic competitors. Accordingly, each producer faces the following demand function:
Yt(j) =

PH;t(j)
PH;t
 
CAH;t; (II.54)
where CAH;t = CH;t+C

H;t is the aggregate world demand for the goods produced. Note that
this expression is the same with Equation (II.48).
Assuming that each producer is free to set a new price at period t, it follows that
the objective function can be written as:
maxePH;t Et
" 1X
k=0
kFt;t+k
n
Yt+k
 ePH;t  MCnt+ko
#
(II.55)
where ePH;t is the new price chosen in period t, and  is the probability that producers
maintain the same price of the previous period. The problem of producers is to maximize
equation (II.55) subject to Equation (II.54). The rst order necessary condition (FONC)
of the rm for this maximization is:
Et
" 1X
k=0
kFt;t+k
n
Yt+k
 ePH;t   MCnt+ko
#
= 0 (II.56)
where   =(   1) is a markup as a result of market power. Using Equation (II.37), we
can rewrite Equation (II.56) as follows:
Et
" 1X
k=0
()k
Yt+k
Ct+k
PH;t 1
Pt+k
( ePH;t
PH;t 1
  Ht 1;t+kMCt+k
)#
= 0 (II.57)
where Ht 1;t+k =
PH;t+k
PH;t 1 and MCt+k =
MCnt+k
PH;t+k
. Log-linearizing equation Equation (II.57)
22For other closed- and open-economy specications with non-zero steady-state ination, see Ascari (2004),
Bakhshi et al. (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2006), Kozicki and Tinsley (2003), Amano et al. (2006, 2007),
Sbordone (2007).
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around trend ination  together with balanced trade results in:
epH;t = '+ pH;t 1+Et " 1X
k=0
()k H;t+k
#
+(1  )Et
" 1X
k=0
()k cmct+k
#
(II.58)
where ' = 1 (1  ) and  = log are constants; cmct = mct  mc is the log deviation
of real marginal cost from its steady state value, mc =   log . Equation (II.58) can be
rewritten as:
epH;t   pH;t 1 = (1  )'+ Et [epH;t   pH;t 1] + H;t +(1  ) cmct (II.59)
In equilibrium, each producer that chooses a new price in period t will choose the
same price and the same level of output. Then the (aggregate) price of domestic goods will
obey:
PH;t =
h
P 1 H;t 1 + (1  ) eP 1 H;t i1=(1 ) (II.60)
which can be log-linearized as follows:
H;t = (1  )
 epH;t   pH;t 1 (II.61)
Finally, by combining Equations (II.59) and (II.61), we obtain an expression for
the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (Equation (II.4) in the main text):
H;t = Et [H;t+1] + m ('+ cmct) (II.62)
where  =

1 (1 )() , m =
(1 )(1 )
1 (1 )() , and ' = 1 (1  ). Note that this expression
reduces to zero-ination steady state New-Keynesian Phillips curve when  = 0 (i.e.,  = 1).
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F. Equilibrium Dynamics
We start with obtaining an expression for real marginal cost in terms of output.
In particular, we can combine Equations (II.44) and (II.52) as follows:
mct = log (1  !) + yt   zt +  t (II.63)
By using the symmetric version of Equation (II.52) for the rest of the world, namelyyt =
ct + st    t, together with Equations (II.22) and (II.40), we can also obtain:
yt = y

t + st    t (II.64)
As discussed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), under the assumption of a con-
stant employment subsidy ! that neutralizes the distortion associated with rmsmarket
power, it can be shown that the optimal monetary policy is the one that replicates the
exible price equilibrium allocation in a closed economy. That policy requires that real
marginal costs (and thus mark-ups) are stabilized at their steady state level, which in turn
implies that domestic prices be fully stabilized. However, as shown by Gali and Monacelli
(2005), there in additional source of distortion in open economy models: the possibility of
inuencing the terms of trade in a way benecial to domestic consumers. Nevertheless, an
employment subsidy can be found that exactly o¤sets the combined e¤ects of market power
and the terms of trade distortions, thus rendering the exible price equilibrium allocation
optimal. In order to show this, consider the optimal allocation from the social planners
point of view: maximize Equation (II.27) subject to Equations (II.42), (II.45), (II.50) and
(II.51). This optimization results in a constant level of employment, Nt = 1.
On the other hand, as in Gali and Monacelli (2005), exible price equilibrium
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satises:
   1

=MCt (II.65)
where MCt stands for real marginal cost at exible price equilibrium. If we combine Equa-
tions (II.38), (II.43), (II.65) with the optimal allocation of the social planners problem (i.e.,
Nt = 1), we can obtain:
   1

= 1  ! (II.66)
which suggests that an employment subsidy can be found that exactly o¤sets the combined
e¤ects of market power and the terms of trade distortions.
After dening domestic natural level of output as the one satisfying exible price
equilibrium (i.e., Equation (II.63) with mct =   log ), we can write it as follows:
yt =   log    log (1  !) + zt    t (II.67)
which can be rewritten by using Equation (II.66) as follows:
yt = zt    t (II.68)
Now, we can dene output gap as the deviation of (log) domestic output (i.e., yt)
from the domestic natural level of output as follows:
xt = yt   yt (II.69)
By using Equation (II.63), we can also write the (log) deviation of real marginal cost from
its steady state in terms of output gap as cmct = xt, which implies that the New-Keynesian
Phillips curve can be written in terms of output gap as follows:
H;t = Et [H;t+1] + m ('+ xt) (II.70)
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By using Equations (II.53), (II.67) and (II.69), we can write the IS curve in terms of output
gap as follows:
xt = Et (xt+1) 
 
it   Et
 
H;t+1

+zt+1 (II.71)
G. Utility-Based Welfare
The period specic utility from consumption, U (Ct), and disutility from working,
V (Nt), can be second-order approximated around their steady states as follows:
U (Ct) = ct + t:i:p:+ o
 a3 (II.72)
and
V (Nt) = nt +
1
2
n2t + t:i:p:+ o
 a3 (II.73)
where t.i.p. represents terms independent of policy and o
 a3 represents terms that
are higher than 3rd order. We have used the steady state relation VN (N)N = UC (C)C
together with our assumptions U(C) = logC and V (N) = N for Equations (II.72) and
(II.73). By using Equation (II.52), its symmetric version for the rest of the world, st +
st  2 t, log version of Equation (II.40) and Equation (II.22), we can write the following
expression for ct:
ct = (1  )yt + yt + (1  ) t (II.74)
Dening ~ct = ct   ct as the deviation of (log) consumption from its exible pricing equilib-
rium, we can write:
ct = (1  )xt + (1  )yt + yt + (1  ) t (II.75)
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which can be inserted into Equation (II.72). Related to Equation (II.73), after dening
~nt = nt   nt as the deviation of (log) employment from its exible pricing equilibrium, by
using the log version of Equation (II.45), we can write:
nt = xt + at + yt   zt (II.76)
where at = log
R 1
0
Yt(j)
Yt
dj

= log
R 1
0
PH;t(j)
PH;t
dj

by using Equation (II.51) and we have
used at = 0 which is implied by the denition of exible pricing. Then, by using Equations
(II.75) and (II.76), we can write:
U (Ct)  V (Nt) =  

xt + at +
1
2
(xt + at + yt   zt)2

+ t:i:p: (II.77)
The following lemmas are helpful for our analysis.
Lemma 1. at = 2vari (pH;t (i)) + o
 a3.
Proof: See Gali and Monacelli (2005), p.732.
Lemma 2.
P1
t=0 
tvari (pH;t (i)) =
1
w
P1
t=0 
t2H;t where w =
(1 )(1 )
 .
Proof: See Woodford (2003), Chapter 6.
According to our lemmas and Equations (II.26), (II.64), (II.69), (II.77), we can
write the utility-based welfare function as follows:
Et
1P
k=0
t+k (U (Ct+k)  V (Nt+k)) = Et
1P
k=0
t+k (log  +  t+k   ) st+k
 12Et
1P
k=0
t+k

(1  log     t+k) w (H;t+k)
2 + (xt+k)
2

+t:i:p+ o
 a3
(II.78)
Note that the utility-based welfare function depends on the volatility in ination and output
gap as well as the trade costs and the terms of trade.
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H. Model Solution
The dynamic system is given by the main Equations (II.19), (II.25), (II.2), (II.8),
(II.70), by the exogenous shock Equations (II.17), (II.26), (II.3), by the denition of do-
mestic ination H;t = pH;t   pH;t 1 and by the denition of output gap xt = yt   yt and
Equation (II.67). For simplicity, after substituting xt = yt   yt and Equation (II.67) into
Equations (II.2), (II.8), (II.70) and after substituting Equation (II.19) into Equation (II.8),
we can rewrite the equations used in the solution of the model as follows:
yt +  t   Et (yt+1 +  t+1) +
 
it   Et
 
H;t+1

= 0 (II.79)
H;t   Et [H;t+1]  m (yt   zt +  t) = 0 (II.80)
st   it +
 
it   Et

H;t+1
  Et st+1    t+1 +  t = 0 (II.81)
it   iit 1   (1  i)
h
Et

H;t+1
i
  (1  i)x [Et (yt   zt +  t)]
  (1  i) [Et (st+1   st)] = 0
(II.82)
H;t   pH;t + pH;t 1 = 0 (II.83)
it = ii

t 1 + "
i
t (II.84)
 t =  t 1 + "

t (II.85)
zt = zzt 1 + "
z
t (II.86)
where we have set all the constants equal to zero.23 Following the lead of Uhlig (1997),
the vector of endogenous state variables is xt =

it pH;t yt st
0
, the single vector of
non-predetermined variable (jump variable) is yt =
h
H;t
i
and the vector of shock variables
23Setting all constants equal to zero doesnt a¤ect our results at all
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is zt =

it  t zt
0
. The model in matrix form is thus:
Axt +Bxt 1 + Cyt +Dzt = 0
Et [Fxt+1 +Gxt +Hxt 1 + Jyt+1 +Kyt + Lzt+1 +Mzt] = 0
zt+1 = Nzt + "t+1
(II.87)
In our case, we will rewrite Equation (II.83) in matrix form as follows:
Axt +Bxt 1 + Cyt +Dzt = 0 (II.88)
where A =

0 1 0 0

, B =

0  1 0 0

, C = [1], and D =

0 0 0 0

.
We can write Equations, (II.79),(II.80), (II.81) and (II.82) in matrix form as fol-
lows:
Et [Fxt+1 +Gxt +Hxt 1 + Jyt+1 +Kyt + Lzt+1 +Mzt] = 0 (II.89)
where
F =
266666666664
0 0  1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0  1
0 0 0   (1  i)
377777777775
; G =
266666666664
1 0 0 0
0 0  m 0
1 0 0 1
1 0   (1  i)x  (1  i)
377777777775
;
H =
266666666664
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 i 0 0 0
377777777775
; J =
266666666664
 1
 
 1
  (1  i)
377777777775
; K =
266666666664
0
1
0
0
377777777775
;
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L =
266666666664
0  1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
377777777775
; M =
266666666664
0 1 0 0
0  m m 0
 1  1 0 0
0   (1  i)x (1  i)x 0
377777777775
:
Finally, we can rewrite Equations (II.84), (II.85) and (II.86) in matrix form as
follows:
zt+1 = Nzt + "t+1 (II.90)
where
N =
26666664
i 0 0
0  0
0 0 z
37777775 ; "t+1 =
26666664
"i

t+1
"t+1
"zt+1
37777775
I. Data Appendix
The data cover the monthly sample over the period 1996:1 to 2006:12. The data
sources are the web page of the Bank of Canada (http://www.bankofcanada.ca), the on-
line version of the International Financial Statistics (IFS), and the Energy Information
Administration. The details are below.
1. For the data downloaded from the web page of the Bank of Canada:
(a) Growth rate in total CPI has been used for Canadian ination.
(b) Overnight rate has been used for Canadian short-term interest rate.
(c) Canadian-dollar e¤ective exchange rate index (CERI) has been used for Canadian
e¤ective terms of trade.
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(d) M1+ (gross) has been used for Canadian M1.
(e) The ination target has been set to the midpoint of the target range, which is
equal to 2.
2. For the data downloaded from online IFS:
(a) Industrial production series (IPS) has been used for Canadian output.
(b) The output gap has been found by detrending Canadian IPS by using Hodrick
Prescott (HP) lter. We use the denition of Khalaf and Kichian (2004) for the
measure of output gap. That is, rather than detrending the log of IPS using the
full sample, T, we proceed iteratively: to obtain the value of the gap at time t,
we detrend IPS with the data ending in T. We then extend the sample by one
more observation and re-estimate the trend. This is used to detrend IPS and
yields a value for the gap at time t+1. This process is repeated until the end of
the sample.
(c) For foreign interest rate, government bond yield of the U.S. for 10 years has been
used.
3. For the data downloaded from Energy Information Administration:
(a) To get a measure of trade costs, although it is necessary to measure the wedge be-
tween the price of imported goods on the domestic market and their price at the
source measured in domestic currency units, as a proxy, we use "All Countries
Spot Petroleum Price FOB Weighted by Estimated Export Volume (Interna-
tional Dollars per Barrel)" for trade costs. This is the best available data for
trade costs to our knowledge. We have also considered using the Couriers and
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Messengers Services Price Indexdownloaded from Statistics Canada as an alter-
native for trade costs. However, the data cover only the period from 2003 to 2006,
which is much shorter than our sample period. Nevertheless, from 2003 to 2006,
the correlation coe¢ cient between All Countries Spot Petroleum Price FOB
Weighted by Estimated Export Volumeand Couriers and Messengers Services
Price Index is around 0.95, which can be seen as an indicator of robustness of
our analysis.
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CHAPTER III
UNDERSTANDING INTERSTATE TRADE PATTERNS
Introduction
What is the main motivation behind intranational trade? Compared to relatively
complex models in the literature, this chapter contributes by introducing a simple partial
equilibrium model to analyze the motivations behind bilateral trade patterns of regions at
the disaggregate level. We attempt to nd why regions do import more goods from some
regions while importing fewer from others. We also investigate why a region imports more
of a good while importing less of another one.
In particular, we introduce a type of monopolistic competition model consisting of
a nite number of regions. There are two types of goods, namely traded and non-traded.
Each region produces and consumes a unique non-traded good. Each region may also
consume all varieties of all traded goods, while it can produce only one variety of each
traded good. While the traded goods are produced by a perfectly mobile unique factor, the
only non-traded good in each region is produced by the same mobile factor together with
traded intermediate inputs.
According to this setup, as is standard in the literature, we show that the trade of a
variety of a particular traded good across any two regions depend on the relative price of the
variety and the total demand (nal consumption demand plus intermediate input demand)
of the good in the destination (importer) region. Our contribution comes into the picture
when we take the ratio between imports of varieties from di¤erent sources (exporters). We
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nd that a region imports more goods (measured in values) from the lower price regions
and fewer goods from the more distant regions.
We show that our model together with our estimation methodology has several
empirical and analytical benets compared to gravity models in the following senses:
(i) In our model, there is no identication problem in terms of estimating the
elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of distance at the same time. By distinguishing
between aggregate level and disaggregate level trade data, together with considering the
production side of our model, we can also estimate the elasticity of substitution across
goods.
(ii) Our methodology controls for a possible issue of overstating the distance mea-
sures (due to using calculated distances, such as great circle distances) mentioned by Hill-
berry and Hummels (2001).
(iii) By construction, the model is capable of controlling for the e¤ects of local (i.e.,
wholesale and retail) distribution costs, insurance costs, local taxes, markup di¤erences in
production, international trade (under reasonable assumptions), and intermediate input
trade, each of which are possible topics for separate debates in the literature (see Anderson
and van Wincoop 2004).
(iv) There is an exogenous solution for the estimated trade expression, and thus,
there is no need for any income data for estimation, given the technological levels.
We estimate the model using bilateral trade data belonging to the states of the
U.S. The estimated parameters correspond to: a) elasticity of substitution across varieties
of a good, each produced in a di¤erent region; b) elasticity of substitution across goods,
each consisting of di¤erent varieties; c) elasticity of distance, which governs good specic
trade costs; and d) heterogeneity of individual tastes, governing geographic barriers and the
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so-called home-bias. We pursue several strategies to estimate these parameters and support
our results with di¤erent sensitivity analyses. Overall, our model is capable of explaining
the interstate trade data up to 84% at the disaggregate level, and up to 77% at the aggregate
level.
Our estimated parameters give insights about a number of issues related to in-
terstate trade patterns within the U.S.: a) compared to empirical international studies,
elasticity of substitution is lower intranationally; b) compared to empirical international
studies, elasticity of distance is higher intranationally; c) there is evidence of home-bias
even at the intranational level; d) trade costs are mostly good specic even at the intrana-
tional level; e) source-specic xed e¤ects are important for bilateral trade patterns, e¤ects
usually ignored in the literature; f) production technologies are both good and region specic
rather than country specic; g) elasticity of substitution across varieties is good specic.
Now, we briey describe how this study relates to its closest antecedents, especially
gravity type studies. The gravity models are popular mostly due to their empirical success.1
When we look at the theoretical background of gravity type studies, Anderson (1979) is
the rst one to model gravity equations. The main motivation behind Andersons (1979)
gravity model is the assumption that each region is specialized in the production of only
one good.2 Despite its empirical success, as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) point out,
the specialization assumption suppresses ner classications of goods, and thus makes the
model useless in explaining the trade data at the disaggregate level. Another deciency of
Andersons (1979) gravity model is the lack of a production side. Bergstrand (1985) bridges
this gap by introducing a one-factor, one-industry, N -country general equilibrium model in
1Deardor¤ (1984) reviews the earlier gravity literature. For recent applications, see Wei (1996), Jensen
(2000), Rauch (1999), Helpman (1987), Hummels and Levinsohn (1995), and Evenett and Keller (2002).
2In the Appendix of his paper, Anderson (1979) extends his basic model to a model in which multiple
goods are produced in each region.
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which the production side is considered. In his following study, Bergstrand (1989) extends
his earlier gravity model to a two-factor, two-industry, N -country gravity model.3
The main deciency of the gravity models is that they cannot control for good
specic transportation costs, good specic local (i.e., wholesale and retail) distribution costs,
good specic insurance costs, good specic local taxes, region specic markup di¤erences in
production, good specic intermediate input trade or international trade. Moreover, as we
have mentioned above, one cannot estimate the elasticity of substitution and the elasticity
of distance at the same time by using gravity equations. However, this chapter controls for
all of these situations.
None of the papers mentioned above empirically deal with the trade patterns within
a country. Recently, Wolf (2000), Hillberry and Hummels (2001), and Millimet and Thomas
(2007) bridged this gap by analyzing the interstate trade patterns within the U.S. However,
these studies use the aggregate level (i.e., total bilateral) trade data, while this chapter uses
disaggregate level bilateral data that give more insight related to good specic analyses.
Since they use gravity type models, they also su¤er from the same issues mentioned above.
Moreover, they cannot distinguish between the elasticity of substitution across varieties of a
good, elasticity of substitution across goods, and the elasticity of distance at the same. By
taking the ratio between imports of varieties from di¤erent origins (exporters), by taking
the ratio between imports of di¤erent goods, and by including intermediate input trade into
the model, this chapter takes care of all of these issues by construction.
Nevertheless, this study is not the rst one that considers trade ratios. For in-
stance, studies such as Head and Ries (2001), Head and Mayer (2002), Eaton and Kortum
3Also see Suga (2007) for a monopolistic-competition model of international trade with external economies
of scale, Lopez et al. (2006) for an analysis on home-bias on U.S. imports of processed food products,
and Gallaway et al. (2003) for an empirical study to estimate short-run and long-run industry-level U.S.
Armington elasticities.
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(2002), and Romalis (2007), among others, have somehow also considered trade ratios in
their gravity type models. Most of these studies have attempted to eliminate price measures
from the gravity equation since they see them as nuisances. In order to get rid of those
price measures, one cannot simply take the ratio among imports of varieties from di¤er-
ent origins; they also have to consider the ratio among imports of varieties within regions.
This process results with having an index for freeness of trade that helps us determine the
impacts of borders (mostly related to international trade literature) rather than explaining
the intranational trade patterns. Although this approach seems ne up to a point, it has
the deciency of not considering the production side at all and not having a structure to
analyze the disaggregate level trade. The closest study to this study is by Romalis (2007).
However, by eliminating the source specic marginal costs (i.e., the production side), Roma-
lis (2007) cannot identify the elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of distance at the
same time; instead, he can only estimate the elasticity of substitution. By considering the
production side, this chapter can estimate the elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of
distance at the same time. Moreover, all of these studies also dont take into account zero
trade observations that have a high share in overall observations.4 This chapter contributes
to the literature by controlling for all of these issues, therefore by having more accurate
empirical results.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our regional
trade model. Section 3 provides insights and depicts our estimation methodology. Section
4 gives the empirical results, while Section 5 concludes. The data are described in the
4Helpman et al. (2008) show that almost 50% of the observations are zero trade observations in interna-
tional trade.
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Appendix.
The Model
We model an economy consisting of a nite number of regions. In each region,
there are two types of goods, namely traded and non-traded. While a unique non-traded
good is produced and consumed within all regions (thus, the non-traded goods market is in
equilibrium in each region separately), each region may consume all varieties of all traded
goods and can produce only one variety of each traded good. Since we only care about the
partial equilibrium bilateral trade implications of our model, in many instances, we skip the
irrelevant details of the model in order to keep it as simple as possible.5
Each traded good is denoted by j = 1; :::; J . Each variety is denoted by i that is
also the notation for the region producing that variety. We make our analysis for a typical
region, r. In the model, generally speaking, Ha;b (j) stands for the variable H, where a is
related to the region of consumption, b is related to the variety (and thus, the region of
production), and j is related to the good.
Individuals
The representative agent in region r maximizes utility U
 
CTr ; C
NT
r

where CTr is
a composite index of traded goods and CNTr is a unique non-traded good. The composite
index of traded goods, CTr , is given by:
CTr 
0@X
j
 
j
 1
"
 
CTr (j)
 " 1
"
1A "" 1
5A general equilibrium framework is not necessary in our analysis. It would only complicate our model
with unnecessary details.
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where CTr (j) is given by:
CTr (j) 
 X
i
(ri)
1
(j)
 
CTr;i (j)
 (j) 1
(j)
! (j)
(j) 1
where CTr;i (j) is the variety i of traded good j imported from region i; " > 0 is the elasticity
of substitution across goods;  (j) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties of good
j; j is a good specic taste parameter; r is a destination (i.e., importer) specic taste
parameter; and nally, i is a source (i.e., exporter) specic taste parameter. For di¤erent
varieties, while having only one bilateral taste parameter, which is both destination and
source specic, is standard in the literature, decomposing it into r and i is new in this
study.6 In particular, both r and i can be used as xed e¤ects in a regression analysis;
i.e., they together represent a unique bilateral taste parameter between regions r and i.
Moreover, by putting restrictions on i, one can easily measure home-bias implications of
our model. Besides, one can also control for issues such as migration by using i (see Millimet
and Thomas, 2007). Our claim will be clearer when we show the bilateral trade implications
of our model in Section 3. We will also test for the validity of this assumption in Section 4.
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure within each variety of goods yields
the following demand functions:
CTr;i (j) = ri
 
P Tr;i (j)
P Tr (j)
! (j)
CTr (j) (III.1)
and
CTr (j) = j

P Tr (j)
P Tr
 "
CTr (III.2)
where P Tr (j) 
P
i riP
T
r;i (j)
1 (j)
 1
1 (j)
is the price index of the traded good j (which
6Distinguishing between destination and source specic taste parameters has useful properties in terms
of our estimation. Our reason will be clearer when we move to Section 3.
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is composed of di¤erent varieties), and P Tr 
P
i jP
T
r (j)
1 "
 1
1 "
is the cost of living
index in region r. It is implied that P Tr (j)C
T
r (j) =
P
i P
T
r;i (j)C
T
r;i (j).
Firms
Since there are two types of goods, namely traded and non-traded, there are two
types of rms in each region.
Production of Traded Goods
Traded good j in region r (i.e., variety r of good j) is produced by the following
production function:
Y Tr (j) = Ar (j)L
T
r (j) (III.3)
where Ar (j) represents the good and region specic technology, and LTr (j) represents a
completely mobile factor of production of which hour is worth W in all regions.7
The rm chooses LTr (j), taking as given its price W . The cost minimization
problem of the rm implies that the marginal cost of producing variety r of good j (in
region r) is given by:
MCTr (j) =
W
Ar (j)
(III.4)
Note that MCTr (j) is good and region specic.
7One can easily assume Lr (j) to be labor and/or capital, but our results are not a¤ected at all by these
details, because we dont employ any factor market in order to keep the model as simple as possible in our
analysis.
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Production of Non-traded Goods
The unique non-traded good in region r is produced by a production function
Y NTr
 
LNTr ; G
NT
r

where LNTr represents the completely mobile factor of production (i.e.,
the same factor used in the production of traded goods) and GNTr is the counterpart of C
T
r
given by:
GNTr 
0@X
j
 
j
 1
"
 
GNTr (j)
 " 1
"
1A "" 1
where GNTr (j) is given by:
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GNTr (j) 
 X
i
(ri)
1
(j)
 
GNTr;i (j)
 (j) 1
(j)
! (j)
(j) 1
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure within each variety of intermediate inputs
yields the following demand functions:
GNTr;i (j) = ri
 
P Tr;i (j)
P Tr (j)
! (j)
GNTr (j) (III.5)
and
GNTr (j) = j

P Tr (j)
P Tr
 "
GNTr (III.6)
Note that the rms share the same taste parameters, r; i and j , with the individuals.
Although this is somehow a restrictive assumption, it has very nice properties in terms of
bilateral trade implications that are discussed in Section 3.
8Since we care about the bilateral trade implications of our model, after assuming that the nontraded
goods market is in equilibrium in each region, the exact functional forms of Y NTr
 
LNTr ; G
NT
r

, demand for
LNTr , and the marginal cost implication for the nontraded goods are all irrelevant in our analysis.
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Trade Cost
We have to dene our trade cost rst. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) cat-
egorize the trade costs under two names, costs imposed by policy (tari¤s, quotas, etc.)
and costs imposed by the environment (transportation, wholesale and retail distribution,
insurance against various hazards, etc.). Since we analyze trade within a country (i.e., the
U.S.), we ignore the rst category and focus on the second one. Instead of assuming an
iceberg transport cost, we assume that the transportation is achieved by a transportation
sector, which is not modeled here.9 This assumption is important to distinguish between
the export income received by the exporter and the transportation income received by the
transporter. The implications of this assumption will be clearer below. In particular, we
assume that, if there is a trade between regions, it is subject to a transportation cost:10
P Ti;r (j) = (1 +  i;r (j))
 
P Tr;r (j)

(III.7)
= (Di;r)
(j)  P Tr;r (j)
where P Tr;r (j) is the price of the traded good at the factory gate (i.e., the source);  i;r (j) > 0
is a good specic net transportation cost from region r to region i; Di;r is the distance be-
tween regions r and i; and  (j) is the elasticity of distance.11 This assumption is commonly
used in the literature (see Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, 2004). The cost implications
of our model in terms of wholesale distribution, retail distribution, insurance or local taxes,
will be provided below.
9Since we consider only the partial equilibrium bilateral trade implications of our model, the actual
role/model of the transportation sector is irrelevant in our analysis after assuming that transportation is
achieved by using the completely mobile factor of production (i.e., the same factor used in the production
of traded/nontraded goods).
10Needless to say, the existence of trade is determined by Equation III.1 for all i, r and j. As we will
discuss in detail in the following sections, we consider the absence of trade, besides the existence of it in our
empirical analysis.
11For the distance within each state (i.e., the internal distance), we use the proxy developed by Wei (1996),
which is one-fourth the distance of a regions capital from the nearest capital of another region.
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Equilibrium
Since we care about the partial equilibrium bilateral trade implications of our
model, we naturally assume that the non-traded good market, of which details are not
shown here, is in equilibrium in each region. So, in this subsection, we depict equilibrium
in the traded goods market. In particular, for each variety r of traded good j produced in
region r, the market clearing condition implies:
Y Tr (j) =
X
i
CTi;r (j) +
X
i
GNTi;r (j) (III.8)
where CTi;r (j) is the demand of region i for variety r of traded good j (produced in region
r); and GNTi;r (j) is the intermediate input demand for variety r of traded good j (produced
in region r) demanded for the production of the non-traded good in region i . Equation
III.8 basically says that variety r of nal good j produced in region r is either consumed
locally or by other regions, either for nal consumption or as an intermediate input.
Price Setting
Since we care about the partial equilibrium bilateral trade implications of our
model, the price setting behavior of the rms producing the unique non-traded good in
each region is irrelevant in our analysis. For the traded goods, in region r, we assume that a
typical rm that produces variety r of traded good j faces the following prot maximization
problem:
max
PTr;r(j)
Y Tr (j)

P Tr;r (j) MCTr (j)

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subject to Equation III.8 and the symmetric versions of Equation III.1 and III.5. The rst
order condition for this problem is as follows:12
Y Tr (j)

1   (j)
P Tr;r (j)
 
P Tr;r (j) MCTr (j)

= 0
which implies that:
P Tr;r (j) =

 (j)
 (j)  1

MCTr (j) (III.9)
=

 (j)
 (j)  1

W
Ar (j)
where (j)(j) 1 represents the gross mark-up. For the second line, we have used Equation
III.4 which implies that, for a specic good, the factory price of the product di¤ers in each
region only because of the region specic technology levels.
Bilateral Trade
We distinguish between disaggregate and aggregate level trade in our analysis.
While the disaggregate level trade considers bilateral ratios of imports of a region for dif-
ferent varieties of a particular good, the aggregate level trade considers bilateral ratios of
imports of di¤erent goods for a particular region.
Disaggregate Level Trade
By using Equations III.1, III.5 and III.7, we obtain our key expression for the ratio
of imports of region r across regions a and b, which is expressed by:
Xr;a (j)
Xr;b (j)
=
a
b
 
P Tb;b (j)
P Ta;a (j)
!(j) 1
Dr;b
Dr;a
(j)(j)
(III.10)
12Notice that the rm takes the composite consumption index of good j (i.e., CTr (j)), the composite index
of intermediate demand for good j (i.e., GNTr (j)) and the composite price index of good j (i.e., P
T
r (j)) in
each region as given in the optimization problem.
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where Xr;k (j) =

CTr;k (j) +G
NT
r;k (j)

P Tk;k (j) is the value of total imports of region r from
region k measured at the source for good j.13 Equation III.10 says that a region imports
more goods (measured in values) from the lower price regions and fewer goods from the
more distant regions.
Substituting Equation III.9 into Equation III.10 results in the general form of our
estimated equations for our disaggregated level trade analysis:
Xr;a (j)
Xr;b (j)
=
a
b

Aa (j)
Ab (j)
(j) 1Dr;b
Dr;a
(j)(j)
(III.11)
Note that Equation III.11 is an exogenous solution for our estimated disaggregate level
trade expression, and thus, there is no need for any endogenous data such as income for the
estimation given the technology levels. Moreover, it can easily be estimated in log terms.
Aggregate Level Trade
By using Equations III.2 and III.6, we obtain our key expression for the ratio of
imports of region r in terms of goods j and k as follows:
Xr (j)
Xr (k)
=
j
k

P Tr (j)
P Tr (k)
1 "
(III.12)
where Xr (m) =
 
CTr (m) +G
NT
r (m)

P Tr (m) =
P
i

CTr;i (m) +G
NT
r;i (m)

P Ti;i (j)D
(j)
r;i

is the value of total imports of region r in terms of good m measured at the destination.14
Equation III.12 says that a region imports more (less) of a good which has a lower (higher)
destination price.
13If we had an iceberg cost in our analysis, we would have had Xr;k (j) = 
CTr;k (j) +G
NT
r;k (j)

PTk;k (j) (1 + r;k (j)) as the export income received by the exporter region for
good j. However, this is not the case in the real world that distinguishes between the exporter sector and
the transportation sector. For instance, our data set of Commodity Flow Survey includes only the export
income received by the rms, not the transportation income.
14Since the data set of Commodity Flow Survey includes only the export income received by the rms,
we have to distinguish between the value of exports at the source and at the destination. We will control
for these issues in our empirical analysis below.
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Substituting Equations III.7, III.9, and P Tr (j) 
P
i riP
T
r;i (j)
1 (j)
 1
1 (j)
into
Equation III.12 results in the general form of our estimated equations for our aggregate
level trade analysis:
Xr (j)
Xr (k)
=
j
k
0B@

(j)
(j) 1
P
i riD
(j)
r;i (Ai (j))
(j) 1
 1
1 (j)

(k)
(k) 1
P
i riD
(k)
r;i (Ai (k))
(k) 1
 1
1 (k)
1CA
1 "
(III.13)
Note that Equation III.13 is an exogenous solution for our estimated aggregate level trade
expression, and thus, there is again no need for any endogenous data such as income for
the estimation given the technology levels. Moreover, it can easily be estimated in log
terms after estimating the disaggregate level expression given by Equation III.11 (i.e., after
obtaining estimates for  (j)s and  (j)s).
Remarks and Estimation Methodology
We employ a two-step estimation process. First, we test the empirical power of
our model at the disaggregate level and obtain estimates of elasticity of substitution across
varieties of each good (i.e.,  (j)s), and good specic distance elasticities (i.e.,  (j)s) in the
disaggregate level estimation, by which we obtain good specic price indices (i.e., Pi (j)s).
Second, we test the empirical power of our model at the aggregate level and obtain the
elasticity of substitution across goods (i.e., ").
Disaggregate Level Trade Estimation
In this subsection, we provide the implications of Equation III.11, and we em-
pirically test di¤erent log versions of it by using the Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) that
covers bilateral interstate trade data within the U.S. The details of data are described in
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the Appendix.
Although Equation III.11 holds on average, it doesnt hold for each bilateral trade
ratio. In empirical terms, following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), and Henderson and
Millimet (2008), to address the unobservable nature of bilateral trade ratios, we assume
that there is an error term associated with each ratio, which implies that:
Xr;a (j)
Xr;b (j)
=
a
b

Aa (j)
Ab (j)
(j) 1Dr;b
Dr;a
(j)(j)
+ r;a;b;j
where E
h
r;a;b;j
 ab ; Aa(j)Ab(j) ; Dr;bDr;a i = 0. This can be rewritten as:
Xr;a (j)
Xr;b (j)
=
a
b

Aa (j)
Ab (j)
(j) 1Dr;b
Dr;a
(j)(j)
r;a;b;j (III.14)
where
r;a;b;j = 1 +
r;a;b;j
a
b

Aa(j)
Ab(j)
(j) 1 Dr;b
Dr;a
(j)(j) (III.15)
and E
h
r;a;b;j
 ab ; Aa(j)Ab(j) ; Dr;bDr;a i = 1. Taking the log of both sides in Equation III.14 results
in the following log-linear expression for the bilateral disaggregate level trade ratios:
log

Xr;a (j)
Xr;b (j)

= log

a
b

(III.16)
+( (j)  1) log

Aa (j)
Ab (j)

+  (j)  (j) log

Dr;b
Dr;a

+ log (r;a;b;j)
To obtain a consistent estimator of the slope parameters by the Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS), we assume that E
h
log (r;a;b;j)
 ab ; Aa(j)Ab(j) ; Dr;bDr;a i does not depend on the regressors.15
15It is well known that modeling zero interregional ows using a normal error process leads to problems. If
the dependent variable cannot take a value below zero, then a normal error process is a poor approximation.
Nevertheless, we dont have such a concern, because our log-linearized equation does have values below zero,
by considering the (log) ratio of bilateral trade values.
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Because of Equation III.15, this condition is met only if r;a;b;j can be written as follows:
r;a;b;j =
a
b

Aa (j)
Ab (j)
(j) 1Dr;b
Dr;a
(j)(j)
r;a;b;j
where r;a;b;j is a random variable statistically independent of the regressors. In such a case,
r;a;b;j = 1+r;a;b;j and therefore is statistically independent of the regressors, implying that
E
h
log (r;a;b;j)
 ab ; Aa(j)Ab(j) ; Dr;bDr;a i is a constant. Following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006),
we relax the assumption of E
h
log (r;a;b;j)
 ab ; Aa(j)Ab(j) ; Dr;bDr;a i not depending on the regres-
sors, in our Sensitivity Analysis #4, below, by considering the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) estimator.
In our estimation, we run only one OLS (or PPML) regression for the pooled
sample by including relevant dummy variables for ab ;  (j) and  (j) in Equation III.16.
Although Ai (j)s are region and good specic technology levels in Equation III.16, they
dont necessarily capture all the source specic xed e¤ects. This is why source specic
taste parameters (i.e., is) may play an important role in our estimation. For instance,
in additional to the technology levels, source specic xed e¤ects may capture possible
di¤erences in source specic production markups, source specic production taxes, and so
on. We test the validity of having both these xed e¤ects and technology levels at the same
time in Version B and Version G of our empirical estimation, below.16
According to Equation III.16, the following propositions are implied:
Proposition 1 Both  (j) and  (j) can be identied in Equation III.16 which is not the
16Multicollinearity is less of a problem in a cross-sectional analysis like ours that has a high sample size.
The reasoning is that we run only one regression instead of good specic regressions; if we were running
good specic regressions, then is and Ai (j)s would have been perfectly correlated, because, in such a
case, we would have good specic is. Moreover, the individual e¤ects of technology and source specic
taste parameters can both be assessed when there are su¢ cient number of observations of high technology
regions with low xed e¤ects and low technology regions with high xed e¤ects. Besides, the theoretical
consequences of multicollinearity is still a debate, because even if the multicollinearity is very high, the OLS
estimators still remain to be the best linear unbiased estimators. The only possible problem arises due to
having wide condence intervals in the presence of multicollinearity. However, by having very low condence
intervals, our estimation results below are robust to a possible multicollinearity problem. See Achen (1982)
and Gujarati (1995) for more details.
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case in most gravity models (see Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; Hummels 1999, 2001;
Wei 1996).
Proof. The identication is realized via the technology levels which are usually
ignored in gravity models. In particular, since both ( (j)  1) and  (j)  (j) can be esti-
mated by Equation III.16, one can identify both  (j) and  (j) while also calculating their
standard errors by employing the Delta method.
Proposition 2 All the variables in Equation III.16 are exogenous, which leaves an applied
researcher free from a possible endogeneity problem. Moreover, there is no need for income
data given the exogenous technology levels.
Proof. The proof follows through Equation III.11.17
Proposition 3 Assuming that overstatement of a distance is proportional to the distance
itself, the model controls for such an issue (because of the use of calculated distance measures
such as great circle distances) as mentioned by Hillberry and Hummels (2001).
Proof. Assuming that overstatement of a distance is proportional to the distance
itself, the distance ratio in Equation III.16 is not a¤ected at all. See sensitivity analysis #3
in Section 4 for details.
Proposition 4 By construction, the model is capable of controlling for the e¤ects of local
(i.e., wholesale and retail) distribution costs, insurance costs or local taxes, each of which
are possible topics for separate debates in the literature (see Anderson and van Wincoop
2004).
Proof. To see this, consider Equation III.1 by including such possible good specic
proportional costs. For instance, say that there is a proportional (net) cost of ' (j) for good
j in region r. Then, it follows that:
Cr;a (j) = a

Pr;a (j) (1 + ' (j))
Pr (j) (1 + ' (j))
 (j)
Cr (j)
17If trade leads to technology transfer, than technology may be correlated with past trade levels. And, if
there are unobservables omitted that are serially correlated, then technology will be endogenous. Neverthe-
less, these are not issues in our case, because we have a static rather than a dynamic analysis. Moreover, we
have unobservable (source specic, destination specic and bilateral specic) xed e¤ects in our analysis.
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and
Cr;b (j) = b

Pr;b (j) (1 + ' (j))
Pr (j) (1 + ' (j))
 (j)
Cr (j)
The same logic applies for Equation III.5, which together with the expressions above, implies
exactly the same expression as in Equation III.10.
Proposition 5 By construction, the model is capable of controlling for the e¤ects of inter-
mediate input trade.
Proof. Proof follows through denition of Xr;k (j) =

CTr;k (j) +G
T
r;k (j)

P Tk;k (j)
in Equation III.10.
Under certain assumptions, the model is also capable of controlling for the e¤ects
of international trade. In particular, we assume that the international trade partners of the
U.S. share similar tastes with the states in which the customs are located. Our justication
comes from the fact that, in CFS, international export (import) shipments are included,
with the domestic destination (source) dened as the U.S. port, airport, or border crossing
of exit from the U.S. After this reasonable assumption, it follows that our estimated trade
ratio given by Equation III.16 is not a¤ected at all by international trade, since the inclusion
of international trade will be proportional in such a case.
By using the general form in Equation III.16, we test several restricted versions
of it along with its unrestricted version. These restrictions are not only important for
econometric signicance tests, but they are also important for economic intuition in terms of
the contribution of each variable in Equation III.16 to explain the interstate trade patterns.
In particular, we test for the following versions of Equation III.16:
Version A) Unrestricted version of Equation III.16 in which we estimate A (the vector
consisting of  (j)s), A (the vector consisting of ab s), and 
A (the vector consisting
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of  (j)s) for all r; j; a and b. This is our benchmark equation by which we use ab
values as xed e¤ects in our regression, by which we can estimate  (j)s, by which
we can estimate  (j)  (j)s, and thus, by which we can obtain estimates of  (j) and
relative standard errors through the use of the Delta method.
Version B) Restricted version of Equation III.16 in which i =  for all i, thus, in which we
estimate B (the vector consisting of  (j)s), and B (the vector consisting of  (j)s)
for all j. Recall that in the unrestricted version of Equation III.16, i values serve
as source specic xed e¤ects in the regression analysis. When a = b, it follows
that log

a
b

= 0. Thus, the purpose of this restricted version is that it helps us
evaluate whether or not there are source specic xed e¤ects. This is also important
in terms of testing our assumption of source specic taste parameters in our CES
consumption/intermediate input functions. We can also see the contribution of these
xed e¤ects in explaining the interstate trade patterns by comparing the results of
this version with the results of version A through an additional restriction test.
Version C) Restricted version of Equation III.16 in which  (j) =  and  (j) =  for all
j, and thus, in which we estimate ;  and C (the vector consisting of ab s) for all
r; a and b. The purpose of this restriction is that it helps us decide whether or not
the trade costs and elasticities of substitution across varieties are good specic. This
restriction is important, because most of the gravity type studies ignore good specic
variations that a¤ect the accuracy of the estimation results. Together with Version
H, this restriction is also used to gure out whether or not the trade costs are good
specic.
Version D) Restricted version of Equation III.16 in which i =  for all i; and in which
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 (j) =  and  (j) =  for all j; thus, in which we estimate  and . This restriction is
used to test whether or not there are source specic taste parameters when there are
common trade costs and common elasticity of substitution across varieties for di¤erent
goods.
Version E) Restricted version of Equation III.16 in which rb = H and
a
b
= 1 for all r;
a (6= r) ; b (6= r); and in which  (j) =  and  (j) =  for all j, thus, in which we
estimate H ;  and . Since we make our analysis for a typical region r, rb = H
and ab = 1 together means that the goods purchased within a region are di¤erent
from the goods imported from other regions, i.e., the so-called home-bias. Together
with  (j) =  and  (j) = , the main purpose of this restriction is to nd whether
or not there is any home-bias, even at the intranational level, when trade costs and
elasticities of substitution across varieties are the same across goods.
Version F) Restricted version of Equation III.16 in which rb = H and
a
b
= 1 for all r;
a (6= r) ; b (6= r); thus, in which we estimate H ;F (the vector consisting of  (j)s)
and F (the vector consisting of  (j)s) for all j. This is the same as version E except
that the trade costs are now good specic. Thus, the main purpose of this restriction
is to nd whether or not there is any home-bias, even at intranational level, when
elasticities of substitution across varieties, and trade costs are good specic.
Version G) Restricted version of Equation III.16 in which Aa (j) = Ab (j) for all j (which
is equivalent, since we talk about the ratios, saying that Ai (j) = A for all i and j);
thus, in which we estimate GG (the vector consisting of  (j)  (j)s) and G (the
vector consisting of ab s). The purpose of this restriction is to evaluate whether the
technology levels are region specic or country specic.
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Version H) Restricted version of Equation III.16 in which  (j) =  for all j, thus, in which
we estimate, A (the vector consisting of ab s), and 
A (the vector consisting of
 (j)s) for all r; j; a and b. The purpose of this restriction is that it helps us decide
whether or not the elasticity of substitution across varieties is good specic. This
restriction is important, because most of the gravity type studies ignore good specic
 (j)s which a¤ect the accuracy of the estimation results.
Aggregate Level Trade Estimation
In this section, we introduce our methodology to estimate Equation III.13. We
empirically test it by using CFS data set and the estimation results of the disaggregate level
trade estimation. Analogous to the disaggregate level trade equation, although Equation
III.13 holds on average, it doesnt hold for each bilateral trade ratio. Therefore, we assume
that there is an error term associated with each ratio, which implies that:
Xr (j)
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
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35 = 0. This can be rewritten as:
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r;j;k (III.17)
where
r;j;k = 1 +
r;j;k
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(III.18)
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and E
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35 = 1. Taking the log of both sides
in Equation III.17 results in the following log-linear expression for the bilateral disaggregate
level trade ratios:
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To obtain a consistent estimator of the slope parameters by the OLS, we assume that
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regressors. Because of Equation III.18, this condition is met only if r;j;k can be written as
follows:
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where r;j;k is a random variable statistically independent of the regressors. In such a
case, r;j;k = 1 + r;j;k and therefore is statistically independent of the regressors, imply-
ing that E
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35 is a constant. As in the
disaggregate level analysis, for robustness, in addition to the OLS regression, we relax the
assumption of E
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35 not depending on
the regressors, by considering a PPML regression.
In our estimation, we run only one OLS (or PPML) regression for the pooled
sample by including relevant dummy variables for each
j
k
in Equation III.19. After having
the estimates for  (j)s and  (j)s coming from the disaggregate level estimation, we have
data and parameters for everything in Equation III.19 except for is and is. In particular,
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is cannot be estimated by our disaggregate level analysis, because they are cancelled out
after considering trade ratios. Moreover, we cannot uniquely identify each and every i in
our disaggregate level analysis due to overidentication issues. Hence, we restrict ourselves
to a special case in which i = i = 1 for all i in our aggregate level analysis.
Although calculated Pi (j)s are region and good specic price levels in Equation
III.19, they dont necessarily capture all the good specic xed e¤ects, especially the actual
preferences of the individuals for specic goods. This is why good specic taste parameters
(i.e., is) may play an important role in our estimation. Below, we test the validity of
having both these xed e¤ects and price levels at the same time.
Empirical Results
The empirical results for disaggregate and aggregate level trade estimations are
given in the following subsections. Before we continue, we have to take care of one more
issue: How should we include zero trade observations in our log-linear estimated equation?
For the sensitivity of our analysis, we follow three di¤erent approaches: 1) Assume that
zero (trade) observations are equal to one U.S. dollars worth; 2) assume that zero (trade)
observations are equal to one U.S. cents worth; 3) ignore the zero (trade) observations.18
Although the last one will be biased toward low elasticities of substitution compared to
the other two, it is worth presenting it for the sake of sensitivity. Moreover, we also use
that third approach to compare the e¤ects of using great circle distances and actual CFS
distances, which is mentioned by Hillberry and Hummels (2001). The estimation based on
18Unfortunately, we cannot employ a tobit specicition to account for the zeros, because we consider the
trade ratios instead of the trade itself. In particular, when we have a zero trade observation, then either
the numerator or the denominator of the left hand side of Equation III.16 (or both) is equal to zero. This
would make the trade ratio equal to either zero or innity (or indeterminate), and thus, employing a tobit
specication would not be plausible in log terms.
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the rst approach will be presented as the Benchmark Case, and the estimation based on
the others will be presented as the Sensitivity Analyses.
Disaggregate Level Trade Estimation Results
The disaggregate level trade estimation results for the benchmark case (i.e., the
rst approach in which zero trade observations are set equal to one U.S. dollars worth) are
given in Table 7. Table 7 distinguishes between di¤erent versions of the estimated equation.
Note that versions B,C,D,E, F, and H are all restricted versions of version A, and version
G is a special case of version A. Thus, we can test for those restrictions and decide whether
or not they are valid. The test results for these restrictions are given in Table 10. As is
evident, all the restrictions are rejected according to our F -test results. This suggests that
Version A, which is obtained through our model, is selected among all of our versions. This
implies that:
 Source specic xed e¤ects are found to be signicant in version B, which supports
our assumption of source specic taste parameters in the utility function.
 Trade costs are found to be good specic in version C, which supports our assumption
of good specic trade costs.
 Production technology for each good is found to be region specic in version G, which
further supports our model.
 Elasticity of substitution across varieties is found to be good specic in version H,
which supports our disaggregate level model.
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As is evident by Version A in Table 7, the elasticity of substitution across regions
is estimated as 5.24 on average.19 The disaggregate level estimates are given in Table 8.
Since the intranational studies within the U.S. such as Wolf (2000), Hillberry and Hummels
(2001), and Millimet and Thomas (2007) use gravity equations, they cannot estimate for the
elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of distance at the same time. So, we compare our
results with the ones in empirical international trade literature and see that our estimates for
the elasticity of substitution are lower on average. In particular, Hummels (2001) estimates
range between 4.79 and 8.26; the estimates of Head and Ries (2001) range between 7.9 and
11.4; the estimate of Baier and Bergstrand (2001) is about 6.4; Harrigans (1993) estimates
range from 5 to 10; Feenstras (1994) estimates range from 3 to 8.4; the estimate by Eaton
and Kortum (2002) is about 9.28; the estimates by Romalis (2007) range between 6.2 and
10.9; the (mean) estimates of Broda and Weinstein (2006) range between 4 and 17.3. This
di¤erence may be due to the distinction between intranational and international data sets
as well as the ignored factors in the literature such as local distribution costs, insurance
costs, local taxes and intermediate input trade. Since our model controls for all of these
factors, we claim that we have more accurate results intranationally. Someone may claim
that the di¤erence between our estimates and the estimates in the literature may also be
due to our inclusion of zero trade observations; however, as we will show in our sensitivity
analyses, the di¤erence between our estimates and the ones in the literature gets higher
when we ignore zero trade observations which is what the studies mentioned above actually
do.
19Also note that our estimates are highly signicant. Moulton (1986) suggests that one should adjust
the standard errors for OLS for the fact that the errors are correlated within the groups because of the
common group e¤ect. In this context, for robustness, we have also considered Moulton standard errors, and
our (t-test) results are almost the same. These results are available upon request. See Moulton (1986) and
Donald and Lang (2007) for the details of Moulton standard errors.
89
According to Version A in Table 7, the distance elasticity is estimated as 0.60
on average. The disaggregate level estimates are given in Table 9. These numbers are
higher than the distance elasticity estimates found by the literature, which are about 0.3
(see Hummels, 2001; Limao and Venables, 2001; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). This
di¤erence is most probably again due to using di¤erent frameworks or data sets, as well as
due to our inclusion of zero (trade) observations into our analysis. We are going to check
for the latter possibility in our sensitivity analysis. Another possible explanation for the
di¤erence between our distance elasticity estimates and the ones in the literature may be
the mode of transportation for interstate trade. In particular, it may well be the case that
the interstate trade is done by air through couriers like UPS, FedEX, and so forth, while the
international trade is done in transportation modes di¤erent from those. We will also check
for this possibility by considering di¤erent distance measures in our sensitivity analysis.
Another reason may be the usual assumption of iceberg transport costs in the literature.
As can be shown, if we had used that assumption instead of having a transportation sector,
our distance elasticities would have had lower estimates.20 However, since our data set of
CFS provides only the income received by the exporter rms (and excludes transportation
income), we prefer to distinguish between the exporter income and the transporter income,
which is against the iceberg cost assumption.
Although version A (implied by our model) is selected among all estimated versions
by our restriction tests, we can still have inference from other versions. Note that versions
E and F represent the cases by which we can analyze whether or not there is a home-bias.
Again according to Table 7, the values for H are positive and signicant, which according
to our denitions for versions E and F, suggest that there is a home-bias across the states
20It can be shown easily that the average  (j) estimate given in Table 1 (i.e.,0.59) would be replaced by
0.43 under the iceberg cost assumption.
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of the U.S. This bias is estimated as 5.73 by Equation E and 2.25 by Equation F. However,
since Equation E is a restricted version of Equation F, we can test this restriction. We
nd that the restriction is rejected, which means that a home-bias of 2.25 is more plausible
compared to 5.73. In particular, a typical state has a taste parameter  for locally produced
goods about 2.25 times more than imported goods. This number is very close to the
intranational home-bias estimated by Hillberry and Hummels (2003) which is exp(0:99) =
2:69. Therefore, although the literature overestimates the elasticity of substitution measures
and underestimates the elasticity of distance measures with respect to our results, the
measures of home-bias seem to be similar. One explanation is due to the interaction between
the two elasticity measures in Equation III.16. In particular, if two elasticity measures
operate in opposite signs (i.e., if one is overestimated and the other is underestimated),
then the results for the xed e¤ects captured by  values are not a¤ected too much since
two estimation errors cancel each other out to some degree.
Finally, the high adjusted R2 value of 0.42 for Equation A also supports our model.
Although version A (implied by our model) is selected among all estimated versions by our
signicance tests, we can still compare the contribution of each variable in Equation III.16
in explaining interstate trade patterns by considering the adjusted R2 values of each version.
In particular, we see that the highest di¤erence of adjusted R2 values takes place between
versions A and D&E, which means that source specic xed e¤ects and good specic trade
costs together play an important role in our estimations. The second highest di¤erence
of adjusted R2 values takes place between versions A and B&F, which means that source
specic xed e¤ects are signicant individually. The third highest di¤erence of adjusted R2
values takes place between versions A and C, which means that good specic trade costs
are also signicant individually. Finally, the lowest di¤erence of adjusted R2 values takes
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place between versions A, G and H, which means that good and region specic technology
parameters and elasticities of substitution across goods, besides the source specic xed
e¤ects, play a lesser role compared to other parameters, which makes sense since we are
making our analysis within a highly integrated economy, the U.S.
Sensitivity Analyses
In order to support our empirical results, in this section, we employ four sensitivity
analyses. The rst two are related to zero (trade) observations, the third one is related to
distance measures, and the last one is related to a possible biasedness of the OLS estimator
in log-linearized models.
Sensitivity Analysis #1 We start our sensitivity analysis by setting zero (trade) obser-
vations equal to one U.S. cents worth. In such a case, the estimation results in Table 7 are
replaced by the ones in Table 11. Note that we can again test for the restrictions of versions
B, C, D, E, F, G, and H with respect to version A. The test results for these restrictions
are given in Table 12. As is evident, all the restrictions are again rejected according to our
F -test results. This suggests that version A is again selected among all of our equations.
The high adjusted R2 value of 0.40 for Equation A again supports our model.
As is evident by Version A in Table 11, the elasticity of substitution is estimated
as 6.27 on average. The disaggregate level estimates are given again in Table 8. Although
these values are slightly higher than the ones in our benchmark case, they are still lower
than the estimates in the literature on average.21
The distance elasticity is estimated as 0.61 on average, which is very close to our
initial estimate in Table 7, yet higher than the ones in the literature. Moreover, the disag-
21Even if we set zero trade observations equal to 0.01 U.S. cent worth, the elasticity of substitution is
estimated as 6.50 on average.
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gregated distance elasticities given in Table 9 are very close to the ones that we estimated
initially.
Again according to Table 11, the values for H are positive and signicant, which
according to our denitions for versions E and F, suggest that there is a home-bias across
the states of the U.S. After a restriction analysis between versions E and F, the restriction
in E is again rejected. Thus, a typical state has a taste parameter  for locally produced
goods about 1.95 times more than imported goods. This number is close to our initial
estimate of 2.25.
Sensitivity Analysis #2 For our second sensitivity analysis, we ignore the zero (trade)
observations. In such a case, the estimation results in Table 7 are replaced by the ones in
Table 13. We again test for the restrictions of versions B, C, D, E, F, G, and H with respect
to version A. The test results for these restrictions are given in Table 14. As is evident,
all the restrictions are again rejected according to our F -test results. This suggests that
version A is again selected among all of our equations. The high adjusted R2 value of 0.60
for Equation A again supports our model.
This time, according to Version A in Table 13, the elasticity of substitution is
estimated as 2.70 on average. The disaggregate level estimates are given again in Table
8. These estimates are very low compared to the studies mentioned above even though
they also ignore zero trade observations (as in this subsection). We had given possible
explanations for this di¤erence above, so we wont repeat them here.
The distance elasticity is estimated as 0.37 on average. The disaggregate level
estimates are again given in Table 9. Although these numbers are closer to the distance
elasticity estimates in the literature (that we mentioned above, which are about 0.3), they
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are still higher. Thus, the di¤erence between our rst two estimates of distance elasticities
(i.e., our initial estimate and our rst sensitivity analysis) and the estimates in the literature
can, to some degree, be explained by the fact that we have included zero (trade) observations
in our rst two estimations. Nevertheless, the di¤erence doesnt disappear completely.
According to Table 13, the values for H are again positive and signicant, which
according to our denitions for Equations E and F, suggest that there is a home-bias across
the states of the U.S. In particular, a typical state has a taste parameter  for locally
produced goods about 1.93 times more than imported goods after testing for the restriction
between Equations E and F and rejecting it. This number is lower compared to our initial
estimates and the estimates of Hillberry and Hummels (2003).
Sensitivity Analysis #3 As we detail in the Appendix, until now, we have used great
circle distances instead of actual CFS distances, because average distance measures are
not provided by CFS for zero (trade) observations. However, as is shown by Hillberry
and Hummels (2001), using great circle distances, instead of actual distances provided by
CFS, may overstate the distance measure as in Wolf (2000). In one of our propositions,
we had claimed that we already control for this issue by taking the ratio of imports as
our dependent variable. Moreover, the coe¢ cient of correlation between the great circle
distances and actual distances provided by CFS is calculated as 0:98, after ignoring zero
trade observations. Nevertheless, as our third sensitivity analysis, we repeat our sensitivity
analysis #2, this time by using the average distance measure provided by CFS instead of
the great circle distance measure that we have used until now. In this way, we can compare
the e¤ects of great circle distances and the CFS distances on our empirical results.
When we use the CFS distances, the estimation results of sensitivity analysis #2
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given in Table 13 are replaced by the ones in Table 15. We again test for the restrictions
of versions B, C, D, E, F, G, and H with respect to version A. The test results for these
restrictions are given in Table 16. As is evident, all the restrictions are again rejected
according to our F -test results. This suggests that version A is again selected among all
of our equations. The high adjusted R2 value of 0.60 for Equation A again supports our
model.
As is evident by Version A in Table 15, the elasticity of substitution is estimated
as 2.74 on average. The disaggregate level estimates are given in Table 8. The distance
elasticity is estimated as 0.38 on average. The disaggregate level estimates are given in
Table 9. All of these estimates are very close to the ones presented for Sensitivity Analysis
#2.
According to Table 15, the values for H are again positive and signicant, which
according to our denitions for Equations E and F, suggest that there is a home-bias across
the states of the U.S. In particular, a typical state has a taste parameter  for locally
produced goods about 2.03 times more than imported goods after testing for the restriction
between Equations E and F, and rejecting it. Although this number is close to our initial
estimates, it is slightly higher compared to Table 13.
Overall, if we compare the numbers in Table 13 and Table 15, we see that they dont
change signicantly. This result supports our claim that we already control for overstating
distances mentioned by Hillberry and Hummels (2001).
Sensitivity Analysis #4 For our last sensitivity analysis, we repeat our analysis for
the benchmark case and the rst three sensitivity analyses by using the Poisson Pseudo-
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator. As Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), and Hender-
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son and Millimet (2008) suggest, under heteroskedasticity, the parameters of log-linearized
models estimated by OLS may lead to biased estimates; thus, PPML should be used. To
show this, Equation III.16 can be written as follows:
Xr;a (j)
Xr;b (j)
= exp

log

a
b

+ ( (j)  1) log

Aa (j)
Ab (j)

+  (j)  (j) log

Dr;b
Dr;a

r;a;b;j
(III.20)
Assuming E[r;a;b;j j ab ;
Aa(j)
Ab(j)
;
Dr;b
Dr;a
] = 1, then Equation III.20 may be estimated consistently
using the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator (see Santos Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006). Since Version A has been chosen among all versions earlier, we repeat our
analysis only for Version A here. The results are given in Table 17.
As is evident, the (average) elasticity of substitution across varieties  ranges
between 2:17 and 2:63, and the (average) elasticity of distance  ranges between 0:30 and
0:59, which are both consistent with our earlier claim that our  estimates are lower than
and our  estimates are higher than the ones in the international trade literature.
Aggregate Level Trade Estimation Results
The aggregate level trade estimation results are given in Table 18. As we have
done for the disaggregate level analysis, we consider four di¤erent approaches with two
di¤erent estimation methods, OLS and PPML. As is evident, the elasticity of substitution
across goods is estimated as 1:38 by OLS (2:19 by PPML) in our benchmark case, which is
the one that sets zero trade observations equal to one U.S. dollars worth. When zero trade
observations are set equal to one U.S. cents worth, the elasticity of substitution across goods
is estimated as 1:27 by OLS (2:19 by PPML). When zero trade observations are ignored,
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it is estimated as 1:95 by OLS (2:44 by PPML). Finally, when CFS distance measures are
used instead of great circle distances, it is estimated as 1:92 by OLS (2:97 by PPML).
Although the estimates of " are lower than the elasticity of substitution across
varieties estimates (i.e.,  (j)s), as expected, according to OLS estimator, they are very
close to each other according to PPML estimator. This result is consistent with the view
that when goods are aggregated, the elasticity of substitution across them decreases. Nev-
ertheless, these numbers are signicantly lower than the estimates in the literature that we
have discussed above. As in our disaggregate level analysis, we claim that this di¤erence
may be due to distinction between intranational and international data sets as well as the
ignored factors in the literature such as local distribution costs, insurance costs, local taxes
and intermediate input trade. Since our model controls for all of these factors, we claim
that we have more accurate results intranationally. Our results are supported by several
sensitivity analyses with high explanatory powers.22
Conclusions
We have written a partial equilibrium model to nd motivations for bilateral trade
ratios across regions. In particular, we have shown that a region imports more goods from
the higher technology regions and fewer goods from the more distant regions, subject to
an elasticity of substitution across varieties. Moreover, a region imports more of a good,
of which price is lower, subject to an elasticity of substitution across goods. As we have
explained in detail in the text, our model has several empirical and analytical benets
compared to the gravity models. Thanks to the disaggregate (state) level data set combined
22We have also tested di¤erent restricted versions of Equation III.19, such as common s or common
Pi (j)s, in our aggregate level analysis. We nd that none of the restrictions are valid, and therefore
Equation III.19 is selected among all versions. These restriction test results are available upon request.
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from the Commodity Flow Survey and the U.S. Census Bureau, we are also able to show
that our simple model is capable of explaining the interstate trade patterns within the U.S.
In particular, we show that the elasticity of substitution measures are overestimated in the
literature, while the elasticity of distance measures (thus, trade costs) are underestimated
in the literature relative to our estimates.
We have shown that source specic xed e¤ects and good specic taste parameters
are important for bilateral trade patterns, which are usually ignored in the literature. We
have also shown that elasticities of substitution across varieties, and trade costs are good
specic, which is not a considered fact in most of the aggregate level gravity type studies.
Moreover, production technology for each good is found to be region specic rather than
country specic. Our sensitivity analyses support our results.
The best strategy for possible future research would be to extend the model of
this study toward explaining international trade patterns. Such an analysis would be more
convenient with a general equilibrium framework, although a partial equilibrium framework
was good enough for this chapter after assuming factor mobility for the production of traded
goods.
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Table 7. OLS Estimation Results
Equation
A B C D E F G H
 [5:24] [1:16] 5:31 1:12 1:08 [1:13]   5:24
[(0:08)] [(0:16)] (0:06) (0:03) (0:03) [(0:17)]   (0:03)
 [0:60] [2:76] 0:59 2:85 2:87 [2:78]   [0:60]
[(0:03)] [(0:13)] (0:01) (0:02) (0:03) [(0:14)]   [(0:29)]
 A   C   5:73 2:25 G H
()   ()   (0:29) (0:22) () ()
             G  
            ()  
R-bar sqd. 0:42 0:31 0:37 0:26 0:26 0:31 0:41 0:41
Notes: The standard errors calculated by Delta method are in parenthesis. The sample size for all
estimations is 47,819 which is found after considering the independent observations (ratios) and after
ignoring the missing observations. The average of the estimated vectors of A and Aare given in
brackets of which full vectors are given in Table 8. The estimated vectors of A; C; G and H (all
having a size of 505) are omitted to save space. For equations E and F,  corresponds to H . For
Equations A-F, the estimates for  are omitted since the estimates for  and  are already given
separately.
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Table 8. Estimated Vectors of Elasticity of Substitution across Varieties
Benchmark SA#1 SA#2 SA#3
Cereal grains 5:01 6:02 2:22 2:32
(0:06) (0:06) (0:18) (0:19)
Other agricultural products 5:05 6:04 2:57 2:45
(0:06) (0:07) (0:09) (0:10)
Animal feed, products of animal 5:01 5:99 2:46 2:57
(0:06) (0:07) (0:10) (0:10)
Meat, sh, seafood 5:54 6:65 2:60 2:64
(0:06) (0:06) (0:07) (0:07)
Milled grain, bakery products 5:14 6:16 2:69 2:74
(0:06) (0:07) (0:07) (0:07)
Prepared foodstu¤s and fats 5:23 6:27 2:61 2:62
(0:06) (0:07) (0:06) (0:06)
Alcoholic beverages 5:25 6:29 2:81 2:83
(0:06) (0:06) (0:08) (0:08)
Tobacco products 5:28 6:33 3:08 3:19
(0:06) (0:06) (0:14) (0:13)
Natural sands 5:25 6:29 2:55 2:44
(0:06) (0:06) (0:12) (0:13)
Gravel and crushed stone 5:22 6:25 2:78 2:85
(0:06) (0:06) (0:10) (0:10)
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Table 8, continued
Benchmark SA#1 SA#2 SA#3
Nonmetallic minerals 5:04 6:01 2:84 2:90
(0:06) (0:07) (0:10) (0:10)
Metallic ores and concentrates 5:23 6:27 3:09 3:38
(0:06) (0:06) (0:19) (0:17)
Coal 5:07 6:06 1:65 1:90
(0:06) (0:06) (0:19) (0:18)
Gasoline, aviation turbine fuel 5:13 6:14 3:09 3:12
(0:06) (0:06) (0:09) (0:09)
Fuel oils 5:10 6:10 2:69 2:87
(0:06) (0:06) (0:10) (0:11)
Coal and petroleum products 5:14 6:15 2:59 2:74
(0:06) (0:07) (0:09) (0:09)
Basic chemicals 5:32 6:38 2:54 2:55
(0:06) (0:07) (0:07) (0:07)
Pharmaceutical products 5:71 6:87 2:69 2:71
(0:06) (0:06) (0:07) (0:07)
Fertilizers 5:08 6:08 4:07 4:08
(0:06) (0:07) (0:09) (0:11)
Chemical products 5:16 6:18 2:65 2:66
(0:07) (0:07) (0:07) (0:07)
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Table 8, continued
Benchmark SA#1 SA#2 SA#3
Plastics and rubber 5:16 6:17 2:72 2:73
(0:07) (0:07) (0:06) (0:06)
Wood products 4:98 5:95 2:65 2:67
(0:07) (0:07) (0:06) (0:06)
Pulp, newsprint, paper 5:74 6:90 2:72 2:74
(0:06) (0:06) (0:06) (0:06)
Paper or paperboard articles 5:21 6:23 2:66 2:67
(0:06) (0:07) (0:07) (0:07)
Printed products 5:19 6:22 2:63 2:64
(0:07) (0:07) (0:06) (0:06)
Textiles, leather 5:21 6:23 2:70 2:72
(0:07) (0:07) (0:06) (0:06)
Nonmetallic mineral 5:35 6:42 2:55 2:56
(0:06) (0:07) (0:07) (0:07)
Base metal 5:38 6:45 2:68 2:70
(0:06) (0:07) (0:06) (0:06)
Articles of base metal 5:15 6:15 2:70 2:73
(0:07) (0:07) (0:06) (0:06)
Machinery 5:40 6:48 2:68 2:70
(0:06) (0:07) (0:06) (0:06)
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Table 8, continued
Benchmark SA#1 SA#2 SA#3
Electronic, electrical 5:37 6:41 2:76 2:78
(0:06) (0:07) (0:06) (0:06)
Motorized and other vehicles 5:58 6:69 2:71 2:72
(0:06) (0:06) (0:06) (0:06)
Transportation equipment 5:22 6:25 2:58 2:57
(0:07) (0:07) (0:08) (0:08)
Precision instruments 4:94 5:87 2:87 2:88
(0:07) (0:08) (0:06) (0:06)
Furniture, mattresses 5:45 6:54 2:71 2:73
(0:06) (0:07) (0:07) (0:07)
Miscellaneous manufactured 5:35 6:40 2:69 2:70
(0:06) (0:07) (0:06) (0:06)
Waste and scrap 5:17 6:19 2:69 2:69
(0:06) (0:07) (0:16) (0:16)
Mixed freight 5:21 6:24 2:68 2:69
(0:07) (0:07) (0:06) (0:06)
Notes: The standard errors calculated by Delta method are in parenthesis. For more details, see 7.
SA#1,2,3 stand for Sensitivity Analysis #1,2,3, respectively.
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Table 9. Estimated Vectors of Elasticity of Distance
Benchmark SA#1 SA#2 SA#3
Cereal grains 0:21 0:22 0:24 0:29
(0:03) (0:02) (0:02) (0:11)
Other agricultural products 0:46 0:47 0:27 0:29
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:04)
Animal feed, products of animal 0:49 0:51 0:53 0:46
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:06)
Meat, sh, seafood 0:95 0:98 0:33 0:32
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02)
Milled grain, bakery products 0:83 0:86 0:35 0:36
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
Prepared foodstu¤s and fats 0:85 0:86 0:41 0:41
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02)
Alcoholic beverages 0:65 0:67 0:40 0:40
(0:03) (0:02) (0:02) (0:03)
Tobacco products 0:23 0:24 0:22 0:27
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:07)
Natural sands 0:43 0:46 0:51 0:55
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:06)
Gravel and crushed stone 0:60 0:63 0:69 0:66
(0:03) (0:02) (0:02) (0:05)
104
Table 9, continued
Benchmark SA#1 SA#2 SA#3
Nonmetallic minerals 0:42 0:45 0:26 0:21
(0:04) (0:03) (0:03) (0:06)
Metallic ores and concentrates 0:16 0:17 0:09 0:35
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:17)
Coal 0:26 0:27 0:33 0:29
(0:03) (0:02) (0:02) (0:08)
Gasoline, aviation turbine fuel 0:67 0:69 0:47 0:47
(0:03) (0:02) (0:02) (0:05)
Fuel oils 0:63 0:65 0:55 0:54
(0:03) (0:02) (0:02) (0:05)
Coal and petroleum products 0:78 0:81 0:42 0:43
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:05)
Basic chemicals 0:77 0:80 0:26 0:27
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
Pharmaceutical products 0:71 0:72 0:46 0:46
(0:04) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02)
Fertilizers 0:37 0:38 0:23 0:16
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:06)
Chemical products 0:80 0:83 0:38 0:38
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02)
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Table 9, continued
Benchmark SA#1 SA#2 SA#3
Plastics and rubber 0:50 0:49 0:38 0:38
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:01)
Wood products 0:89 0:91 0:39 0:39
(0:03) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02)
Pulp, newsprint, paper 0:84 0:87 0:32 0:31
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02)
Paper or paperboard articles 0:99 1:03 0:39 0:39
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02)
Printed products 0:62 0:63 0:43 0:42
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:01)
Textiles, leather 0:34 0:33 0:29 0:29
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:01)
Nonmetallic mineral 0:93 0:96 0:49 0:47
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02)
Base metal 0:85 0:87 0:45 0:44
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02)
Articles of base metal 0:64 0:65 0:40 0:41
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02)
Machinery 0:42 0:41 0:36 0:35
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:01)
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Table 9, continued
Benchmark SA#1 SA#2 SA#3
Electronic, electrical 0:30 0:28 0:32 0:31
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:01)
Motorized and other vehicles 0:76 0:78 0:37 0:37
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02)
Transportation equipment 0:33 0:34 0:23 0:22
(0:04) (0:04) (0:04) (0:03)
Precision instruments 0:69 0:71 0:25 0:25
(0:04) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02)
Furniture, mattresses 0:73 0:75 0:36 0:35
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02)
Miscellaneous manufactured 0:27 0:25 0:34 0:34
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:01)
Waste and scrap 0:30 0:31 0:40 0:41
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:09)
Mixed freight 1:05 1:05 0:59 0:60
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02)
Notes: The standard errors calculated by Delta method are in parenthesis. For more details, see 7.
SA#1,2,3 stand for Sensitivity Analysis #1,2,3, respectively.
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Table 10. Restriction Test Results
Equation
B C D E F G H
F -test 18:74 48:91 23:97 23:86 18:74 7:10 7:29
d.f. 1 505 74 579 578 504 38 37
d.f. 2 47; 743 47; 312 47; 817 47; 816 47; 742 47; 276 47; 275
p-value (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the restrictions are valid.
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Table 11. OLS Estimation Results for Sensitivity Analysis 1
Equation
A B C D E F G H
 [6:27] [1:19] 6:37 1:15 1:11 [1:17]   6:26
[(0:07)] [(0:18)] (0:06) (0:03) (0:03) [(0:20)]   (0:03)
 [0:61] [3:31] 0:61 3:41 3:46 [3:34]   [0:62]
[(0:03)] [(0:17)] (0:01) (0:03) (0:03) [(0:17)]   [(0:30)]
 A   C   6:00 1:95 G H
()   ()   (0:26) (0:26) () ()
             G  
            ()  
R-bar sqd. 0:40 0:30 0:36 0:25 0:25 0:30 0:39 0:39
Notes: The standard errors calculated by Delta method are in parenthesis. The sample size for all
estimations is 47,819 which is found after considering the independent observations (ratios) and after
ignoring the missing observations. The average of the estimated vectors of A and Aare given in
brackets of which full vectors are given in Table 8. The estimated vectors of A; C; G and H (all
having a size of 505) are omitted to save space. For equations E and F,  corresponds to H . For
Equations A-F, the estimates for  are omitted since the estimates for  and  are already given
separately.
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Table 12. Restriction Test Results for Sensitivity Analysis 1
Equation
B C D E F G H
F -test 18:03 46:96 23:06 23:00 18:05 6:91 7:09
d.f. 1 505 74 579 578 504 38 37
d.f. 2 47; 743 47; 312 47; 817 47; 816 47; 742 47; 276 47; 275
p-value (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the restrictions are valid.
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Table 13. OLS Estimation Results for Sensitivity Analysis 2
Equation
A B C D E F G H
 [2:70] [1:06] 2:63 1:05 1:01 [0:98]   2:68
[(0:09)] [(0:18)] (0:06) (0:02) (0:02) [(0:20)]   (0:04)
 [0:37] [0:92] 0:38 0:86 0:83 [0:93]   [0:37]
[(0:03)] [(0:02)] (0:01) (0:01) (0:01) [(0:12)]   [(0:18)]
 A   C   2:03 1:93 G H
()   ()   (0:08) (0:15) () ()
             G  
            ()  
R-bar sqd. 0:60 0:33 0:58 0:32 0:32 0:33 0:59 0:59
Notes: The standard errors calculated by Delta method are in parenthesis. The sample size for
all estimations is 12,581 which is found after considering the independent observations (ratios) and
after ignoring the missing observations together with zero observations. The average of the estimated
vectors of A and Aare given in brackets of which full vectors are given in Table 8. The estimated
vectors of A; C; G and H (all having a size of 709) are omitted to save space. For equations E
and F,  corresponds to H . For Equations A-F, the estimates for  are omitted since the estimates
for  and  are already given separately.
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Table 14. Restriction Test Results for Sensitivity Analysis 2
Equation
B C D E F G H
F -test 14:56 7:40 13:89 13:70 14:40 4:61 4:72
d.f. 1 701 74 775 774 700 38 37
d.f. 2 12; 740 12; 113 12; 814 12; 813 12; 739 12; 077 12; 076
p-value (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the restrictions are valid.
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Table 15. OLS Estimation Results for Sensitivity Analysis 3
Equation
A B C D E F G H
 [2:74] [1:08] 2:66 1:06 1:01 [1:01]   2:70
[(0:09)] [(0:18)] (0:06) (0:02) (0:01) [(0:20)]   0:04
 [0:38] [0:92] 0:38 0:86 0:83 [0:92]   [0:38]
[(0:04)] [(0:12)] (0:01) (0:01) (0:01) [(0:13)]   [(0:18)]
 A   C   2:16 2:03 G H
()   ()   (0:09) (0:19) () ()
             G  
            ()  
R-bar sqd. 0:60 0:32 0:59 0:31 0:32 0:33 0:59 0:59
Notes: The standard errors calculated by Delta method are in parenthesis. The sample size for
all estimations is 12,581 which is found after considering the independent observations (ratios) and
after ignoring the missing observations together with zero observations. The average of the estimated
vectors of A and Aare given in brackets of which full vectors are given in Table 8. The estimated
vectors of A; C; G and H (all having a size of 709) are omitted to save space. For equations E
and F,  corresponds to H . For Equations A-F, the estimates for  are omitted since the estimates
for  and  are already given separately.
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Table 16. Restriction Test Results for Sensitivity Analysis 3
Equation
B C D E F G H
F -test 14:36 6:88 13:71 13:51 14:20 4:40 4:53
d.f. 1 709 74 783 782 708 38 37
d.f. 2 12; 505 11; 870 12; 579 12; 578 12; 504 11; 834 11; 833
p-value (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the restrictions are valid.
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Table 17. PPML Estimation Results
A A R-bar sqd.
Benchmark Case 2:17 0:59 0:54
(0:01) (0:01)
Sensitivity Analysis #1 2:17 0:59 0:54
(0:01) (0:01)
Sensitivity Analysis #2 2:63 0:30 0:83
(0:04) (0:01)
Sensitivity Analysis #3 2:54 0:34 0:84
(0:04) (0:01)
Notes: The standard errors calculated by Delta method are in parenthesis. For each case, the
sample size is the same as in the earlier tables. The average of the estimated vectors of A and
Aare presented.
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Table 18. Estimation Results for Elasticity of Substitution Across Goods
" R-bar sqd.
Benchmark Case (OLS) 1:38 0:68
(0:14)
Sensitivity Analysis #1 (OLS) 1:27 0:68
(0:13)
Sensitivity Analysis #2 (OLS) 1:95 0:77
(0:14)
Sensitivity Analysis #3 (OLS) 1:92 0:77
(0:14)
Benchmark Case (PPML) 2:19 0:13
(0:01)
Sensitivity Analysis #1 (PPML) 2:19 0:13
(0:01)
Sensitivity Analysis #2 (PPML) 2:44 0:08
(0:01)
Sensitivity Analysis #3 (PPML) 2:97 0:07
(0:02)
Notes: The standard errors are in parenthesis The sample size for all estimations is 1,319 which is
found after considering the independent observations (ratios) and after ignoring the missing obser-
vations.
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Appendix
This Appendix depicts the details of the data used in the empirical analysis. For
the bilateral trade analysis, we use the state-level Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) data ob-
tained from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics for the United States for the year 2002.
In particular, we use bilateral interstate trade data for the 2-digit Standard Classication
of Transported Goods (SCTG) commodities of which codes are given in Table 19 and of
which names are given in the rst column of Table 8 in the respective order.
The CFS captures data on shipments originating from select types of business
establishments located in all states of the U.S. However, because of data availability, we
exclude Alaska, District of Columbia and Hawaii from our analysis. In CFS, shipments
traversing the U.S. from a foreign location to another foreign location (e.g., from Canada
to Mexico) are not included, nor are shipments from a foreign location to a U.S. location.
Shipments that are shipped through a foreign territory with both the origin and destination
in the U.S. are included in the CFS data. The mileages calculated for these shipments
exclude the international segments (e.g., shipments from New York to Michigan through
Canada do not include any mileages for Canada). International export (import) shipments
are also included in CFS, with the domestic destination (source) dened as the U.S. port,
airport, or border crossing of exit from the U.S.
In order to obtain the technology levels, we rst use an approximate crosswalk be-
tween 3-digit North American Industry Classication System (NAICS) and 2-digit SCTG
obtained from the National Transportation Library of the Bureau of Transportation Statis-
tics. This crosswalk is given in Table 19. After that, we use Ai (j) = log

Vi(j)
PiLi(j)

as our
measure for the technology levels, where Vi (j) is the industry/region specic value added;
Pi is the cost of living index for state i borrowed from Berry et al. (2003); and Li (j) is the
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industry/region specic hours of labor supplied by the production workers. For the value
added of each NAICS industry in each state, we use the state level U.S. Census Bureau
data for the relevant industries in 2002.23
For distance measures, we calculate great circle distance between states by using
latitudes and longitudes of capital cities of each state published by U.S. Census Bureau.
Note that we dont use the average distance measures given by CFS in our initial analysis,
because those measures are available only for realized trade observations. Since we consider
zero (trade )observations in our analysis, we use the great circle distance measures that
are not included in CFS. Moreover, because we use the ratio of imports of a region (and
thus, the ratio of distances), we already control for a possible issue of overstating the
distance measures mentioned by Hillberry and Hummels (2001). Nevertheless, we compare
our estimation result obtained by great circle distances and with the one obtained by CFS
distances in our sensitivity analysis #3 in the text.
23Although we use value added for each industry to calculate technology levels, this should not be necessary
the case if we already had a better measure of technology. In other words, our claim in the text saying "We
dont need any income data given the technology levels" still holds. Although the state-level production
functions typically include public and private capital, to be consistent with the model, technology is dened
on the basis of value added by labor.
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Table 19. Crosswalk Between NAICS and SCTG
SCTG NAICS SCTG NAICS SCTG NAICS
2 311  312 17 324 31 327
3 311  312 18 324 32 331  324
4 311  312 19 324  325 33 332
5 311  312 20 325 34 333
6 311  312 21 325 35 334  335
7 311  312 22 325 36 336
8 311  312 23 325 37 336
9 311  312 24 326 38 334
11 212 26 321 39 337
12 212 27 322 40 339
13 212 28 322 41 313  331
14 212 29 323 43 MIX OF ALL
15 212 30 313
Notes: The source is National Transportation Library of the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics.  means that an average of the relevant NAICS industries has been used to obtain
technology levels. ** means that there is no corresponding production data for that specic NAICS
industry in the U.S. Census Bureau data set; thus, we assume that the technology levels are the
same across states for those industries. Finally, SCTG 43 corresponds to mixed freight for which an
average of all other NAICS industries in the table are used to obtain technology levels.
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CHAPTER IV
A MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL CITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR REAL EXCHANGE
RATES
Introduction
According to the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts, expenditure by
consumers at the retail level is about twice what producers receive for the same goods and
services. This di¤erence has come to be called the distribution margin. The distribution
margin includes transportation costs from the factory gate to the nal point of consumption
as well costs and markups at the wholesale and retail stage.
Most existing international models abstract from the distribution sector entirely
and focus on the fraction of transportation costs attributable to international shipments.
Abstracting from the distribution sector is problematic for three reasons. First, the dis-
tribution sector may help us to understand the large and persistent deviations from the
Law-of-One-Price (LOP) and Purchasing Power Parity. Second, the general equilibrium in-
teraction of the distribution sector and the production sector is not well understood. Given
the prominent role of the dichotomy between traded and non-traded goods in international
nance, this is an important omission. Recent evidence also suggests that information tech-
nology and scale economies in distribution have altered the e¢ ciency and markup structure
of the distribution sector (e.g., the Walmart e¤ect). These developments may have funda-
mentally altered price dispersion and dynamics, both across locations within countries and
across countries. Third, the distribution sector includes the nancial, legal, medical and
education sectors. These sectors have grown immensely in economic importance over time.
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Much of the economic activity engaged by these sectors is geographically segmented due
either to the arms-length nature of the exchange, public policy decisions or some combina-
tion of the two. Since the shares of expenditure attributable to these sectors tend to rise
with the level of development, their economic importance continues to rise globally.
We have two related goals in this paper. The rst is to develop a tractable sto-
chastic general equilibrium model of production and distribution at the microeconomic level
of individual goods and services across cities. The second is to use the theory to specify a
regression model to estimate microeconomic parameters of a cost function, specic to an
individual retail good or service, which includes the cost of distribution as well as the more
traditional inputs of capital and labor embodied in traded inputs. This cost function is
used to conduct a variance decomposition of prices across cities into a distribution margin,
a trade cost margin and a residual, good-by-good. The distribution margin is further parsed
into the inuences of labor and retail infrastructure costs across cities. The Economist In-
telligence Unit (EIU) retail price data along with supplementary sources for wages at the
city level are used in the empirical work. Since the model assumes perfect competition and
abstracts from o¢ cial barriers to trade, the residual in the regression equation is expected
to include markups, o¢ cial barriers to trade and measurement error.
In the model, each city is inhabited by two representative agents, a manufacturer
and a retailer. The manufacturer produces a single homogeneous good using labor as the
only input. The manufactured good is shipped to all other cities of the world and deviations
in the prices of these traded goods reect only shipping costs from the factory door to the
receiving dock at the retail establishment. The retailer transforms these goods by combining
them with her labor and a xed factor; she may also produce pure services which require no
traded inputs at all. The xed factor is intended to capture retail infrastructure, broadly
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dened to include land, buildings, equipment and public infrastructure.
The advantage of drilling down to the level of individual goods and services at
the city level is that we can learn a great deal about production structure from the cross-
sectional variance in the data. What distinguishes the manufacturing sector from the dis-
tribution sector is intimately related to what distinguishes a personal computer from a
haircut. Aggregating the data tends to obscure these di¤erences. For example, if trade
costs are symmetric, aggregating across imports and exports has the e¤ect of understating
their role. Having cities as the locations allows both greater attention to the spatial dimen-
sions of manufacturing specialization and a more precise measure of the distance between
production and consumption locations.
We have two sets of results, one for the sources of LOP variance for the median
good, the other for the di¤erences in the sources of variance across goods in the cross-
section. For the median good in the EIU sample, trade costs account for about 50 percent of
LOP deviations, the distribution margin accounts for about 10 percent and the remaining
40 percent is unaccounted for. Because the median good in the EIU has a distribution
share of only 0.2, well below the aggregate value of 0.5 in the U.S. National Income and
Product Accounts, we also report results centered on this value. Now the tables turn, with
distribution costs accounting for 43 percent, trade costs 36 percent percent and 21 percent
of the variance unexplained.
The relative importance of trade and distribution is fairly stable across sets of
locations that include high and low income countries and when comparing within country
and cross-border city pairs. The absolute level of cross-sectional variance rises when a
border is crossed as one would expect or when comparisons are made between cities with
vastly di¤erent wealth levels. One exception is the division of the variance accounted for
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by the distribution sector into the cost of labor and capital. Variance across low income
countries is dominated by di¤erences in the capital component, with labor playing a small
role. For other countries, the division of the distribution margin across labor and capital is
closer to equality.
Turning to di¤erences in geographic price dispersion across goods, we nd substan-
tial heterogeneity consistent with Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2005) who focused on
European Union capital cities using Eurostat micro-price data. The structure of the model
and methodology allow us to say more about the underlying sources of this heterogeneity.
In the international data, the distribution margin accounts for 50 percent of cross-sectional
variance in LOP deviations for the good with the highest distribution share and this fraction
falls to a mere 10 percent as we move to the good with the lowest distribution share. Retail
infrastructure accounts for more than 30 percent of the cross-sectional variance in LOP de-
viations across Canada and the United States for the good with the highest infrastructure
intensity, while accounting for virtually none of the variance for the good with the lowest
infrastructure intensity.
Our theoretical model is closest to Giri (2009) who adds a good-specic distribu-
tion cost to the Eaton-Kortum (2002) model. In Giris model distribution services are in
xed proportion to the physical units of the base good as in Burstein, Neves and Rebelo
(2003) (BNR) with e¢ ciencies drawn from a distribution with a country-specic mean and
common world-wide variance. In contrast, we assume that the technological parameter
for distribution inputs is goodspecic while the productivity of the distribution sector is
city-specic. Given that this margin is measurable in the NIPA, we view this as a more
tractable way to model the distribution sector than the random e¢ ciency approach. Our
model shares with Alvarez and Lucas (2007), Atkeson and Burstein (2007), Eaton and Ko-
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rtum (2002), and Kanda Naknoi (2008) an interest in the role of traditional trade costs.
However, to the extent these papers incorporate a distribution sector, it is a common wedge
across all goods in the retail basket, which assumes away any cross-sectional variance in
price deviations due to the distribution margin. We nd this heterogeneity to be essential
for improving our understanding of LOP deviations.
The Model
Each city, indexed by j, is inhabited by two representative agents. As is usual in
representative agent frameworks, these two agents should be viewed as stand-ins for a large
number of atomistic agents of each type, since we will be assuming perfect competition in
all factor and nal goods markets throughout. One agent specializes in the production of a
single traded good, indexed by i, while the other specializes in retail trade and production
of non-traded services. Production in the manufacturing sector is proportional to labor
input, the factor of proportionality is a random productivity variable. Retail production
requires both labor and capital. Capital is xed and is broadly dened to include land,
buildings, equipment and public infrastructure. Productivity varies across cities in both
the traded goods sector and the retail sector.
Traded goods are subject to iceberg transportation costs which are good and des-
tination specic. Final goods and local inputs (retailer labor and retail capital) are not
traded beyond the city limits. While hours and consumption are both choice variables,
the assumptions we make in the model imply constant hours in all sectors in all locations,
reminiscent of the Long and Plosser (1983) multi-sector, closed economy, real business cycle
model. Retail infrastructure, including land, capital and equipment, is in xed supply
(denoted Kj).
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The good index, i, distinguishes physical objects from the identities of agents
and locations only when needed to avoid confusion. In describing the ow of goods from
one location to another, the source is the rst subscript and the destination is the second
subscript. Thus, Xsd refers to the shipment of good X, from city s to city d. Given
the assumption that individuals at each location specialize, s also indexes the good and
the individual to whom the income ows, while d indicates the expenditure side of the
equation.  sd is the iceberg shipping cost from the source to the destination. Since there
are no durable goods or assets in the model, adding time subscripts is innocuous: they are
omitted here since the focus is on the steady-state properties of the model and long-run
deviations from the LOP.
The full solution for quantities and prices is given in the appendix. This sec-
tion presents the complete model and parts of the equilibrium solution relevant for pricing
implications, which is the focus of our empirical work.
Consumers
Agents preferences are log-additive over consumption and leisure:
U
 
CAj ; L
A
j
  (1  ) logCAj +  logLAj , A = m; s. (IV.1)
CAj is aggregate consumption and L
A
j is hours of leisure, for an individual working in city
j. There are two individuals in each city, indexed by A = m; s; one is engaged in the
manufacture of a single good (m) and the other is engaged in retailing and service activities
(s).
The consumption aggregate is CES over varieties of manufactured goods produced
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worldwide:
CAj =
 
MX
i
(i)
1
"
 
CAij
 " 1
"
! "
" 1
. (IV.2)
CAij is the consumption of good i in city j by worker of type A; " > 0 is the elasticity of
substitution across goods, i is a good specic taste parameter and M is the number of
manufactured goods in existence. M is also the number of cities given our specialization
assumption.
The two agents inhabiting city j, maximize utility (IV.1) subject to their respective
budget constraints:
X
i
PijC
A
ij WAj NAj + 'AHjKj (IV.3)
where Pij is the price of good i in destination city j. These prices will be the same for all
agents in the same location, but di¤er across locations for reasons described below. Each of
the two residents of city j earn labor income from their production activities and split the
rental income accruing to the retail infrastructure in their city ('m + 's = 1), the stock of
which is assumed to be xed at Kj . The rental price of retail infrastructure is denoted Hj.
The consumers problem may be solved in two stages. In the rst stage, the con-
sumer chooses aggregate consumption and leisure, subject to a budget and time allocation
constraint. In the second stage, the consumer minimizes expenditure across goods. Here
we collapse the problem to a single stage for brevity. The key equations from the solution
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to the consumers problem are:
CAij = i

Pij
Pj
 "
CAj (IV.4)
CAj =
WAj N
A
j + '
AHjKj
Pj
(IV.5)
NAj = 1     'A
HjKj
WAj
(IV.6)
LAj =  + '
A
HjKj
WAj
(IV.7)
Aggregate real consumption is nominal consumption deated by the ideal deator Pj P
i i (Pij)
1 "
 1
1 "
, which ensures
P
i PijCij = PjCj as well as a theoretical mapping from
price indices to welfare.
The rst equation determines consumption demand for a particular good as a
function of the relative price of the good paid by the nal consumer in their home market
and that individuals aggregate consumption level. It is important to note that, Pij is the
retail price of good i, in city j; it embodies the cost of local retail services paid to the retailer
in addition to the traditional iceberg trade costs of the imported item. The price index,
is a weighted average of these retail prices, the closest empirical counterpart would be the
CPI index. The second equation is aggregate consumption of an agent, which is equal to
her real income. Real income is the sum of nominal wage and rental income, deated by
the local price level, Pj .
The last two equations determine hours of work and leisure. In the absence of
rental income, the two agents would work the same number of hours, independent of their
relative wage, due to the o¤setting income and substitution e¤ect of wages on e¤ort with
Cobb-Douglas preferences. In the presence of rental income the requirement for constant
e¤ort in equilibrium is that the ratio of rental income to labor income be constant. Most
growth models impose restrictions on tastes and technology to ensure constancy of hours
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per capita in the presence of trending productivity.1
Manufacturers
The production function for manufactured good, i, is:
Yi = AiN
m
i (IV.8)
where Ai is the productivity level and Nmi is hours of work.
Manufacturers choose labor inputs to maximize prots:
max
Nmi
(QiiYi  Wmi Nmi ) . (IV.9)
The manufacturer receives the factor gate price, Qii, for every unit produced, no matter
where the goods end up being sold. Given the assumptions of constant returns to scale,
perfect competition and one factor of production, the factory gate price equals the manu-
facturing wage divided by productivity:
Qii =
Wmi
Ai
. (IV.10)
Given specialization, the productivity level in this expression is good and city-specic. The
presence of a nation-specic component could easily be incorporated by allowing Ai to have
a common factor across cities located within the same country.
Retailers in each city purchase the manufactured goods and pay a proportional
shipping cost. Thus the retail purchase price is the factory-gate price marked up by a
proportional shipping cost:
Qij = (1 +  ij)Qii = (1 +  ij)W
m
i =Ai (IV.11)
1Details of these restrictions in the context of the one sector stochastic growth model may be found in
King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988).
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where  ij > 0 is the net transportation cost from city i to j. Qij is the price the retailer pays
in the destination city. The empirical counterpart to this would be a wholesale price. The
local manufacturing plant is close enough to the city to ignore local transportation costs
so that  ii = 0. E¤ectively this cuts out one intermediary, the wholesaler, and the retailer
is viewed as operating next to the factor gate. The destination price of the manufactured
good depends: i) positively on both the manufacturing wage and the trade cost; and ii)
negatively on manufacturing productivity.
Retailers
The retailer in each city optimally chooses how much of each manufactured good
to purchase from various cities of the world. The retailer transforms these goods using a
fraction of her time endowment and some amount of the local retail infrastructure. The
retailer then sells the resulting composite good in the local retail market. The production
function for good i, sold in city j is:
Rij =
 
BjN
s
ij
i (Kij)1 i1 i (Gij)i (IV.12)
Gij is the amount of the manufactured good imported from city i, by a retailer in city
j. N sij is the fraction of the retailers time endowment allocated to the transformation of
imported good i for local consumption in city j andKij is the amount of retail infrastructure
allocated to retail good i in city j. Bj is labor-augmenting productivity specic to the city
(equivalently, the retailer), common to all goods sold there.2
While the production function is restricted to be common to all locations, it is
very exible across goods. It captures pure labor services (e.g., baby-sitting services) with
2In principle one could add good-specic productivity of retailers to account for di¤erent levels of com-
petency across goods, but we lack productivity data to operationalize this idea.
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i equal to zero and i equal to one; internet purchases (e.g., Amazon.com book purchases),
i equal to one, and all points in between.
The retailer in city, j, maximizes prots from the sale of each good, i, by optimally
choosing the three inputs needed to produce the good: i) the amount of the traded input,
Gij , to import ii) the fraction of her time to devote to the good, N sij ; and iii) how much
local infrastructure to allocate to the activity, Kij :
max
Nsij ;Kij ;Gij
(PijRij  W sjN sij  HjKij  QijGij) (IV.13)
At the optimum, the unit price equals marginal cost. Given constant returns to scale and
three factors of production, the retail price of good i sold in location j, is a Cobb-Douglas
aggregate of the price (inclusive of trade cost) that the retailer paid to acquire the traded
input, Qij , the retailers market wage, W sj , and the rental price of retail infrastructure, Hj :
Pij = MC
s
ij = i
 
W sj =Bj
i (Hj)(1 i)(1 i) (Qij)i (IV.14)
 1i  ii

(1  i) (i)i (1  i)(1 i)
(1 i)
(IV.15)
The retail price in city j is rising in input prices and falling in retail productivity, Bj .
Equilibrium
The appendix contains the tedious algebra necessary to arrive at the equilibrium
allocations discussed in this section. In the remainder of the paper the consumption aggre-
gator is restricted to Cobb-Douglas to arrive at closed form solutions.
In the global general equilibrium, all the optimality conditions of partial equilib-
rium must hold for consumers, retailers and manufacturers. In addition, the supply of each
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good must equal its total demand, including the resources lost to iceberg shipping costs.
Yi =
X
j
Gij(1 +  ij) (IV.16)
=
X
j
Gij +
X
j
Gij ij (IV.17)
= Gi + Ti (IV.18)
In words: the production of good i, Yi, is exhausted between the global demand for that
good by retailers aggregated across destinations, Gi, and physical loses due to iceberg costs,
Ti.
Each individual has a xed amount of time to devote to hours of work and leisure,
here, normalized to unity. The time constraints for the manufacturers and the retailers are
thus:
Lmj +N
m
j = 1 (IV.19)
Lsj +
X
i
N sij = 1 . (IV.20)
The summation in the second time constraint reects the fact that the retailer must divide
her time across theM di¤erent retailing activities. The notation implicitly sets the number
of goods at the retail level equal to the number of goods in the manufacturing sector.
Nothing we derive requires this: we could have some activities that use no traded inputs
at all in which case the number of retail goods would exceed the number of manufacturing
goods by the number of pure services produced by retailersin each city.
The citys retail infrastructure is exhausted across uses:
Kj =
X
i
Kij .
131
The Data
Our focus is retail price dispersion across international cities at the microeconomic
and macroeconomic level. The data source for prices is the Economist Intelligence Unit
(EIU) worldwide retail price survey. The survey spans 123 cities, located in 79 countries.
Most of the cities are national capitals. The larger number of cities than countries is due
to the fact that the survey also includes multiple cities in a few countries. Noteworthy are
the 16 U.S. cities included in the survey; the next largest number of cities surveyed equals
5 in Australia, China and Germany. Up to data availability for particular years and cities,
the number of goods and services priced is 301. The available sample is 1990 to 2005.
Our goal is to understand the sources of variation in LOP deviations. The Cobb-
Douglas functional forms in our model rationalize the use of logarithms of LOP deviations
across bilateral city-pairs:
qijk;t = ln(Sjk;tPij;t=Pik;t) . (IV.21)
while our long-run focus further suggests the use of time-averaged deviations:
qijk = T
 1X
t
qijk;t . (IV.22)
Crucini and Telmer (2007) derive a variance decomposition which is very useful for splitting
the total variance of LOP deviations into long-run deviations and time series uctuations:
V arjk;t(qi;jk;t j i) = V arjk(Et[qi;jk;t j i; jk]) + Ejk[V art(qi;jk;t j i; jk)] (IV.23)
Vi = Ti + Fi : (IV.24)
The rst term, Ti, which is meant to remind the reader of trade costs broadly
dened, is the focus of this paper. It is the variance of the deviations from the LOP across
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all location pairs remaining after time-averages of the data have been taken. The role of
time-averaging is to eliminate the time series component of the variation, which is valid
when the data are stationary and su¢ ciently long time samples are available, which is the
case here. The second term, Fi, which is to remind the reader of uctuations, is the focus
of the international nance literature, often featuring short-run uctuations of LOP due to
local currency price stickiness. One of the novel ndings of Crucini and Telmer is that the
ratio of the variance of the long-run deviations to the total (i.e., Ti=Vi) is very large for the
average good: 0.51 for U.S.-Canada intranational pairs and 0.69 for all international city
pairs in the EIU data. In other words, the variance component this model focuses upon is
at least as important in an accounting sense as the focus of business cycle models.
One way to visualize this property of the data is to estimate LOP distributions
using kernel estimation. Figure 18 has eight such kernel estimates. Each chart contains two
lines, one for the distribution of time-averaged LOP, qijk, and one for the distribution of
the time series deviations from the long-run means, qijk;t   qijk. The upper two charts are
distributions for U.S. city pairs and the lower two are international pairs. The left column
uses non-traded goods prices and the right column uses traded goods prices. The dominance
of the long-run sources of variation relative to the short-run (time series) sources of variation
in most cases is evident in the wider dispersion in the LOP distributions represented by the
solid lines than those represented by the dashed lines in each chart. The role of borders in
increasing price dispersion is evident in comparing the top and bottom panels and the role
of the type of good, as summarized by the classical dichotomy, is apparent by comparing
charts in a particular row across columns.
Table 20 presents summary statistics relating to these gures. The least amount of
price dispersion is found in U.S. traded goods, 0.29 and the greatest amount is found in the
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case of non-traded goods involving border crossings, 1.07. More surprising is the fact that
non-traded goods in the U.S. have less price dispersion than do traded goods internationally,
0.54 compared to 0.68. Interquartile di¤erences yield similar measures of price dispersion.
As discovered by Crucini and Telmer (2007), the time series variation is always less than
the long-run variance, with the possible exception of traded goods across U.S. cities and
even there one of the two measures (interquartile di¤erence) also gives this ranking. Notice
also that the distinction between traded and non-traded goods is obvious in the long-run
measure, but ambiguous in the time series measure. Given our emphasis on trade costs,
broadly dened and abstraction from stochastic variation due to shocks interacting with
sticky prices, this observation is another reason to focus on the time averaged data with
our model.
The EIU survey o¤ers little in the way of wage data. Supplemental wage data at the
country level come from the International Labor Organization (ILO) survey of occupational
and sectoral wages and at the city level from the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) survey.
The ILO data are averages for countries. They span 49 sectors, 162 occupations and 137
countries. The sample period is annual from 1983 to 2003. The complete list of these sectors,
occupations, and countries is found in Oostendorp (2003). In the raw ILO data, the most
common period is the month, followed by the hour, but some countries report weekly pay,
others give daily rates for some occupations, and so on. In order to have a comparable
wage data across countries, the standardized version of ILO survey by Oostendorp (2003)
is used: in cases in which the wage data are reported as hourly or daily, then these wages
were made (roughly) comparable with monthly wages by multiplication by 160 and 20
respectively. In order to have the largest panel of wage data that are comparable across
countries, the monthly wages in US dollars that have been obtained by country-specic and
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uniform calibration in Oostendorp (2003) are used.
Wage data at the city level is more appropriate given the EIU retail price data
is city based and the intent of the model. International cities were surveyed by the UBS
in 2006. These are hourly wages in US dollars, spanning occupations in 71 international
cities, 60 of which are also surveyed by the EIU. Among the 60 EIU cities there are four
cities from Brazil, Canada, China, France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland; four cities from
Germany, and four cities from the U.S. The hourly wages have been obtained by dividing
the income per year in each occupation by the city level hours of work in a year, where the
latter we collected by a survey, also conducted by the UBS.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) city wage data from the Occupational Employ-
ment Statistics (OES) Survey in 2006 are used to complement UBS data. These wage data
are hourly wages in US dollars for the same 16 US cities found in EIU retail price survey.
The combination of UBS and BLS wage data, then, provides wage data for 72 EIU cities,
comprised of 16 from the BLS and the remainder (non-U.S. cities) from the UBS. Within
these 72 EIU cities, in terms of intranational cities, we have two cities from Brazil, Canada,
China, France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland; three cities from Germany, and 16 cities from
the US.3
In a preliminary part of the analysis, the BLS city wage data are used for broader
wage dispersion analysis. These data cover two industries, namely production and sales, for
400 cities (on average) within the U.S. in terms of hourly wages from 1999 to 2006.
A number of trade-o¤s present themselves in terms of the model focus and the
available data. Country-level wage data is generally available for longer periods of time,
but fewer locations than city-level wage data. Since the model is explicitly constructed to
3In an earlier version of this paper we used PWT per capita annual income data covering the annual
period from 1990 to 2004 to proxy for real wages. These data span all 79 EIU countries. The results were
qualitatively similar to those reported here.
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mimic city level aggregation and steady-state features, ideally one would want long time
series at the city level. Unfortunately these are simply not available. These trade-o¤s are
discussed as they arise below.
Land prices and rents are even more di¢ cult to come by than are wages and prices.
We use the EIU survey data item: Typical annual gross rent for top-quality units, 2,000
square meters, suitable for warehousing or factory use.4
The other two pieces of information are sectoral estimates of the distribution
shares, 1   , which are calculated from a combination of U.S. NIPA data and input-
output tables. The NIPA data extend to 57 sectors, while the input-output data span 33
sectors. The NIPA shares are computed as the value the producers receive relative to the
value consumers pay for the output of a particular sector. The distribution margin, 1  ,
includes transportation costs, retail and distribution costs and markups. Sectors involving
arms-length transactions, such as medical services are recorded in the NIPA as though the
producer and consumer valuation is equal. While this is literally true in some cases, this
accounting fails to distinguish local inputs from traded inputs used in the production of ser-
vices. For these sectors we use the input-output tables to determine the distribution share.
These sectoral measures from the NIPA complement the good-level parameters estimated
using a regression framework discussed below.
Finally, the greater circle distance between cities in the EIU sample is used to
4One additional commerical rental price is available in the EIU, Typical annual gross rent for a 1,000
square meter unit in a Class A building in a prime location.Results are very similar with this alternative
measure.
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estimate the trade cost component of the LOP deviations at the retail level.5
Microeconomic Sources of Long-run Variation in Wages
In the model, wage deviations arise across the retail and manufacturing sectors
and across cities. The amount of labor income accruing to the manufacturer relative to the
retailer in city j is,
Nmj W
m
j
N sjW
s
j
=
P
i iiP
i (1  i) ii
(IV.25)
Which is intuitive: the numerator is an expenditure share weighted average of labors share
of manufacturing and the denominator is the counterpart in retailing. The appearance of
the parameter i in the denominator accounts for the fact that retail production involves
some retail infrastructure, unless i = 1, in which case retail production is labor-only. Note,
also, that the ratio is the same in all cities.
As the primary interest is wage variation across cities as an explanation for cost
and price variation across cities, we would like to understand the wage ratio and e¤ort ratios
separately. The equilibrium relative sectoral wage is given by:
Wmj
W sj
=
'm
1  'm
(1  ) N sj
(1  ) Nmj
Thus, given xed shares of rental income across agents in the city, relative wages and relative
hours move inversely as one would expect. The appendix shows that the equilibrium e¤ort
5Hummels (2001) provides the most comprehensive estimates of sectoral trade costs using import unit
values, a more direct method than employed here. Unfortunately these estimates are available for a limited
number of countries and are more aggregated than our retail data.
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levels are:
Nmj =
(1  0) (1  )
(1  0) + 'm (0   1)
N sj =
1 (1  )
1 + '
s (0   1)
where 0 
P
i (1  i)i and 1 
P
i (1  i) ii. E¤ort in both sectors is declining in
the share of rental income allocated to the agent (a wealth e¤ect), and in the preference for
leisure (), as one would expect.
Substituting these expressions into the wage ratio leads to the following expression
for relative wages:
Wmj
W sj
=
1  'm
'm
(1  0) + 'A
1 + (1  'A)
 =  (0   1).
As the retail sector becomes more labor intensive (thus reducing rental income),
(0   1) converges to zero and the model reverts to the labor-only version with a common
fraction of available hours worked by both agents, equal to (1  ) and the sectoral wage
ratio converges to:
Wmj
W sj
=
1  0
0
=
P
i iiP
i (1  i)i
which is exactly the same expression as labor income shares in the more general case (see
equation (IV.25)).
Turning to wage di¤erences across cities things are much simpler even in the
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general case:
W sj
W sk
=
jj
kk
(IV.26)
Wmj
Wmk
=
jj
kk
. (IV.27)
The cross-city wage di¤erential is the same in both sectors and is determined by the product
of the taste and technology parameters in the two locations being compared. The intuition
for this result is as follows. Consider, rst, the special case in which all goods use traded
inputs in the same proportion, j = . Wages are higher in locations that produce the
goods most preferred by consumers, given by the comparison of j and k, a demand-side
e¤ect. Next, consider the case with symmetric tastes across goods j = ; then wages are
the highest for producers of manufactures requiring the least amount of input from retailers
(i.e., the lowest 1   ). Essentially, the higher the distribution share, the less productive
is an hour allocated to production of the manufactured good in terms of delivering a unit
of consumption to nal consumers. This lowers the equilibrium real wage.
Wage data are available by occupation or sector of employment. Our model focuses
on the distinction between goods and services, suggesting the production sector denition
is more appropriate. However, we use both labor classications as a robustness check.
The more comprehensive of the sources used is the ILO survey of wage levels
across countries. These data span 49 sectors, 162 occupations and 137 countries. The
sample period is annual from 1983 to 2003.6 Because the model is intended to be based on
city-level data, the preferred measure is wage data from the UBS that span 14 occupations
and 71 international cities for the year 2006.
According to the model, if the retail sector uses only labor and traded goods,
6Useful technical documentation is found in Remco H. Oostendorp (2003).
139
the ratio of manufacturing wages to service wages provides on estimate of the overall scale
of the distribution sector Wmj =W
s
j = =1   ,  =
P
i ii. Since we lack consumption
expenditure shares at the present time, we associate this with the distribution share alone
since using the symmetric taste version of the model we have:  = . A direct way to
measure the overall size of the distribution sector is to use U.S. NIPA data and input-output
data. Crucini and Shintani (2008) do exactly this and nd  = 0:57. The advantage of
their calculation is that is it based on expenditure weighting of sectoral s.
Table 21 reports the sectoral wage ratio averaged across locations as well as the
implied value for . It turns out that the direct and indirect (model-based) estimates are
equal when U.S. wages in production sector relative to the sales sector are used. The
wage ratio in the international data is consistent with a value  of 0.52. While this is a
modest di¤erence from the U.S. value, the implied manufacturing wage premium is quite
dramatically a¤ected: it is a factor of 5 smaller than the U.S. case. It could be that relative
productivity di¤erences are the cause. Another possibility is that the U.S. and international
agencies have di¤erent classication systems for the sectors.
As the theory is a two-sector model, any sectoral variation in wages in a particular
city is attributable to wage di¤erences across the manufacturing and service sectors. Vari-
ation in wages across sub-sectors are abstracted from entirely. Thus, it is important for the
theory that wages di¤er signicantly across locations and less so across sectors other than
the two sectors emphasized by the model (retail and manufacturing). And this is what is
found.
Table 22 conducts a variance decomposition by sector and country for time-
averaged wages in the case of the ILO survey and an analogous decomposition by sector and
city for wages in 2006 for the UBS survey data. Since the answer may depend on the set
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of sectors and locations used, we consider three location groups and allow for many sectors
throughout. The location groups are the entire world, the OECD and the LDC.
Based on the ILO wage data: locations account for between 72 and 85 percent of
the cross-sectional variation in wages, sectoral di¤erences account for less than 10 percent.
The dominance of location in accounting for wage dispersion is somewhat less pronounced
when the data is organized by occupation: location e¤ects drop to between 38 and 65
percent. Most of di¤erence is not attributed to a pure sectoral component, but rather an
interaction of location and sector. The UBS tell a similar story to the ILO for location
e¤ects, with the occupation e¤ect rising in contribution due to a lower interaction with
location compared to the ILO.
In sum, location is a key component of wage dispersion with the precise fractions
depending somewhat on the set of locations examined and the precise denition of wage
categories.
Microeconomic Sources of Long-run Variation in Real Exchange Rates
We turn, now, to the main focus, price dispersion. In the model, prices consumers
actually pay may di¤er from factory gate prices for two reasons. The rst is the trade cost
to import the good from the foreign production location. The second is the value added
by the retailer. To simplify the notation, all international prices have been converted to
common currency units (it does not matter which numeraire is chosen). The ratio of the
price of good i in city j relative to k, based on the theory is:
Pij
Pik
=

W sj =Bj
W sk=Bk
i(1 i)Hj
Hk
(1 i)(1 i)Qij
Qik
i
.
Noting that the last term reduces to the ratio of trade costs from the single source of good i
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to each of the destinations, j and k and taking logs, denes the Law-of-One-Price deviation
across a city pair:
qijk = (1  i) [i!jk + (1  i)hjk] + i ijk (IV.28)
= i!jk + ihjk + i ijk .
The retail margin is the rst term in square braces; it is a weighted average of the productivity-
adjusted wage and the rental price di¤erential faced by retailers in the two cities. The
weights attached to the relative input prices in the retail sector depend on i. The entire
retail component gets weighted by its overall share in the production of the nal good,
(1  i). The second term is the relative trade cost. The last line, used to specify our
regression approach, expresses the relationship in terms of the three key cost ratios, retail
wages, rental prices and trade costs.
The aggregate real exchange rate in our theory follows directly from equation
(IV.28) since the consumption aggregator is Cobb-Douglas (i.e., " = 1):
qjk = !jk + hjk +
X
i
ii ijk (IV.29)
 
X
i
ii(1  i),  
X
i
i(1  i)(1  i)
The aggregate real exchange rate has a number of interesting features. The distribution
component of the PPP deviations are driven by exactly the same wage and rental price di¤er-
entials as was true of the LOP deviations, the impact factors are consumption-expenditure-
weighted production parameters,  and . The trade cost component is more convoluted
because the expenditure shares, production coe¢ cients, and trade costs are good specic.
However, it seems plausible that the individual deviations could average out across goods
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since the  ijk are expected to vary in sign across goods.
Regression Specication
This section conducts a variance decomposition of retail prices into the channels
described by the equilibrium model. Adding a measurement error term to the theoretical
equation for the LOP deviation, gives:
qijk = i!jk + ihjk + i ijk + "ijk (IV.30)
Data on retail prices, wages and rent, are available, but no data on retail productivity or
trade costs exist for this cross-section of locations, at this level of disaggregation. The raw
wage ratios are used in place of !jk and a two-stage estimation approach is used to infer
the impact of trade costs.
The rst-stage regression is:
qijk = 1i!jk + 1ihjk + ijk. (IV.31)
where ijk is an estimated residual, which, according to the theory, is the LOP deviation
in the traded component of cost. In practice it will incorporate other sources of deviations
as well. In an attempt to purge these other factors from the pure trade cost component,
the estimated residuals are projected on bilateral distances. To accomplish this, dene the
direction-of-trade indicator function:
Iijk =
8>><>>:
1 if ijk > 0
 1 if ijk < 0
(IV.32)
where ijk = qijk   1i!jk   1ihjk from the rst-stage regression. In words: imports
(exports) are assumed to be relatively expensive (inexpensive) at the destination (source).
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Consider, now, the more elaborate equation for stage two:
qijk = 2i!jk + 2ihjk + & i2Iijkdjk + "ijk (IV.33)
2i = (1  i)i (IV.34)
2i = (1  i)(1  i) (IV.35)
&2i = ii (IV.36)
with the trade cost replaced by Iijkidjk. The indicator function ensures the sign of the
implied trade cost is consistent with the sign of the residual estimated in stage one. The
greatest circle distance between locations j and k is the empirical counterpart to djk and
goods are allowed to have di¤erent trade cost elasticities with respect to distance, i. The
benet of projecting the prices on wages, rents, and the indicator function multiplying
distance is that we relegate any sources of variation in retail prices not correlated with
wages, rental prices or distance to the error term. This gives us more condence that the
wage, rental, and trade cost components are capturing what the model says they should.
The model is best suited to describe the long-run properties of real exchange rates
since we abstract from nominal exchange rate variation and sticky prices. While we have a
long panel of EIU retail price data from which to construct time-averages and target long-
run price dispersion, as noted earlier, we lack comparable city-level panel data on wages.
Moreover, the argument could be made for estimating the parameters with a single cross-
section. Our benchmark estimation and variance decomposition uses time-average data as
available (i.e., for qijk and hjk) and wage data for a single cross-section in 2006. Wage data
from the UBS is used for cities outside of the U.S. and wage data from the BLS is used for
U.S. cities. Preliminary experimentation with alternatives does not seem to alter the main
thrust of the results.
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We see in Table 23, that the empirical model captures the majority of long-run
retail price dispersion across locations for all groupings of the data. The range of variance
accounted for is between 70 percent and 90 percent for the median good when pooling all
international cities or just those in North America. The t of the model is excellent over
much of the distribution of goods. The lowest quartile for the R2 is a very respectable 0.67
(the OECD cross-border pairs). In summary, the empirical model ts well across sub-set of
locations and across goods ranging from haircuts to personal computers.
Variance Decomposition
Using the estimated equations motivated by the theory, we are able to provide
a cross-sectional variance decomposition analysis according to the following equation (we
suppress the residual and covariance terms here for expositional convenience; also the pa-
rameters used in computations will be those from the second stage estimation, though we
suppress the subscript denoting this as well in what follows):
varjk (qijk) = (1  i)2Dijk + 2i dijk .
According to the theory, geographic price dispersion at the level of an individual good,
i, is a weighted average of the geographic dispersion in distribution costs, Dijk, and the
geographic dispersion of destination prices for traded inputs, dijk. The relative contribution
of distribution costs and trade costs for a particular good hinges on the value taken by the
distribution share, i, ranging from close to zero for a personal computer to close to 1 for
a haircut.
Recall that the distribution cost component is a weighted average of the dispersion
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in wages and rental prices:
Dijk  [2i varjk(!jk) + (1  i)2varjk(hjk)] .
Finally, the quantitative role of trade costs depends on the relationship between trade costs
and distance interacting with the direction of trade:
dijk = 
2
i varjk [Iijkdjk] .
Table 24 presents estimates of the variances of retail prices, wages and rental prices
for various location groups: i) intranational city pairs (which given the data, is dominated
by U.S. city pairs), and ii) cross-border city pairs (using three groupings, OECD, LDC and
World).
The conventional wisdom is that factor markets are close to perfectly integrated
intranationally, while the immobility of labor and possibly capital prevents this from oc-
curring internationally. This seems to be a reasonable assumption of labor markets since
we nd wage dispersion of 3 or 4 percent, for intranational pairs. It appears not to be true
of rental prices, where dispersion is about 30 percent. These numbers are fairly robust of
inclusion of intranational city pairs outside of North America.
Turning to cross-border city pairs, consistent with expectations, we see less of
a tendency toward factor-price equalization than within countries. In fact, there is an
approximate tripling of the variance of wages as a consequence of crossing the U.S.-Canadian
border. The border width appears less dramatic when we look at rental prices, where
the variance merely doubles. When we expand the set of international comparisons to
the OECD, we nd virtually no impact on wage dispersion, but a large impact on rental
price dispersion. Expanding the geography further to include both the OECD and non-
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OECD (the row labelled WORLD), wage dispersion increases considerably more than rental
price dispersion. The main implication for retail price dispersion, though, is that factor
price dispersion rises by a factor of about 30 for both wages and rental prices as we move
from intranational city pairs to international city pairs. Distribution costs, therefore, are
expected to be signicant contributors to the absolute level of LOP deviations at the retail
level, particularly for cross-border pairs since factor prices are far from being equalized
internationally. Moreover, the relative contribution of distribution costs relative to trade
costs will shift across goods according to the distribution share parameter, i.
We turn now to the details of the variance decomposition. The analysis considers
both a variance decomposition for the median good and results good-by-good. In each case
we contrast interesting geographic groups. For the discussion that follows, it is useful to
refer to the full variance decomposition:
varjk (qijk) = [(1  i)i]2varjk(!jk) + [(1  i)(1  i)]2varjk(hjk)
+(ii)
2varjk [Iijkdjk] + varjk ["ijk] + cov terms
Consider a good which uses no traded inputs at the retail level (i = 0). The prediction
simplies reduces to:
varjk (qijk) = 
2
i varjk(!jk) + (1  i)2varjk(hjk) + cov terms
We key insight here, is that price dispersion is entirely due to retail costs associated with
wage and rental price dispersion, varjk(!jk) and varjk(hjk), respectively. These numbers
naturally depend on the locations pooled in the estimation for the reasons discussed earlier.
Borders matter.
At the opposite end of the continuum is a good with no retail costs at all (e.g., a
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good available on the internet that trades up to a shipping cost everywhere in the world
(i = 1)). Now the expression for the predicted price dispersion reduces to:
varjk (qijk) = 
2
i varjk [Iijkdjk]
This is an intriguing expression. The coe¢ cient out front is the elasticity of trade cost with
respect to distance (recall, the empirical model assumes a log-linear proportional trade cost
function as is typical in the gravity literature). The variance of distance is a function of
the set of locations under examination. As bilateral distance become less symmetric (less
equal), trade cost matters more for price deviations.
The variance decomposition results are given in Table 25. For the median good,
distribution costs account for between 5 and 20 percent of overall price dispersion, depending
on the locations used. The wage component tends to account for more of this dispersion
than the rental component. An exception is the LDC group where the rental component
accounts for 12.6 percent of the dispersion, compared to only 2.5 percent for wages. Trade
costs dominate the picture throughout the table, accounting for as much as 60 percent of
the price dispersion for cross-border OECD pairs, to a lower, but still very substantial, 36.1
percent across the Canada-U.S. border. Approximately 30 percent of the variance is left
unaccounted for by the model. This variation could be due to a combination of markup
variation, o¢ cial barriers to trade or measurement error. The covariance across e¤ects is
typically less that 5 percent. The bottom line of the analysis of the median good are that
trade costs dominate independent of the location or border crossing and that distribution
margins are important enough not to ignore.
Variation across goods within the cross-section, is interesting. Figure 19 shows
the variance decomposition at the individual good level as a function of the traded input
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share, i. To make these easier to read we have smoothed the proles by taking centered
moving averages of the variance share across 10 goods. Starting with all international cross-
border pairs and the good with the lowest traded input share (roughly 0.4), wage dispersion
accounts for about 45 percent of price dispersion. As we move to goods with the highest
traded input share (roughly 0.97), wage dispersion accounts for almost none of the price
dispersion. Of course if this good had literally no non-traded inputs the contribution would
necessarily be exactly zero. The OECD group tells a similar story with about 30 percent of
price dispersion accounted for by wage dispersion at one end of the continuum of goods and
less than 10 percent contributed for goods embodying mostly traded inputs. The Canada-
U.S. pairs have a lower contribution from wage dispersion as we would expect given the
similar wage levels of the two countries, the contribution of this component also declines as
 rises, though not as smoothly as the other groups. In most cases, the falling contribution
of wage di¤erences is associated with a rising role for trade costs. The intranational pairs
show less heterogeneity in the proportion of variance explained by various components as
the trade share of nal good production varies. Partly this reects the lower variance of
wages and rent across cities within countries. Nonetheless, the contribution of distribution
costs is not negligible for the intranational pairs either.
Figure 20 displays the same variance decomposition by good plotted against the
labor share of total retail cost, i. We see the dramatic e¤ect of this parameter on the split of
distribution margin variance across labor and rent. As we move across goods based on this
parameter, the contribution of rent goes from zero to about 40 percent in the Canada-U.S.
panel and from zero to about 20 percent in the world grouping (for cross-border city pairs).
The contribution of wage dispersion tends to follow the same pattern in reverse, maintaining
the total share of price dispersion due to distribution costs. The OECD is anomalous in
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the sense that the distribution share contributes about 10 percent without much variation
across goods until we reach very high labor intensities in distribution. Turning to the
intranational pairs, the overall contribution of wage dispersion is rising in its cost share as
one would expect.
The results for the median good in the EIU cross-section seem to downplay the
role of distribution costs relative to trade costs. Given the dramatic di¤erences in how
the variance decomposition plays out across goods, the natural question that arises is how
representative the EIU sample is of the CPI basket. A second issue is the extent to which
the estimated distribution share matches up with the direct measures in the NIPA data.
Regarding the second issue, the average estimated value of the distribution share
across goods we use in the estimation is 0.2. This value is signicantly below, 0.5, the
average we get when we merge our micro-data with the U.S. NIPA and use the sectoral
values of the distribution share from that source. Moreover, the di¤erence between the
regression estimates of the distribution share and the direct NIPA measure is not due to a
few outliers: 151 out of 160 regression coe¢ cients values are below their NIPA counterparts.
This suggests that our good-level estimates of the distribution shares are downward biased.
To account for this estimation bias and make the results relevant for aggregate
consumption, we recompute our variance decomposition using goods with distribution shares
in the neighborhood of  = 0:5, the expenditure weighted average of the distribution shares
found in the U.S. NIPA data. What we do is average the decomposition results across
5 goods on either side of this value. Table 26 reports these ndings. We see that the
contribution of the distribution margin is much more signicant. Wage dispersion alone
now accounts for more than one-third of retail price dispersion when all cross-border city
pairs are pooled (WORLD). The role of wages for the OECD and LDC groupings is more
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limited suggesting the city pairs that straddle high and low income countries are the reason
for the much elevated wage component. It is interesting to note that for the Canada-U.S.
pairs, wage dispersion plays a signicant role as well. Keep in mind, however, that the
absolute dispersion of prices across North American cities is about one-fth of that existing
across cities of the world, thus the signicant role of wage dispersion in North America is
partly due to the fact that there is little in the way of price dispersion to explain in North
America relative to the broader international sample.
Conclusions
Consumers face prices that are to a varying degree, location-specic. Our model
of production and distribution across cities shows how these di¤erences are shaped by the
distances separating cities due to trade costs, the good-specic share of retail distribution
and its division between local labor and rental costs. While we found trade costs dominated
distribution costs by a factor of 5 to 1 for the median good in the sample, their relative
contribution varies greatly across goods. For nal goods that involve mostly non-traded
inputs, distribution margins dominate trade costs. Given that most of the goods in the EIU
have low distribution shares, these unweighted averages understate the role of distribution
margins in the aggregate consumption basket. Using the aggregate distribution share and
estimates of the variance decomposition for individual goods with that share, the tables are
turn: distribution costs now clearly dominate trade costs.
In future work we will undertake analysis of PPP using our model and empirical
methodology. We expect the distribution margin will dominate trade costs in this case we
well. These ndings point to the importance of incorporating a distribution sector into
existing international trade and macroeconomic models.
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Table 20. Kernel Density Summary Results
Long-run LOP deviations
Standard Interquartile First Third
Deviation Range Quartile Quartile
U.S. cities
Traded goods 0.294 0.385 -0.161 0.224
Non-traded goods 0.543 0.616 -0.250 0.366
International cities
Traded goods 0.681 0.796 -0.365 0.431
Non-traded goods 1.069 1.092 -0.497 0.595
Short-run LOP deviations
Standard Interquartile First Third
Deviation Range Quartile Quartile
U.S. cities
Traded goods 0.250 0.295 -0.151 0.144
Non-traded goods 0.258 0.295 -0.151 0.144
International cities
Traded goods 0.412 0.417 -0.209 0.209
Non-traded goods 0.488 0.430 -0.215 0.215
Note: Long-run LOP deviations are time-averaged LOP deviations, short-run LOP deviations are
the di¤erence between the raw LOP series and the long-run means.
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Table 21. Mean Sectoral Wage Di¤erentials
Wmj =W
s
j Implied 
World Manufacture to Sales (ILO) 1.07 0.52
U.S. Production to Sales (BLS) 1.34 0.57
Note: For details on the data sources, see the data appendix.
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Table 22. Variance of Wage Di¤erentials across Sectors and Locations
Industry (ILO) Occupation (ILO)
Location Sector Error Location Sector Error
World
Proportion of variance 0.85 0.04 0.10 0.65 0.01 0.34
Observations 46 19 136 113
OECD
Proportion of variance 0.84 0.06 0.10 0.64 0.03 0.33
Observations 27 12 26 113
LDC
Proportion of variance 0.72 0.08 0.20 0.38 0.04 0.58
Observations 36 19 109 113
Occupation (UBS)
World
Proportion of variance 0.66 0.19 0.15
Observations 56 14
OECD
Proportion of variance 0.51 0.31 0.18
Observations 32 14
LDC
Proportion of variance 0.48 0.29 0.23
Observations 24 14
Notes: A panel has been selected such that the total number of observations is maximized
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Table 23. Explanatory Power
First quartile Median Third quartile
Panel A: International cities, cross-border pairs
CANADA-US 0:83 0:90 0:94
OECD 0:67 0:71 0:74
LDC 0:70 0:73 0:75
WORLD 0:69 0:72 0:75
Panel B: Intranational cities, no border
CANADA-US 0:72 0:77 0:81
OECD 0:71 0:76 0:79
WORLD 0:70 0:75 0:79
LDC 0:70 0:73 0:75
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Table 24. Variance of Prices across Locations
Retail Rental
Prices Wages Prices
Panel A: International cities, cross-border pairs
CANADA-US 0.07 0.13 0.61
OECD 0.25 0.17 3.05
LDC 0.42 0.59 11.18
WORLD 0.38 1.15 9.49
Panel B: Intranational cities, no border
CANADA-US 0.06 0.04 0.33
OECD 0.06 0.03 0.27
LDC   
WORLD 0.07 0.03 0.28
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Table 25. Variance Decomposition (median across EIU goods)
Total Fraction of variance account for by:
Wages Land Prices Trade cost Error Covariance
Panel A: International cities, cross-border pairs
CANADA-US 0.07 10.1 7.8 36.1 12.8 15.5
OECD 0.25 2.3 1.7 60.0 29.4 0.8
LDC 0.42 2.5 12.6 53.9 27.2 0.4
WORLD 0.38 7.7 3.4 50.7 28.1 5.1
Panel B: Intranational cities, no border
CANADA-US 0.06 4.8 5.9 53.8 24.8 2.3
OECD 0.06 5.1 3.7 51.4 26.5 3.0
LDC      
WORLD 0.07 5.2 4.9 55.8 26.1 1.7
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Table 26. Variance Decomposition (aggregate NIPA)
Total Fraction of variance account for by:
Wages Land Prices Trade cost Error Covariance
Panel A: International cities, cross-border pairs
CANADA-US 0.10 31.8 16.6 38.5 13.1 
OECD 0.36 10.7 6.2 54.6 28.5 
LDC 0.75 15.2 16.7 45.7 22.4 
WORLD 0.66 36.4 6.8 36.0 20.9 
Panel B: Intranational cities, no border
CANADA-US 0.12 10.0 8.5 57.2 24.3 
OECD 0.13 6.6 11.0 56.0 26.3 
LDC      
WORLD 0.10 8.6 6.3 59.7 25.4 
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Figure 18. Kernel Density Estimates of Price Distributions
Notes: The solid lines are kernel density estimates of the distribution of qijk, time averaged LOP
deviations over the period 1990-2005. The dashed lines are kernel density estimates of the distri-
bution of (qijk;t   qijk), time series deviations from these long-run values. Each chart contains a
di¤erent location and commodity grouping as indicated by the headers.
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Figure 19. Variance Decomposition as a Function of Traded Input Share
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Figure 20. Variance Decomposition as a Function of Non-traded Labor Input Share
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Model Appendix
This appendix presents the function forms of the model, the rst-order conditions
and details for the model solution.
Function forms
U(Cj ; Nj)  (1  ) log (Cj) +  logLj (IV.37)
Cj =
 
MX
i
(i)
1
" (Cij)
" 1
"
! "
" 1
(IV.38)
Pj 
 X
i
i (Pij)
1 "
! 1
1 "
(IV.39)
Yj = AjN
m
j (IV.40)
Rij = (Gij)
i
 
BjN
s
ij
i (Kij)1 i1 i (IV.41)
Constraints
Lj +Nj = 1X
i
PijCij = PjCjX
i
PijC
m
ij  Wmj Nmj + 'HjKjX
i
PijC
s
ij  W sjN sj + (1  ')HjKj
162
where ' 2 (0; 1) is the capital income share received by the manufacturer, (1  ') is the
capital income share received by the retailer, Hj is the price of capital, andKj is the amount
of capital.
Consumer and producer problems
max
Cj
f(1  ) log (Cj) +  logLj + j [Wmj (1  Lj) + 'HjKj   PjCj ]g (IV.42)
max
Cj
f(1  ) log (Cj) +  logLj + j [W sj (1  Lj) + (1  ')HjKj   PjCj ]g(IV.43)
max
Nmj
fQjjAjNmj  Wmj Nmj g (IV.44)
max
Gi;Nsj
fPij (Gij)i
 
BjN
s
ij
i (Kij)1 i1 i  QijGij  W sjN sij  HjKijg(IV.45)
E¢ ciency conditions
CAij = i

Pij
Pj
 "
CAj (IV.46)
CAj =
WAj
Pj
(1  )

 
1 NAj

(IV.47)
Nmj = 1    
'HjKj
Wmj
(IV.48)
N sj = 1    
(1  ') HjKj
W sj
(IV.49)
Lmj =  +
'HjKj
Wmj
(IV.50)
Lsj =  +
(1  ') HjKj
W sj
(IV.51)
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N sij =
(1  i) 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W sj
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(IV.52)
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(IV.53)
Gij = Rij
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Qij
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(IV.54)
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i) (1  i)
i
Qij
Hj
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BjQij
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i
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(IV.55)


Qij
Hj
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i) (1  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(i 1)(1 i)
(IV.56)
Qjj = MCj =
Wmj
Aj
(IV.57)
Pij = MC
s
ij =
(Qij)
i

W sj
Bj
i
(Hj)
(1 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ii

(1  i) (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i)(1 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(1 i) (IV.58)
Price relationships
Qji = (1 +  ji)Qjj (IV.59)
The retail rm
N sj = 1  
(1  ') HjKj
W sj
=
X
i
N sij =
X
i
8>><>>:
(1 i)i
i
Qij
W sj
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General equilibrium
Manufacturing Labor Market
The labor supply of the manufacturer is used in the manufacturing process, which
implies:
Yj
Aj
= 1     'HjKj
Wmj
(IV.60)
Goods Market
In the global general equilibrium all the conditions of partial equilibrium must
hold. However we also require that the supply of each good equals the demand for each
good. This is where the treatment of trade costs becomes crucial. We will assume that
trade costs are of the iceberg variety, so the physical resource constraint for good j must
satisfy:
Yj =
X
i
Gji (1 +  ij) (IV.61)
In words: the units produced equal the demand of traded inputs of retailers at the desti-
nations plus a fraction lost to iceberg costs. The aggregate fraction lost will depend on the
equilibrium allocations since the loss along any bilateral trade route is proportional to the
volume of trade along that branch:
Tj
Yj
=
P
iGji ijP
iGji (1 +  ij)
(IV.62)
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Returning to our global equilibrium, we substitute the optimal traded input choices of the
retailers into the resource constraint to arrive at:
Yj =
X
i
Rji

BiQji
W si
(1  j) j
j
(j 1)j  Qji
Hi
(1  j)
 
1  j

j
!(j 1)(1 j)
(1 +  ji)
Recall IV.60:
Yj
Aj
= 1     'HjKj
Wmj
Combining these last two we get:
X
i
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The equilibrium of the retailer implies:
Rij = C
m
ij + C
s
ij = i

Pij
Pj
 "  
Cmj + C
s
j

Assuming that " = 1 (for the rest of the text), we have:
Rij = C
m
ij + C
s
ij =
i
Pij
 
PjC
m
j + PjC
s
j

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i
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 
Nmj W
m
j +N
s
jW
s
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
Rji =
j
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m
i +N
s
iW
s
i +HiKi)
which says that the total income (sales) of the retailer from good i is equal to the share of
that good in the budget of the region. Thus, we have
X
i
Rji

BiQji
W si
(1  j) j
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!
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Recall the price set by the retailer:
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By using Qjj =
Wmj
Aj
and Qji = (1 +  ji)Qjj , we can write
X
i
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This is the rst equation for the relation between NmWm, N sW s, and HK.
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Retailing Labor Market
We have the following condition for the retailing labor market equilibrium:
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This is the second equation for the relation between NmWm, N sW s, and HK.
Capital Market
We have the following condition for the capital market equilibrium:
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This is the third equation for the relation between NmWm, N sW s, and HK.
Implications for Wages, Rents, Wage Income, and Capital Income
Recall IV.64, IV.65, IV.66, which are:
Nmj W
m
j = jj
X
i
(Nmi W
m
i +N
s
iW
s
i +HiKi)
N sjW
s
j =
 
Nmj W
m
j +N
s
jW
s
j +HjKj
X
i
(1  i) ii
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Combine IV.65 and IV.66 to get:
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which show that the sectoral wage incomes and capital incomes are all proportional to each
other within each city.
Recall the individual optimality condition for the retailer:
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Combine this with IV.67 to get:
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(IV.70)
which shows that N sj is constant across regions. In a special case in which the share of
capital is equal to zero in the retail production function (i.e., i = 0), or in which the share
of capital income received by the retailer is equal to zero (i.e., ' = 1), we have N sj = (1  ).
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Combine IV.69 with IV.64 to get:
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which show that the manufacturing wage income and the retailing wage income are propor-
tional across cities. It is implied that:
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since N sj is constant across regions. If we also use IV.67, we obtain:
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where KA is the capital stock in city A = j; k.
Recall the individual optimality conditions for both the retailer and the manufac-
turer:
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These conditions can be combined to obtain:
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Combine the last two expressions to get:
Nmj W
m
j
N sjW
s
j
=
Nmj
N sj
' (1  )  'N sj
(1  ') (1  )  (1  ')Nmj
=
(1 Pi (1  i)i)P
i (1  i) ii
Nmj
 
' (1  )
N sj
  '
!X
i
(1  i) ii
= (1  ') (1  )
 
1 
X
i
(1  i)i
!
  (1  ')Nmj
 
1 
X
i
(1  i)i
!
which can be combined with IV.70 (i.e., N sj ) to obtain:
Nmj = (1  ) 
' (0   1) (1  )
' (0   1) + (1  0)
= (1  ) when ' = 0 or i = 1
where 0 
P
i (1  i)i, 1 
P
i (1  i) ii, 0   1 =
P
i (1  i) (1  i)i.2 P
i ii = 1 0. This shows that Nmj is constant and equal across cities. The level of e¤ort
is equal to the leisure share of expenditure, (1  ) when either rental income is zero for the
manufacturer (' = 0) or when retail production is labor-only i = 1. E¤ort is declining in
asset income.
Nmj
(1  ) = 1 
' (0   1)
' (0   1) + (1  0)
@
Nmj
(1 )
@'
=   (0   1) d 1 + ' (0   1) d 2
=  (0   1) d 1[ 1 + 'd 1]
sign
@
Nmj
(1 )
@'
= sign [ 1 + 'd 1] since  (0   1) d 1 > 0
' < d
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Nmj =
(1  0) (1  )
(1  0) + ' (0   1)
N sj =
1 (1  )
1 + (1  ')  (0   1)
Wmj
W sj
=
(1  0) + ' (0   1)
(1  ') (1  ) (1  0) + ' (0   1)  (1  ')
(1  ')  (0   1)
1 + (1  ')  (0   1)
Implications for Price Ratios across Cities
Recall the retail price of good i in city j and city k:
Pij =
(Qij)
i

W sj
Bj
(1 i)i
(Hj)
(1 i)(1 i)
ii ((1  i) i)(1 i)i ((1  i) (1  i))(1 i)(1 i)
Pik =
(Qik)
i

W sk
Bk
(1 i)i
(Hk)
(1 i)(1 i)
ii ((1  i) i)(1 i)i ((1  i) (1  i))(1 i)(1 i)
Take their ratio to get:
Pij
Pik
=
(Qij)
i

W sj
Bj
(1 i)i
(Hj)
(1 i)(1 i)
(Qik)
i

W sk
Bk
(1 i)i
(Hk)
(1 i)(1 i)
By using Qij = (1 +  ij)Qii, we can write the ratio of the price of good i across regions j
and k as follows:
Pij
Pik
=
((1 +  ij))
i
((1 +  ik))
i

W sj
Bj
(1 i)i
(Hj)
(1 i)(1 i)
W sk
Bk
(1 i)i
(Hk)
(1 i)(1 i)
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By using IV.71 and IV.72, the analytical solution for the price ratios can be written as:
Pij
Pik
=

Bk
Bj
i jj
kk
(1 i)1 +  ij
1 +  ik
i Kk
Kj
(1 i)(1 i)
where Kj is the total amount of capital in city j.
Estimation Appendix
The derivation of the variance decomposition of equation IV.33 can be written as
follows:
varjk [Et (qijk;t)] = varjk [(1  bi) biEt (!jk;t)] + varjk [(1  bi) (1  bi)Et (hjk;t)]
+varjk
hbiEt bIijk;tbidjki+ varjk [Et (b"ijk;t)]
+2cov ((1  bi) biEt (!jk;t) ; (1  bi) (1  bi)Et (hjk;t))
+2cov

(1  bi) biEt (!jk;t) ; biEt bIijk;tbidjk
+2cov

(1  bi) (1  bi)Et (hjk;t) ; biEt bIijk;tbidjk
where bis, bis, bIijks, bis and b"ijks are all estimated values for the relevant variables.
Note that the covariance terms including Et (b"ijk;t) are equal to zero by OLS regression.
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